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This thesis examines the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions, with 
a particular focus on the case of South Sudan between 2005 and 2013. Drawing on the 
nascent literature on military integration, this thesis makes five contributions that help 
understand the role this process can play in such environments. First, this thesis argues 
that governments undergoing war-to-peace transitions can either fight armed groups, 
ignore them and accept that they lack the monopoly on the use of force within the 
country, or seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. 
When presented with these options, integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice in some 
cases. Second, this thesis demonstrates that military integration can help temporarily 
overcome wartime factionalism, thereby benefitting short-term peace consolidation, but 
can eventually lead to instability if the process is not approached as a transitional security 
mechanism. Third, the case of South Sudan examined in this thesis shows how the 
combination of an open-ended integration process and failed demobilization initiatives 
can increase pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of 
mitigating the threat these groups pose to stability. Fourth, this thesis argues that a 
disconnect between the integration process and broader defence sector reform efforts can 
result in the security sector being rebuilt on an unstable foundation, as was the case in 
South Sudan. Finally, this thesis uses South Sudan’s experience with military integration 
to demonstrate how a military’s failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process risks 
leaving the security sector in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to 
transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force prone to fracturing 
during periods of heightened political competition.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
 
In December 2013, South Sudan’s military integration process faced its most serious 
challenge, as a political crisis that had been developing throughout the year within the 
ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) suddenly escalated, dragging the 
country into civil war. In July of that year, President Salva Kiir issued Republican 
Decrees 50/2013 and 51/2013, dismissing all ministers and deputy ministers, 
respectively, in effect sacking his entire cabinet.1 Included in this effort to marginalize 
potential challengers within the SPLM was Kiir’s Vice President, Riek Machar.2 With 
Machar having attempted to wrest control of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) by force during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-
2005), many feared that his dismissal might catalyse a new rebellion — this time against 
the government of a newly-independent South Sudan. However, Machar, who had spent 
the past decade since returning to the SPLM/A attempting to repair his tarnished image 
and promote himself as a potential successor to Kiir, initially chose to try and gain power 
through legitimate means. A few months prior to his sacking, Machar had articulated the 
president’s failures as rationales for his own pursuit of SPLM leadership, including 
dysfunction within the ruling party, the government’s inability to deliver services, public 
sector corruption, tribalism within the civil service and security forces, widespread 
insecurity, and the country’s regional and international isolation.3 
 
                                                
1 “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict,” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms 
Survey, June 27, 2014), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/documents/HSBA-South-
Sudan-Crisis-Timeline.pdf. 
2 Aside from the Vice President, other members of the political elite affected by Kiir’s shakeup included 
Pagan Amum (Secretary General of the SPLM), Deng Alor Kuol (Minister of Cabinet Affairs), John Luk 
Jok (Minister of Justice), Gier Chuang Along (Minister of Internal Affairs), Oyay Deng Ajak (Minister for 
National Security in the Office of the President), Madut Biar (Minister of Telecommunications), Majak 
D’Agoot (Deputy Minister of Defence), Cirino Hiteng (Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports), Kosti 
Manibe (Minister of Finance), Ezekel Lol Gatkuoth (former head of mission for the Government of 
Southern Sudan Mission to the United States), and Chol Tong Mayay (former governor of Lakes state). 
John Young, “A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for 
Sudan and South Sudan (Small Arms Survey, September 2015), 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-IO.pdf. 
3 Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy (South Africa: Centre for Advanced Studies of 
African Society, 2014). 
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With the SPLM’s powerful brand as liberation-movement-turned-political party, political 
competition occurred within a de facto one-party state, thereby making a fight within the 
ruling party a fight for national power.4 Therefore, throughout the remainder of the year, 
Machar and other prominent members of the SPLM whom the President had 
marginalized continued their attempts to unseat him as party Chairman. Their calculus 
was that by replacing Kiir as Chairman of the SPLM through internal party mechanisms, 
the new party leader would, according to the SPLM constitution, become the party’s 
presidential candidate in the 2015 elections, and would then become the next president of 
South Sudan by default. 
 
In November, Kiir announced, and later retracted, his intention to dissolve all political 
structures of the SPLM other than the Chairman’s office, thus threatening the political 
futures of former party insiders.5 On December 6, senior SPLM leaders who had been 
sacked by the president held a press conference calling for the long-delayed meeting of 
the SPLM Political Bureau to be held to discuss differences over the management of the 
party.6 Some of these individuals subsequently boycotted the meeting of the SPLM’s 
National Liberation Council (NLC) on December 14 and 15, protesting that the meeting 
had not been delayed to allow additional time for dialogue. Suspicious that a Machar-led, 
SPLA-supported coup was imminent, Kiir reportedly ordered the Presidential Guards, 
some of which included the personal forces of his former Vice President, disarmed. 
 
During disarmament the evening of the 15th, fighting erupted between Dinka and Nuer 
members of the presidential guard, allegedly over selective disarmament, and quickly 
spread to SPLA Headquarters at Bilpam. By the following day, Kiir had ditched his 
civilian attire and his trademark black 10-gallon Stetson for army fatigues, accusing 
Machar, via nationally televised press conference, of plotting a coup. Denouncing his 
former vice president as a ‘Prophet of Doom,’ Kiir alluded to the events of 1991 in which 
Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong defected from the SPLA, thereby unleashing an 
                                                
4 “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects,” The Sudd Institute, August 
3, 2014, http://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/South-Sudan-Crisisfinal.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict.”  
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ethnic conflict within southern Sudan that occurred as a subset to the broader southern 
resistance to the government in Khartoum. While Machar escaped Juba and made his way 
into the bush, eleven senior political leaders were detained and accused of complicity in 
the alleged coup attempt. 
 
Within days of the initial conflagration, Nuer elements of SPLA Division 8 in Jonglei 
state, Division 4 in Unity state, and Division 7 in southern Upper Nile state had defected 
and formed an armed opposition – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-
Opposition (SPLM-IO).7 These units had been comprised of armed groups, such as the 
South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) that had been integrated into the SPLA following the 
Juba Declaration (See Appendix  B) nearly eight years prior.8 Many of the original 
SPLM-IO commanders and the men they led could also trace their lineage to the Sudan 
Armed Forces or to Anyanya II; the latter had fought the SPLA in the 1980s for control 
of the southern rebellion.9 By February 2014, South Sudan’s parliament estimated that up 
to 70 per cent of the SPLA had defected to the opposition.10 Machar denied that he had 
attempted to oust Kiir by coup, yet by the end of the first week of the conflict, he was 
claiming that SPLA commanders who had defected in parts of the Greater Upper Nile 
and had pledged their support for him in the initial days of the crisis were, indeed, under 
his command. 
 
Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army had been integrating 
other rebel groups operating in what was then southern Sudan during the Second 
Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). Even so, by the time the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed ending the war with the Government of Sudan, over 
50,000 men were members of up to 50 armed groups that included rivals to the SPLA, 
                                                
7 “The SPLM-in-Opposition,” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey, May 2, 
2014), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/HSBA-SPLM-IO-
May-2014.pdf. 
8 Douglas H. Johnson, “Briefing: The Crisis in South Sudan,” African Affairs 113, no. 451 (April 1, 2014): 
300–309, doi:10.1093/afraf/adu020; “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict 
Prospects.” 
9 Young, “A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO.” 
10 “S. Sudan Admits Mass Defection of Army Troops to Machar Rebels,” Sudan Tribune, February 17, 
2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50004. 
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which came to comprise the military of South Sudan.11 Faced with both legal and 
practical imperatives to address non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of South 
Sudan could either attempt to fight them, accept that it did not possess a monopoly on the 
use of force in the South, or attempt to reach a political-military accommodation with 
them. For the most part, the government chose to accommodate armed groups, 
formalized through the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006, which 
granted these groups amnesty for all war-related activities in exchange for their loyalty to 
the government and integration into the SPLA.12 Through military integration, the SPLA 
thus became the primary vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan 
between the Juba Declaration and the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.13 
 
Beyond simple correlation, there is no evidence of a causal relationship between the 
government’s decision to integrate armed groups into the SPLA and the political crisis 
that precipitated South Sudan’s descent into civil war in December 2013. However, 
considering the role that the fragmentation of the SPLA played in transforming the 
political crisis into armed conflict, it is important to understand the military integration 
process that the country had undertaken in the years preceding the conflict.  
 
This thesis is a detailed study of South Sudan’s effort to integrate armed groups into a 
statutory security framework during its attempt to transition from war to peace. Within 
this study, I will answer the following questions: 
                                                
11 John Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration,” Sudan Human 
Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey, November 2006), 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-01-SSDF.pdf; “Sudan’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead,” Africa Report No 106 (International Crisis 
Group, March 31, 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/sudan/Sudans%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement%20The%20Long%20Road%20Ahead.p
df. 
12 “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And 
the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF),” January 8, 2006, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060108_JubaDeclarationOnUnityAndIntegratio
n.pdf. 
13 Lauren Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate 
during a Civil War,” Conflict Research Unit Report (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International 




• Why did the Government of South Sudan choose to accommodate armed groups 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed? 
• Why did this attempt to accommodate armed groups ultimately fail? 
• What are the wider lessons that can be drawn from South Sudan’s attempt at 
accommodating armed groups during its aborted transition from war to peace? 
 
Having answered these questions, I will reflect more broadly on what this case could tell 
us about the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions. 
Background on South Sudan 
 
Affectionately known as ‘the world’s newest country,’ South Sudan gained independence 
from the Republic of the Sudan in July 2011. South Sudan’s independence was the result 
of an internationally-recognized referendum on self-determination, in which the 
population of the then-autonomous region of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of separation from Sudan, per the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. By 2005, South Sudan had been at war for 40 of the years since Sudan’s 
independence in 1956 – during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and the Second 
Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). As a result, South Sudan had some of the worst 
development indicators in the world and lacked basic services such as water, sanitation, 
and health facilities. In addition, 51 per cent of the population lived below the poverty 












                                                






With a capital in Juba, South Sudan had ten states that generally fell into three regions: 
Greater Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria.15 The Greater Upper Nile region, 
comprising the former Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states, has historically been 
afflicted by insurgencies and inter-communal violence. Located in the northeastern part 
of the country, this region is strategic not only because it produces the entirety of South 
Sudan’s oil, but also due to its shared borders with Sudan and Ethiopia, which had 
previously supported armed rebellions operating there. This region bore the brunt of 
infighting within the southern liberation movement from the outset of the Second 
Sudanese Civil War, which grew in intensity after the 1991 split within the SPLA. Much 
of the history of factionalism within the SPLA is tied to this region, as are the former 




Ethnicity and regional identities have played salient roles in South Sudan’s conflicts, as 
well as in the political sphere. In fact, the strength of such identities is such that South 
                                                
15 In October 2015, President Kiir issued a decree (36/2015) expanding South Sudan’s states from 10 to 28. 
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Sudanese have a stronger sense of citizenship in their ethnic groups than in the 
geographic expression that is South Sudan.16 The country has over 60 major ethnic 
groups, of which, the Dinka are the majority (35.8 per cent), followed by the Nuer (15.6 
per cent), Azande, Toposa, Shilluk, Murle, and other ethnic groups.17 Some of these 
ethnic groups are subdivided into sub-ethnic groups; for example, the Dinka are 
subdivided into more than twenty major, named, sub-ethnic groups while the Nuer are 
subdivided into between eleven and thirteen such groups.18 Smaller ethnic groups, such 
as the Acholi, Azande, Bari, Mundari, and Toposa, which reside in Equatoria are 
collectively referred to as Equatorians. Inter-ethnic conflicts have occurred between the 
Dinka, Murle and Lou Nuer in Jonglei state, between the Lou Nuer of Jonglei and the 
Jikany Nuer of Upper Nile state, between the Bor Dinka and Mundari of Central 




To say that South Sudan faced a challenging political, social, and economic context after 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is an understatement. Between the 
CPA and South Sudan’s eventual independence in July 2011, the region embarked on a 
massive state-building enterprise unparalleled in its history. In addition to working to 
implement various protocols of the CPA in partnership with the government in 
Khartoum, South Sudan also faced the daunting task of building a government quite 
literally from scratch. After decades of marginalization, South Sudan had to create 
structures and procedures to govern the autonomous region that it had been granted in the 
CPA, and prepare governing institutions in case the region’s citizens voted for 
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(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, October 2011), 
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17  “CIA World Factbook - South Sudan,” accessed June 26, 2015, 
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independence in the 2011 referendum. This included establishing, furnishing, and staffing 
ministries at multiple levels of government from the federal government to the ten states, 
86 counties, and several payams and bomas. In addition, South Sudan had to establish the 
South Sudan Legislative Assembly, as well as state assemblies and local councils, and 
agree upon a Transitional Constitution for Southern Sudan.  
 
At the same time, the former guerrilla movement that was in the process of transforming 
into a political party at the helm of a civilian government faced immense pressure to 
deliver services to the population, which was expecting a peace dividend after decades of 
war. In addition to having a shortage of experienced public administrators, South Sudan 
had limited civil service delivery mechanisms to build off of despite the existence of 
wartime constructs such as the SPLM/A’s Civil-Military Administrators, the Sudan 
Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SSRA), and the Civil Authority for the New 
Sudan (CANS).20  
 
During the Interim Period of the CPA, there were three militaries in Sudan/South Sudan – 
the SAF, the SPLA, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).21 Per the CPA, there was to be 
a formal process of military integration between the SAF and the SPLA, and the JIUs 
were established with the intent of demonstrating national unity and serving as a nucleus 
of a future national army should South Sudan vote for unity over independence in 2011.22 
Chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, a JIU support group was established in 
November 2007 to coordinate international support, and included the JIU Commander 
and representatives from UNMIS and donor countries including the United States, United 
                                                
20 Øystein Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s 
(Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2005). 
21 Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan, August 15, 2014. 
22 Per the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements, equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and 
SPLA would comprise Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) with a total force strength of 39,000 soldiers during the 
interim period of the peace agreement. In addition, parties to the peace agreement were to establish a Joint 
Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency of Sudan, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and the 
SPLA, their deputies, and senior officers from both forces. The JDB was responsible for coordination 
between the SAF and the SPLA and for command of the JIUs. The subsequent Permanent Ceasefire and 
Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices spelled out the command and control, 
composition and organization, training, and detailed deployment for the JIUs.  
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Kingdom, Egypt, Norway, and the Netherlands.23 Furthermore, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1784 (2007) requested that UNMIS develop a plan to support the Joint 
Defence Board and enable the full establishment of JIUs.24 
Economy 
 
South Sudan occupied an area almost the size of France, but had extremely limited 
infrastructure, making connectivity between rural areas and urban centres, or between 
urban centres themselves extremely difficult. A majority of the roads were unpaved, and 
many were impassable during the May–October rainy season.25 This raised transportation 
costs and hindered the movement of goods to market, which in turn made the country 
highly reliant on imports.26 In addition, due to the toll the wars had taken on South 
Sudan, the region had limited economic activity outside of subsistence agriculture and 
pastoralism. Although approximately 90 per cent of South Sudan’s land was arable, only 
10 per cent was under cultivation by the time the country became independent.27 
According to some assessments, South Sudan’s large and fertile tracts of land had the 
potential to produce hardwood timber, gum arabic, and honey.28 
 
Depending on where the border between Sudan and South Sudan was drawn, 
approximately three-fourths of Sudan’s oil ended up in South Sudan after 
independence.29 However, as South Sudan was landlocked, it was at the mercy of an oil 
                                                
23 J. Bennett et al., “Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010” (United Kingdom: ITAD Ltd., December 2010), 
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25 African Development Bank Group, “South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan - A Program for 






27 U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Transition Strategy for South Sudan, 2011–13,” 
June 2011, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/south_sudan_transition_strategy_full.pdf. 
28 Government of the Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013.” 
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pipeline that ran through Sudan towards Port Sudan on the Red Sea to get its oil to the 
global market. With oil accounting for 98 per cent of public sector revenue and almost all 
foreign exchange earnings, South Sudan was the most oil-dependent government in the 
world, which left it vulnerable to the volatility of global oil prices.30 
 
In January 2012, the Government of South Sudan decided to cease oil production due to 
an inability to reach an agreement with the Government of Sudan with regards to oil 
pipeline transit fees. A leaked March 2012 World Bank memo predicted the fallout of 
South Sudan’s decision: a dramatic contraction of the economy, massive depreciation of 
the South Sudanese Pound, and a depletion of fiscal reserves.31 In addition, the World 
Bank predicted a rapid reversal in some of the key development gains achieved since the 
CPA, such as increased poverty, higher child mortality, lower school attendance, and 
deepening food insecurity.32 In September 2012, Sudan and South Sudan reached an 
agreement on the pipeline fee, and production resumed in April 2013.  
 
A few months after the World Bank memo was leaked, President Kiir wrote an open 
letter to 75 former and current senior government officials in an effort to recover stolen 
government funds. In this letter, the president estimated that an amount of $4 billion had 
been unaccounted for in the country’s coffers. 33 As an indication of the level of 
corruption that afflicted the new post-conflict government, this amount was estimated to 
comprise about a third of South Sudan’s oil revenue between the signing of the CPA in 
January 2005 and the country’s independence in July 2011.34 
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As this and other cases of gross corruption have demonstrated since the Interim Period, 
Kiir’s unwillingness to take a harder line against massive corruption has been one of his 
methods of maintaining political stability and avoiding exacerbating the fragile security 
situation in South Sudan.35 Accordingly, the South Sudanese state became above all, an 
instrument of patronage, with senior and/or symbolic posts consuming a large portion of 
the state’s budget following the signing of the CPA, as salaries alone accounted for 40 
per cent of the government’s budget between 2006 and 2011.36 Yet while this approach 
facilitated short-term stability, it precluded the long-term development of a functioning 
government that administered and provided public services through effective 
institutions.37 
‘Enemies of the Peace’ 
 
South Sudan’s potentially volatile post-conflict environment contributed to the perpetual 
fear that the CPA would not hold, prompting the SPLA to maintain a wartime posture. 
Indeed, skirmishes along the common border between Sudan and South Sudan in the 
spring of 2012 raised concerns that a new conflict would erupt. Meanwhile, the security 
environment was continually non-permissive in the Greater Upper Nile region, which 
witnessed multiple instances of ethnic conflict and cattle-raiding, including the SPLA’s 
fight to disarm the White Army militia in 2006, and a succession of Khartoum-supported 
armed groups in 2010 and 2011. 
 
Given the southern liberation movement’s history of fragmentation and the Government 
of Sudan’s record of support to non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of Southern 
Sudan faced an immediate imperative to mitigate the threat potential of tens of thousands 
of spoilers to the peace agreement during the Interim Period (2005-2011) of the CPA, 
which preceded the referendum on self-determination. As the focus of the CPA had 
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primarily been on North-South peace, there was insufficient focus on forging South-
South unity and reconciliation to overcome the ethnic factionalism that had afflicted the 
southern liberation movement in the past. The CPA left many issues of contention in the 
South unresolved, such as divisions within the South that were tied to competitions over 
leadership of the southern rebellion; perceptions of ethnic marginalization between the 
Dinka and the Nuer; or personal animosities towards SPLM/A leader John Garang’s style 
of leadership and his conceptualization of the SPLM/A as a revolution aimed at 
transforming a united ‘New Sudan’ through the replacement of the ruling NCP (formerly 
the National Islamic Front) regime in Khartoum with a secular, democratically elected 
government.38 
 
In an effort to streamline the peace process, all non-SPLA armed groups – such as the 
South Sudan Defence Force and local self-defence militias, referred to in the CPA as 
Other Armed Groups (OAGs), had been excluded from participating in the negotiations. 
Yet some of these groups collectively possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities, 
and strategic locations to become spoilers and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of 
the territory of South Sudan – including some of the areas vital to oil production.39  
Why Military Integration? 
 
The CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Permanent Ceasefire and Security 
Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices stipulated that OAGs were 
required to either be incorporated into the security forces of Sudan or South Sudan (i.e. 
Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife) or be reintegrated into the civil service and civil 
society institutions.40 Moreover, recognizing the threat that these armed groups posed to 
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the stability of southern Sudan, President Salva Kiir negotiated a settlement with the 
SSDF, resulting in the issuance of the Juba Declaration in January 2006. The Juba 
Declaration offered members of various southern rebel groups amnesty for all war-related 
activities in exchange for their loyalty to the Government of Southern Sudan and 
integration into the SPLA.41 Many members of OAGs chose to integrate into the SPLA, 
swelling its ranks to between 140,000 and 200,000 soldiers – more than twice the size of 
a military that a future potentially independent South Sudan would need and could afford. 
During the Interim Period, the SPLA was also trying to reduce its parade to 120,000 
soldiers while conceptualizing several demobilization initiatives that could attempt to 
provide alternative livelihoods for former combatants.  
 
Further complicating matters, South Sudan chose to integrate armed groups into the 
SPLA because this process allowed South Sudan to temporarily overcome its history of 
factionalism and ethnic conflict in order to consolidate political-military power. By 
reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of South Sudan 
limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA 
armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail the referendum 
on self-determination.42 Military power-sharing through integration was also a means by 
which to signal a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, 
allowing armed groups an insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the 
post-CPA South. 
The Civil War-Era SPLA 
 
At the outset of the process of integrating OAGs into the SPLA, there were questions 
regarding what kind of force armed groups were actually integrating into. Although some 
of its forces were conscripted, the SPLA was largely a non-salaried volunteer army of 
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between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers spurred into action by combatants’ frustration with 
the government in Khartoum and their desire to protect their communities. In the months 
leading up to John Garang’s death in July 2005, some elements of the SPLA had started 
adopting conventional military formations, at least on paper, and were starting to possess 
the attributes of a national army.43 This was a transition from the SPLA’s modus operandi 
during the civil war.  
 
Because its rank-and-file was largely rural and socio-economically marginalized, 
combatants had limited social awareness or political consciousness. 44  One of the 
drawbacks of the composition of the SPLA was that it assumed the attributes of an 
occupying force within the areas it controlled due to a lack of political education as to the 
purpose of the movement, as well as its inability to develop solidarity with the population 
on whose behalf they were fighting.45 In other words, contrary to the Socialist rhetoric of 
the movement’s leadership, the rank-and-file were not spurred into action by 
‘revolutionary zeal.’46 In the early days of the movement, recruits were trained in 
Ethiopia on tactical combat skills as well as in political and moral orientation, and 
eventually this training was able to take place within the liberated parts of the South as 
they gained ground against the Sudan Armed Forces. 47 
 
Within the literature on South Sudan, there are some disparities when it comes to the 
structure of the SPLA during the war. Although South Sudan’s terrain made centralized 
administration of the SPLA rather challenging, the Political-Military High Command was 
still able to maintain a level of control over the formation of strategy and policy.48 
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Contrary to the structure of Anyanya, the southern liberation movement during the First 
Sudanese Civil War, the SPLA was highly centralized.49 By some accounts, the SPLM/A 
blended autocratic control at the strategic level with the delegation of a degree of 
autonomy to local leaders and military commanders at the tactical level.50 By other 
accounts, power within the SPLA was personified in its leader John Garang, who 
contradicted his rhetoric on democracy and pluralism with his proclivity for maintaining 
autocratic control of the movement.51 By Garang’s design, the SPLA depended on his 
personal control from top to bottom. 52  Opposed to the institutionalization of the 
movement, he neutralized his military high command by maintaining complete control 
over weapons and supplies, putting his supporters in key positions, and dealing directly 
with select commanders.53 This resistance to institutionalizing the SPLM/A made the 
movement dependent on his personal control, and prevented the emergence of cohesive, 
professional units that could potentially provide a base from which internal rivals could 
mobilize.54 Consequently, Garang retarded the development of military capacity and 
cohesion within the SPLA, while simultaneously stunting the movement’s political 
culture.55 
 
The experience of the SPLM/A’s struggle for self-determination emphasized unity of 
purpose, thereby attempting to transcend the ethnic boundaries in the South.56 In fact, the 
SPLM/A was the first institution in the South that attempted to create a national identity 
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that had the potential to transcend these ethnic or regional identities.57 During the 
liberation struggle, the SPLM/A became a melting pot for the South’s ethnic differences 
and contradictions, allowing the contradictions between North and South58 to remain 
stronger than the internal contradictions within the South.59 Included in the movement at 
various times were divergent actors such as Garang’s loyalists including Dinka from his 
home area of Bor in Jonglei state, Nuer members of Anyanya II who resented Garang’s 
leadership of the southern resistance at the outset of the civil war, Equatorians who were 
at times threatened by the expansion and predation of SPLM/A in their home areas, 
Socialists who believed that Sudan’s struggle was between its core and its periphery, 
those opposed to the imposition of Arab-Islamic culture by the government in Khartoum, 
and former SPLA officers who had defected and returned to the fold. 60 Across this 
panoply of diverse interests, the movement’s focus on a revolution aimed at transforming 
a united Sudan through a secular, democratically elected government allowed it to have 
the flexibility to advocate for a broad vision across the South rather than defending the 
parochial interests of its members.61 As a result of the SPLA’s habitual absorption of 
armed groups during the civil war, the post-CPA military eventually came to consist of 
old guard SPLA, southerners who had previously belonged to the Sudan Armed Forces, 
and former members of the SSDF and other armed groups that had been affiliated with 
the Government of Sudan during the Second Sudanese civil war.62 Because the SPLA 
never succeeded in developing the ethos of a national military, the outcome was 
described as a confederation of ethnic militia in which parochial interests superseded 
national ones.63 Former armed group commanders, many of whom had been granted 
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senior ranks upon integration into the SPLA, allegedly composed ethnically-defined units 
of rank-and-file soldiers that had previously fought under their command.64 There were 
also allegations that prominent South Sudanese ministers and other politicians maintained 
their own personal security forces.65 Consequently, many of the integrated forces were 
believed to maintain loyalties to their particular ethnic groups or to their former leaders 
rather than to the Republic, the President, or even the formal SPLA chain of command.66 
This meant that every military operation risked ethnic conflict. 
 
One of the reasons the SPLM/A failed to foster a cohesive identity may have been a 
diminishing focus on political and moral orientation over time. In particular, a lack of 
commitment to a common national political agenda could be attributed to the eventual 
neglect of political education and ideological training.67 In fact, some argue that the 
SPLM/A’s failure to forge cohesion within an ethnically-diverse movement gave the 
government in Khartoum ample opportunities to exploit divisions in the South.68 
 
As the wartime dream of self-determination turned into reality in the post-CPA era, there 
was concern that the limited cohesion forged through collective opposition to the North 
could threaten the viability of the new nation.69 Southern solidarity during the Interim 
Period, by one assessment, was opportunistic and superficial, rooted in the collective 
opposition to the North.70 By several assessments, the SPLA by 2006 was a diverse 
collection of armed groups whose loyalties belonged to their ethnic groups or individual 
leaders rather than to the SPLA or the nascent South Sudanese state.71 Due to its inability 
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to forge a national identity within the southern liberation movement, factionalism had 
been a major characteristic of the SPLM/A, and consequently, the SPLA had been and 
continued to be quite factionalized at the outset of the integration process.72 Once 
independence was secured in 2011, there was little to deter the emergence of divisions 
within the SPLM/A.73 
Civil-Military Relations 
 
Despite the fact that it has multiple political parties, South Sudan is a de facto one-party 
state. Both of the monikers ‘SPLM’ and ‘SPLA’ are highly coveted and have sentimental 
value in South Sudan. This is a function of the status that the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army attained as the strongest armed group in the South during the Second 
Civil War, the role that its founder, the late Dr. John Garang, played in delivering the 
much-desired Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the role the SPLM/A played after 
his death as the protector of South Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the 
dominant political force that midwifed South Sudan’s independence after decades of civil 
war.74 The status the SPLM/A achieved in the South is relevant to the line of inquiry in 
this thesis because inclusion in the ruling party and the military therefore became a 
competition for national power and prestige. In other words, because of the legitimacy of 
the SPLM/A, the single most important determinant of access to political and economic 
power in South Sudan was the movement or one’s relation to it.75 With the line between 
political party and guerrilla army blurred by the SPLM/A’s armed liberation lineage, such 
competition eventually manifested itself militarily, as evidenced by the perpetual 
proliferation of armed groups in Greater Upper Nile after the April 2010 elections, and 
the outbreak of civil war in December 2013. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-Keepers,” International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 22 (2015): 410–34. 
72 Young, The Fate of Sudan. 
73 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Lauren Hutton, “South Sudan: From Fragility at Independence to a Crisis of Sovereignty,” Conflict 
Research Unit Report (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, March 2014), 
https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan.pdf. 
 30 
Overall, the SPLM was submerged within a military subculture.76 Since the founding of 
the liberation movement in 1983, the armed movement was always dominant to the 
political wing, which arguably led to a deeply ingrained militarization of governance and 
politics in South Sudan.77 This characterization can be attributed to the fact that the 
evolution of the SPLA rapidly outpaced the political and ideological development of the 
SPLM.78 Furthermore, the movement’s failure to engage in dialogue as a means by which 
to resolve its internal contradictions meant that military confrontation became the 
primary means of resolving political disputes.79 Additionally, the party and the military 
had become synonymous due to the fact that the political leadership of the SPLM was 
comprised of many old guard military leaders.80 As the only state-like structure during 
the civil war, the SPLA logically became the primary source of manpower for not only 
the state security forces, but also the civil service.81 Furthermore, with the SPLA’s officer 
corps largely composed of ‘politicians-in-waiting,’ the SPLM/A was sometimes 
described as a politicized armed group.82 The fusion of the military and politics was 
evident in the political nature of the armed forces, where, due to the lack of cohesion 
within the SPLA, parts of the military would identify with particular political leaders.83 
Politics in South Sudan has thus been underpinned, and in fact defined, by the ability of 
politicians and army officers to mobilize fighters and destabilize strategic regions of the 
country such as Greater Upper Nile. 84  As a result of all these factors, political 
factionalism was often expressed within the military – as demonstrated by the political 
crisis within the SPLM that led to the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in 
December 2013.85 
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While the SPLM and the SPLA were supposed to be legally distinct as the independent 
Republic of South Sudan began to take shape, they maintained ‘enduring and structural 
links’ and were never completely disaggregated from one another. 86  The 2011 
Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, Part 10, Chapter 1, Article 151 
(2) stipulated that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army “…shall be transformed into the 
South Sudan Armed Forces, and shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, 
regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as 
established under this Constitution and the law.”87 However, President Kiir faced stiff 
resistance to renaming the military, and the ‘new’ national military continued to be 
referred to as the SPLA.88 Transformation from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to 
the South Sudan Armed Forces would have signalled a clean break between the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement and the national military of the newly independent 
Republic of South Sudan. In addition, new, non-partisan nomenclature could have 
indicated a greater sense of socio-political and ethnic equality within the diverse and 
often recently-adversarial members of the newly-integrated security force, which could 
have helped mitigate the history of factionalism within the South. 
 
Support from the International Community 
 
Amidst the aforementioned challenges, South Sudan benefitted from substantial 
goodwill, foreign investment, and humanitarian assistance on the part of the international 
community, which endorsed South Sudan’s independence in 2011.89 International support 
came from the Joint Donor Team and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan; 
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, and the World 
Bank; and individual donors, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, 
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Germany, Japan, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden.90 Furthermore, the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan was established by UN Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), with a 
mandate to support the implementation of the CPA largely through monitoring the 
ceasefire agreement and the redeployments of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
SPLA during the Interim Period.91 Its successor, the United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan, was established by UN Security Council resolution 1996 (2011), with an original 
mandate to support the Government of South Sudan in peace consolidation, thereby 
fostering longer-term state building and economic development; assist the Government of 
South Sudan in conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and the protection of 
civilians; and help the Government of South Sudan to develop the capacity to provide 
security, establish the rule of law, and strengthen the security and justice sectors in the 
country.92 
Core Argument  
 
This thesis provides a detailed study of South Sudan’s experience implementing a 
military integration process during its attempt to transition from war to peace between 
2006 and 2013. In order to accomplish the objectives of this study, I will argue that the 
Government of Southern Sudan faced three choices vis-à-vis adhering to the 
requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the threat that non-SPLA groups 
posed to stability. They could: 1) attempt to combat them militarily, 2) ignore them and 
accept that they did not possess a monopoly on the use of force93 in southern Sudan, or 3) 
reach a political-military accommodation with them. As the government sought to ease 
over divisions in the South in the runup to the 2011 referendum on self-determination, it 
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largely chose to reach an accommodation with armed groups by offering them amnesty 
and integration into the SPLA – an approach formalised by the 2006 Juba Declaration on 
Unity and Integration, which brought many OAGs into a statutory security framework 
per the requirements of the CPA. 
 
Integration thus took on the attributes of military power-sharing within South Sudan, and 
served multiple peacebuilding purposes during the Interim Period (2005-2011) of the 
CPA. First, given the civil war-era divisions in the South, military integration was a 
means by which to signal a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to 
compromise. Second, by reducing the manpower available for armed groups and 
containing former combatants in a statutory security mechanism, the Government of 
South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support 
of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail 
the referendum on self-determination.94 Third, by bringing OAGs into the government’s 
power structures of the South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing non-SPLA 
armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA 
South. Integrating them into the SPLA through the Juba Declaration offered them a 
mutually reinforcing political-military power-sharing arrangement that was arguably 
necessary due to the legacy of South-South divisions and the exclusion of OAGs from the 
negotiations that led to the CPA. Finally, the SPLA, although multi-ethnic, carried the 
perception of being a Dinka-dominated movement – especially after the 1991 split 
between Garang and Machar, after which the South-South conflict took on Dinka vs. 
Nuer attributes. Therefore, military integration, which brought in primarily Nuer armed 
groups, made the SPLA more diverse, thereby making it more of a symbol of national 
unity. After integration, the SPLA became between 65 and 70 per cent Nuer.95 Overall, 
by allowing the Government of South Sudan to consolidate political-military power, 
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military integration allowed for the implementation of the CPA, including the 2011 
referendum on self-determination, which resulted in its independence from Sudan. 
 
Despite the initial utility of military integration, it became, over time, the government’s 
de facto means by which to mitigate the threat that armed groups posed to stability. 
Consequently, integration became an open-ended process with armed group leaders 
repeatedly defecting and reintegrating without consequence. With the expectation that the 
government wished to ‘buy peace’ at any cost, this cycle had several negative 
implications. It created a perverse incentive for members of the SPLA to use violence in 
order to advance their positions or increase their wealth. It precluded the SPLA from 
‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on cohesion and professionalism. 
And it created a continuous opportunity cost for the SPLA, as well as the country at large, 
by diverting resources from military professionalism due to the ever-growing need to pay 
the salaries of military personnel. 
 
Due to South Sudan’s open-ended approach to integration, a process that should have 
been temporary and transitional became an end in and of itself. This kept the SPLA in a 
state of arrested development and prone to fracturing during periods of heightened 
political competition. Compounding the pressure placed on the integration process was 
the failure of demobilization initiatives, such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration, Wounded Heroes, a Civic Works Corps, and a Pensions program, that 
were all supposed to contribute to rightsizing the SPLA. This meant that while the SPLA 
was absorbing armed groups, there was no functioning ‘release valve’ to flush former 
combatants out of the security sector. 
 
Transformation of South Sudan’s defence sector, including assisting the SPLA in 
becoming a cohesive national military, was concurrent to the integration process. 
However, these efforts were not aligned with the military integration process. As a result, 
SPLA Transformation was being conducted on an unstable foundation, which eventually 
unravelled in December 2013 when South Sudan collapsed into civil war. 
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The end result was that while South Sudan’s military integration process played a 
stabilizing role prior to the referendum on self-determination, it eventually played a 
destabilizing role due to the manner in which it was implemented. Thus, through military 
integration, South Sudan addressed short-term security dilemmas, but created long-term 
instability with its lack of a long-term strategic vision for the integration process. 
Contribution to the Field 
 
Much of the literature on war-to-peace transitions tends to focus on the role of the United 
Nations and other third party actors in such a context, and not enough on how former 
combatants themselves attempt to consolidate peace. This thesis takes an ‘inside-out’ 
approach to analysing the case of South Sudan, with a primary emphasis on gathering 
data on the implementation of the integration process between 2006 and 2013 that had 
not been gathered previously.    
 
There has been a rather substantial body of work on South Sudan in the past decade and a 
half, which may be attributed to the peace process finally gaining momentum in 2002, the 
signing of the CPA in 2005, and the anticipation of the referendum, which provided for 
the possibility of a new country in East Africa. The attendant political, economic, social, 
and security issues have been analysed in depth by academics, consultants, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, and government agencies. Analyses of South Sudan’s 
security issues have focused on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, security 
sector reform, and armed conflict, including insurgencies, cattle-raiding, and other types 
of communal violence. The focus of this thesis specifically on the SPLA emphasizes the 
importance of this socio-political entity within South Sudan. In addition to its legitimacy 
being based on the fact that it fought for, and won, self-determination for the South, the 
SPLA has become a primary vehicle through which to access power and wealth in South 
Sudan. Thus, this thesis’ focus on the dynamics of this attempt to integrate armed groups 




While a single case study may be limited in external validity, an in-depth case study on 
South Sudan yields important data on the country’s military integration process that may 
otherwise be inaccessible or overlooked. Empirical data on South Sudan’s integration 
provides details on the role this process played during South Sudan’s transition from war, 
to autonomous region, to independent state, and back to war. As there has been little 
substantive analysis that provides the level of empirical data I have been able to collect 
on South Sudan’s military integration process, this thesis fills the gap by providing in-
depth analysis on this aspect of South Sudan’s security sector, and the role this process 
has played in the country’s attempt to transition from war to peace. 
 
As will be explored further in Chapter 3 (Review of the Literature on Military 
Integration), my thesis topic is situated in the broader theoretical literature on managing 
potential spoilers in the aftermath of a peace settlement. Through my analysis of South 
Sudan’s experience with military integration, I am thus able to make the following five 
contributions to the theoretical understanding of the role that military integration plays in 
transitions from war to peace: 
• During such transitions, governments can either fight armed groups, ignore them 
and accept that they lack a monopoly on the use of force within the country, or 
seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. 
When presented with these options, integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice in 
some cases.  
• Military integration can help temporarily overcome wartime factionalism, thereby 
benefitting short-term peace consolidation, but can eventually lead to instability if 
the process is not approached as a transitional security mechanism.  
• The combination of an open-ended integration process and failed demobilization 
initiatives can increase pressure on the military integration process as the most 
expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups pose to stability.  
• A disconnect between the integration process and broader defence sector reform 
efforts can result in the security sector being rebuilt on an unstable foundation, as 
was the case in South Sudan.  
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• A military’s failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process risks leaving the 
security sector in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform 
the military from gaining traction, and making the force prone to fracturing during 
periods of heightened political competition. 
 
This thesis seeks to fill a critical gap in the understanding of the role that this relatively 
under-examined process of bringing armed groups into a statutory security framework 
plays as countries attempt to transition from war to peace. Considering the increasing use 
of military integration as part of civil war settlements across the world, the sheer 
complexity of South Sudan’s case warrants further analysis – if only as a cautionary tale 
on how not to pursue a military integration process. 
Research Methodology 
 
This thesis is a qualitative explanatory case study that employs historical analysis and 
interviews to examine the role that military integration played in the transition from war 
to peace in South Sudan between 2006 and 2013. I have chosen this research design 
because the evaluation of political-military processes in transitional security 
environments, such as in the case of South Sudan in particular, provides a deeper 
understanding of the sequence of events through which initial conditions have been 
translated into case outcomes.  
 
It is important to stress that, in this study, 2006 is chosen as the starting point for 
understanding the military integration process in South Sudan because the Juba 
Declaration, signed in January of that year, formalized the integration of armed groups 
into the SPLA. Over time, military integration became the de facto approach for 
managing the threat posed by armed groups until the outbreak of conflict in December 
2013 – another bookend for this study. Although the focus of this thesis is on the time 
period between 2006 and 2013, part of it covers the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-
2005) in order to offer a historical context that explains why the Government of South 
Sudan pursued military integration during the period that followed the war. 
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The term Interim Period, used frequently in this thesis, followed the Pre-Interim Period 
that lasted six months from the signing of the CPA (January – July 2005). In this thesis, 
Interim Period refers to the six-year period between July 2005 and July 2011, during 
which signatories to the CPA agreed to make unity attractive through implementation of 
the agreement’s protocols on political power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security 
arrangements. It was during this period that military integration became formalized 
through the signing of the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006, 
and eventually became the government’s de facto approach to mitigate the threats that 
armed groups posed to stability. During the Interim Period, national elections took place 
in Sudan and in the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan. In accordance with the 
provisions of the CPA, a referendum on self-determination was held in January 2011. 
During the referendum, 98.8 per cent of South Sudanese voted for secession from Sudan, 




After the Second Sudanese Civil War ended, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
articulated four dimensions of power-sharing (military, political, economic, and 
territorial) between the National Congress Party in the North and the SPLM/A in the 
South. Within South Sudan, power-sharing arrangements were less formal; accordingly 
this thesis addresses these arrangements as forms of de facto power-sharing. 
 
Power-sharing is a reconstitution of state authority through the creation of government 
institutions that balance power among rival forces, or at the very least, prevent one party 
from accumulating the power to exercise unilateral authority.97 Created during negotiated 
settlements to armed conflict, power-sharing institutions determine who holds power, to 
what end, and how it is exercised. Military integration can be one dimension of power-
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sharing that is often employed alongside other power-sharing arrangements along 
political, economic, and territorial dimensions. In this thesis, I use the term military 
integration to refer to a dimension of power-sharing that involves the distribution of 
authority within the coercive apparatus of the state by incorporating or amalgamating 
non-statutory armed groups (i.e., rebel groups, local militia, etc.) into a statutory security 
framework (i.e., military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, etc.)98  
 
Of the 128 civil wars fought and concluded between 1945 and 2006, approximately 40 
per cent of the peace settlements had some element of military integration.99 Integration 
as a part of peace settlements has also been increasing over time – from not being 
included in peace settlements in the 1940s, to being a part of 10 per cent of such 
settlements in the 1960s, 36 per cent in the 1980s, and 56 per cent in the 2000s.100 
Between 1945 and 1999, there were 34 cases of military integration, and the majority of 
these were in sub-Saharan Africa in countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.101 Outside of the 
continent of Africa, integration has also been attempted in Lebanon (1989), Cambodia 
(1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Georgia/South Ossetia (1995), and the 
Philippines (1996).102 
 
Military power-sharing involves the distribution of the state’s coercive powers among 
former combatants through the integration of warring parties into the state’s security 
forces on the basis of a balance of troop numbers or on a proportional basis, contingent 
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on the size of the armed factions.103  Alternatively, military power-sharing can be 
accomplished by the creation of a new military that draws members from former 
combatants; the creation of a new military that draws members based on the proportions 
of former combatants and factions; the appointment of non-dominant former combatants 
to key leadership posts in the military; and by allowing former combatants to maintain 
their own security forces.104 The appointment of members of the ‘subordinate’ group to 
key leadership positions allows them to, in principle, monitor the policy decisions and 
movement of troops that could threaten the interests of their group, and prevent the 
coercive apparatus of the state from being monopolized by a single group which has 
recently demonstrated hostile intentions. 105  The CPA’s Protocol on Security 
Arrangements and the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities and Appendices stipulated that Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) comprised of 
equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army would serve 
as the nucleus of the national military in the event of a vote for unity in the referendum 
on self-determination. Within South Sudan, military power-sharing was formalized 
through the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration signed in January 2006, through 
which a Military Technical Committee was to oversee the integration of OAGs into the 
SPLA. 
 
Political power-sharing covers the proportional distribution of political power within the 
executive, administrative, or electoral sectors of government.106 Political power-sharing 
arrangements usually entail the distribution of political positions such as cabinet posts 
and seats in the legislature.107 The participation of former combatants in the political 
sphere can place them in a better position to prevent the imposition of policies that would 
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be detrimental to their interests.108 The CPA’s Protocol on Power Sharing stipulated 
southern participation in a Government of National Unity. In addition, during the Interim 
Period, a series of conferences aimed to discuss matters of political-military power-
sharing within the South: OAG Dialogue Conferences (April 18-21, 2005; June 20-July 
3, 2005; and January 6-7, 2006), Dialogue between the SPLM and Southern Political 
Parties (November 8-13, 2008), All Political Parties Conference (September 26-30, 
2009), South-South Dialogue Conference (October 13-17, 2010). Upon succeeding 
Garang in mid-2005, Kiir also met with SSDF leadership to indicate his willingness to 
accommodate them, and subsequently appointed several SSDF members as ministers, 
commissioners, and members of regional assembly and state legislatures. 109 As part of 
the Juba Declaration, the Administrative and Civil Service Committee was created to 
manage the integration of non-military personnel into national and state government. 
 
Economic power-sharing involves access to and the distribution of the state’s economic 
resources among former combatants, and often entails formulas for resource distribution 
or pledges to direct resources to individuals on the basis of group membership or 
geographic location.110 Economic power-sharing prevents the state’s economic resources 
from being monopolized by one group, or from being used to marginalize potential 
competitors. 111  In Sudan, the CPA’s Agreement on Wealth Sharing covered the 
management and distribution of the country’s resources and revenue during the Interim 
Period.  
 
Territorial power-sharing covers the decentralization or division of authority on the basis 
of federalism or regional autonomy.112 Territorial power-sharing creates opportunities for 
regionally-concentrated groups to govern themselves, thus providing them with political 
influence vis-à-vis the central government, and the assurance that their culture and values 
                                                
108 Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.” 
109 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.” 
110  Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict 
Management”; Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security”; Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace. 
111  Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict 
Management”; Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security”; Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace. 
112  Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict 
Management.” 
 42 
will be protected from the interests of the political centre.113 Accordingly, the CPA’s 
Protocol on Power Sharing stipulated the establishment of an autonomous region in the 
South. 
 
Military integration is a distinct process from disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration, which is defined below. However, integration can take place prior to, or 
even concurrent to DDR and broader social, political, and economic assistance to former 
combatants.114 As it encompasses a wide array of policies and is not a standardized 
process, there exists no universal concept of, or approach to military integration.115 
Generally, the process includes negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, 
fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment.  
 
As Roy Licklider notes, integration takes place amidst a range of political-military 
contexts.116 Of the cases he examined in New Wars from Old: Merging Competing 
Military Forces after Civil Wars, some processes (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) had a high level of 
foreign involvement while others (Lebanon, the Philippines, Rwanda, and South Africa) 
developed autonomously. Some cases (Mozambique and South Africa) benefitted from 
substantial political support at the local level, while others (Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) did not. And some cases (Rwanda and Sierra Leone) 






                                                
113 Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace; Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.” 
114 Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.” 
115  Tatjana Stankovic and Stina Torjesen, “Fresh Insights on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners” (Oslo: NUPI/CPS/IDDRS, August 2010), 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4595~v~Fresh_Insights_on_Disarmament_Demobiliz
ation_and_Reintegration__A_Survey_for_Practitioners.pdf; Knight, Mark, “Military Integration and War 
Termination,” in Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR, ed. Melanne A. Civic and Michael 
Miklaucic, 1st edition (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 61–76. 
116 Roy Licklider, “How Unique Is South African Military Integration?,” Scientia Militaria, South African 




This thesis argues that military integration should have been the foundation of any future 
plans to reform South Sudan’s security sector. Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept 
that emerged in the late 1990s for which no single definition has been agreed upon. For 
the purpose of this thesis, I use the definitions of security sector and security sector 
reform from the 2008 Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,117 which 
states that: 
“‘Security sector’ is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions 
and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of 
security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes 
defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions 
responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of 
the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal 
conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, 
the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the 
design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and 
civil society groups. Other non-state actors that could be considered part of the 
sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.” 
 
This report goes on to define ‘security sector reform’ as:  
“a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of 
effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without 
discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”  
 
Although security sector reform normally includes a focus on aspects of the security 
sector outside of the military, the scope of this thesis is on the integration of armed 
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groups into the SPLA. As such, the term SPLA Transformation captures the most 
relevant aspects of security sector reform for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
The definition of SPLA Transformation used in this thesis has been derived from U.S. 
and UK requests for proposals and periodic program reviews pertaining to defence sector 
transformation projects – an approach similar to the method used in Richard Rands’ In 
Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond. The goal of SPLA 
Transformation was for the SPLA, supported by foreign donors, to transition from a 
guerrilla force into a professional, accountable, affordable, and disciplined military 
operating under civilian authority and capable of providing security for the people of 
South Sudan.118 
 
As Transformation commenced during the interim period of the CPA, the goal was for 
the SPLA to either operate as part of the national Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under a 
government of national unity or as the national military of a potentially independent 
South Sudan post-2011.119 According to the SPLA’s Objective Force 2017, SPLA 
Transformation involved four main activities: 1) enhancing operational capabilities; 2) 
educating and training SPLA personnel; 3) improving SPLA values and standards; and 4) 
rightsizing the SPLA.120 The SPLA received a range of support from the United Nations 
missions, the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland for SPLA Transformation 
– from improving command and control structures to facilitating the development of core 
and supporting defence institutions to improving the military’s understanding of the rule 




Of the aforementioned aspects of SPLA Transformation, rightsizing the SPLA is most 
relevant to this thesis, as reducing the parade of the military over time should have 
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relieved the pressure that the military integration process placed on the SPLA. Estimates 
of the SPLA parade vary widely. At the signing of the CPA, it was believed to comprise 
90,000 personnel. With the integration of armed groups, it was believed to total 140,000, 
but by independence, it was believed to have risen to 207,000.121  Since then, the parade 
was believed to have grown to 230,000 soldiers (before the onset of civil war in 
December 2013 and defection of tens of thousands of soldiers) due to recruitment and re-
enlistment; this figure may have also included tens of thousands of ghost soldiers, based 
on a previous internal audit of the SPLA.122 
 
The definition of rightsizing used in this thesis comes from Richard Rands’ In Need of 
Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond, which used the term ‘rightsizing’ 
to refer to “…the process of finding a balance between military effectiveness and 
affordability in terms of force structure, composition, and size. Rightsizing need not 
always imply ‘down-sizing’ or reductions in troop numbers; depending on the nature of 
perceived threats, it could imply a need to increase the size of a military force.”123 In the 
period in question in South Sudan, rightsizing refers to the SPLA’s goal to reduce its 
parade, thereby reducing the stress that non-essential personnel placed on the military’s 
operational capabilities and resources.124 
 
Both during the interim period and after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the 
primary method of reducing the parade of the SPLA was to be through Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration, and to a lesser extent, through the Wounded Heroes 
program and a pensions scheme and civil works brigades that the government had 
conceptualized but never quite implemented. 
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is the process through which former 
combatants are reintegrated into civilian society. Although the focus of this thesis is not 
on the DDR process in South Sudan, it was to play a central role in counteracting the 
rapidly expanding parade of the SPLA. According to the United Nations: 
• Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often 
also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of 
responsible arms management programmes. 
• Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend 
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing 
of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, 
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the 
support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. 
• Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and 
gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country 




Two types of sources were utilized in this thesis. The first method of data collection was 
analyses of primary and secondary sources; the second was individual interviews. 
Original data for this thesis was collected between August 2012 and July 2015 in South 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Financial and safety 
                                                
125 United Nations, “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards,” August 2006, 
http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/08/UN-2006-IDDRS.pdf. 
 47 
considerations prevented fieldwork in South Sudan from extending beyond a few weeks 
at a time over the course of three trips to the region. 
 
My fieldwork spanned an active period for South Sudan, in terms of its internal and 
external relations. During this timeframe, South Sudan moved from post-independence 
tensions with Sudan, allegations of supporting armed groups in each others’ countries, 
austerity measures due to the cessation of oil transport from South Sudan to Sudan, the 
government’s open-ended amnesty and integration of armed groups, and the 
conceptualization of various mechanisms to reduce the parade of the SPLA. It also 
spanned the sacking of the entire cabinet in July 2013 and the outbreak of conflict just 
over four months later. These events not only created a natural endpoint for examining 
the fragility of the military integration process, but I suspect also contributed to the 
combined enthusiasm and suspicion with which I was received on research trips to South 
Sudan after the conflict had broken out. The attitudes and potential biases of interviewees 
will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter. 
Primary Sources 
 
Several primary sources provided background information on the military integration 
process, and concurrent efforts to rightsize and transform the SPLA. They also provided 
insight on the priorities, interests, and concerns within South Sudan as well as its 
international partners between 2006 and 2013. For this thesis, I relied on primary sources 
such as the SPLA’s strategic guidance documents, powerpoints and conference reports 
from workshops on SPLA Transformation, official speeches, transcripts, briefings, 
internal policy memos and reports, memoirs, constitutions and other legislation, peace 
agreements, ceasefires, and amnesties. I also relied on reports by the United Nations 
Security Council, UN agencies, and those of the donor community on efforts to 
accommodate armed groups in South Sudan and transform the country’s security sector. 
Some of these primary source documents were obtained from interview subjects, while 
others were obtained on the internet. While I had originally hoped to develop a more 
thorough record of the numerous integration processes conducted by the SPLA since the 
signing of the Juba Declaration, it was extremely difficult due to the fact that records 
 48 
documenting the process were not officially maintained in any centralized facility or by 
any organ of the South Sudanese government. Rather, access to this information 
depended on getting in touch with the rapporteurs of each integration committee, and on 
the quality of notes this individual kept on this process. Combined with the fact that some 
of these officers were retired or had moved on to new command positions, it ended up not 
being a worthwhile endeavour to go into that level of granularity on the integration 
process. In any event, the focus of my thesis was not at the tactical level, but rather on the 
integration process at the strategic and operational levels. 
Secondary Sources 
 
From a historical standpoint, there was a substantial body of secondary source literature 
on Sudan’s second civil war, which provided the context for understanding divisions 
within the southern rebellion and the subsequent bidding war that the South Sudanese 
government waged with the Government of Sudan for loyalty of non-SPLA armed groups 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005. During the interim 
period, due to the level of international interest in what would potentially become ‘the 
world’s newest country,’ there were several books, academic journal articles, 
commissioned studies, reports by non-governmental organizations, and news reports on 
South Sudan’s transition, from which I could draw additional information to supplement 
the aforementioned primary sources. 
Interviews 
 
Lastly, but most importantly, personal interviews of individuals who had first-hand 
experience with, or significant knowledge of South Sudan’s military integration process 
provided critical insight on the means and modalities of the process, the context in which 
it was implemented, and reasons why it fell apart. In order to conduct these semi-
structured interviews on the military integration process, I made three trips to South 
Sudan (August 2012, August 2014, and December 2014), two trips to Ethiopia (August 
and December 2014) and two trips to Kenya (August and December 2014). Before these 
trips, I secured a ‘research permit’ from a South Sudanese colleague who was in 
government, which would provide me the necessary top cover in case any other 
government or military officials inquired if I possessed the appropriate certifications to 
 49 
conduct research in South Sudan. I conducted 54 interviews of SPLA generals, staff at 
the Ministry of National Security, former Ministry of Defence officials, personnel at the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), academics, civil society observers, 
diplomats, expatriate security consultants, and current/former mediators of South Sudan’s 
peace processes. These interviews are the basis for much of the analysis in this thesis. In 
the event that in-person interviews were not possible, interviews were conducted by 
phone, Skype, and over email correspondence. After all interviews, I was able to call or 
email the interviewees with follow-up or clarification questions. 
 
The primary target population of interviewees was individuals who had personally 
participated in the decisions surrounding the integration of armed groups into the SPLA, 
or in the direct implementation of the process. The secondary target was individuals who 
had maintained visibility of the integration process specifically, or the transformation of 
South Sudan’s security sector more generally. Interviewees were initially identified based 
on a network I had built from working on South Sudan prior to commencing this program 
of study. When originally interviewed, these individuals verbally consented to being 
contacted for future research once I informed them that I would be writing a PhD thesis 
focused on the military integration process in South Sudan.  
 
While protecting the identities of the initial interviewees, I snowballed into an expanded 
network of potential interviewees whom I approached by phone and email prior to and 
during future trips to South Sudan, and eventually to Ethiopia and Kenya. In many 
instances I would not receive a direct referral, but rather a name and personal cell phone 
number from an interviewee. It was then left to my powers of persuasion to get what 
were often high-ranking strangers to take time out of their busy schedules to indulge my 
line of inquiry. Some of these individuals went above and beyond what I asked of them 
as interviewees and became invested in the progress and outcome of my research. Many 
of these initial contacts and offers of assistance were made based on the familial ties of 
people in my network, or based on my own academic kinship networks. My ability to 
leverage both of these networks vastly facilitated my access to interview participants with 
deep subject matter expertise on my thesis topic. 
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The nature of the questions asked of each interviewee depended on their relationship to 
my thesis topic and on any issues I sought to clarify, either from other interviewees or 
from my primary source research. Some interviewees were long-time SPLA cadres who I 
was able to ask about the basic structure of the integration process, their personal 
experience implementing the integration of armed groups into the SPLA, and their 
assessments of the implications of integration. Some interviewees were diplomats, UN 
personnel, or expatriate security consultants who were able to give me visibility on the 
relationship – or lack thereof, as I discovered – between the SPLA’s integration process 
and broader efforts to transform the defence sector with the assistance of foreign donors, 
as well as the challenges associated with reducing the parade of the SPLA. Some 
interviewees were academics, researchers, or civil society observers who provided broad, 
external analysis on the implications of South Sudan’s oversized and non-cohesive 
military for internal security, and the tensions, and often blurred lines between the 
civilian and military spheres in South Sudan. Across all categories of interviewees, I was 
able to ask questions that drew on their long-term knowledge of, and engagement in, the 
Sudan-South Sudan peace process, of which military integration in the South was a by-
product. This served as a means by which to understand the rationales underpinning 
South Sudan’s approach to armed groups during the interim period and after 
independence. 
 
I opted to use open-ended questions in a semi-structured manner to encourage 
interviewees to speak at length about their experience with, or knowledge of, military 
integration in South Sudan. Using a qualitative method such as interviews allowed me to 
gather yet-unrecorded data from interviewees and allowed me to understand their 
experiences and place them firmly in context. By allowing me to reinterpret questions 
and clarify answers, this format allowed me to expand upon the thought processes, 
associations, and narratives that interviewees had constructed regarding the recent 
military integration process, providing both a variety of perspectives, as well as a more 
comprehensive understanding of political phenomena than other forms of data collection. 
However, one potential shortcoming of relying on interviews for data collection is that 
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my interpretation of the material could be highly subjective and the interview process 
may not easily be replicated by future researchers. 
Methodological Challenges & Limitations 
 
Near the end of my first year of research, half of my original dissertation quite literally 
ran away. As originally conceived, the focus of this thesis had been equally split between 
the SPLA’s concurrent integration and demobilization efforts. However, the 
demobilization initiatives conceptualized in South Sudan quickly became less relevant in 
December 2013, due to the defection of much of the SPLA to join the armed opposition. 
Following discussions with my advisor in early 2014, we made two decisions on the way 
ahead. First, we decided that I should scope the thesis more narrowly on the process of 
integrating armed groups into the SPLA, and only speak to the demobilization initiatives 
so far as they affected the military integration process. Second, we decided to make the 
cutoff date for data collection December 2013, in order to mitigate the challenge of 
keeping up with the rapidly changing security situation and peace negotiations after the 
civil war broke out. In the end, the fracturing of the SPLA improved the scoping of this 
thesis and allowed me to dive deeper on understanding the role of military integration 
during war-to-peace transitions, rather than splitting my time and energy between 
integration and demobilization.  
 
This thesis presented multiple additional challenges in the spheres of methodology and 
fieldwork. As previously mentioned, due to the level of interest in South Sudan after the 
signing of the CPA, there were ample studies on the proliferation of armed groups, DDR, 
and even some on SPLA Transformation. However, the majority of information that I 
required specifically on the military integration process had not been documented in 
writing. The lack of centralized oversight over the military integration process combined 
with poor record-keeping meant that much of the data I needed to gather was in the heads 
of select individuals or in their personal files. Some records were incomplete, or had large 
gaps due to the fact that it did not appear that any person or organization had formally 
assumed responsibility for collecting and preserving records on military integration in 
South Sudan. In addition, due to political and military reshuffling and retirements from 
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service, many of these individuals were no longer involved with the military integration 
process and needed to be tracked down. My ability to track them down was usually based 
on my ability to tap into their professional or kinship networks. Furthermore, following 
the outbreak of conflict in 2013, there was a diaspora of South Sudanese political elites 
and expatriate advisors who relocated outside South Sudan and now live in neighbouring 
countries, Europe, Australia, or North America. Tracking these individuals down was a 
challenge, as was, at times, gaining access to personnel within the Office of the President 
or National Security, who could have shed light more on their bureaucracies’ roles within 
the integration process.  
 
My personal safety was continually a concern, prompted by mid-2012 border skirmishes 
with Sudan and fears that the two countries would return to war, increasing criminality 
exacerbated by South Sudan’s worsening economic situation, and the perpetual threat of 
violence or predation by the country’s security forces. Most importantly, the events of 
December 2013 demonstrated that violence was not always restricted to the Greater 
Upper Nile region (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states where the majority of armed 
groups had proliferated.) Rather, the sporadic gunfights and roving death squads in Juba 
in December 2013 were unanticipated at the outset of this course of study, as was the 
eventual targeting of both national and expatriate humanitarian aid workers, publicized 
by the attacks by the South Sudanese military on the Terrain Camp compound in Juba in 
July 2016. Two incidents in 2014 and 2016 in which South Sudanese security forces shot 
at armoured U.S. Embassy vehicles, although perhaps not intentionally, highlighted the 
dangers of trying to navigate Juba on my own post-2013. This level of unpredictable 
violence and the growing sense that foreigners were not immune from being targeted had 
a substantial impact on my decision to only stay in Juba for a few weeks at a time.  
Fortunately, my decision to spend only the most necessary time in South Sudan, 
restricting my travel to Juba, and the safety precautions I took meant that no harm came 
upon me during the course of my fieldwork. 
 
Before the drastic shift in the security environment in 2013, it was already looking 
difficult for me to conduct fieldwork that would help me gain greater granularity on the 
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integration process. Yet, even before the conflict commenced, I had accepted that I would 
have difficulty accessing members of armed groups safely through my interviewee 
network, and within the financial constraints of my budget. Any biases that may have 
resulted from these constraints are discussed in further depth later in this chapter. 
 
After December 2013, there were significant doubts as to my ability to safely access 
interviewees and pose questions about my thesis topic, which had become, overnight, 
politically sensitive due to the role the SPLA had played escalating the level of violence 
at the outset of the conflict. Indeed, in multiple instances prior to fieldwork in August and 
December 2014, I was warned by colleagues concerned for my safety that I should not be 
conducting research on military integration in light of the ongoing political-military 
context. Fortunately, I was able to build rapport with interviewees during these rounds of 
fieldwork by asking them very general questions about political-military power-sharing 
arrangements from the CPA period to the present before drilling down to the 
disintegration of the military integration process. As previously mentioned, some 
participants were suspicious, while others were eager to engage with me. I sensed a 
genuine desire to place more analytical rigor behind understanding how the military 
integration process had contributed to war rather than peace in this particular case. This 
line of inquiry was particularly relevant for some of the interviewees who had visibility 
on the ongoing peace negotiations in neighbouring Ethiopia, where the issue of merging 
the SPLA and the armed opposition had, during the course of 2014, become a feature of 




During the fieldwork interviews for this thesis, interview data could have been biased as 
a result of the questions I asked, or due to my actions during the interviews. I may have 
also encountered response bias during the course of my interviews, as interviewees may 
have been anxious to appease me, or impress me with how well-connected they were to 
the topic at hand.  
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My identity as an American in the context of the conflict that commenced in 2013 may 
have influenced interviewee responses in two ways. The first is that there had been 
allegations that the United States and other Western powers encouraged the opposition to 
challenge the ruling elite, which caused the SPLM to fracture and catalysed the outbreak 
of armed conflict in December 2013. This created a narrative that the United States was 
tacitly backing the opposition and was therefore responsible for the actions that 
ultimately led the country down the path of war in December 2013. The reality, however, 
was far more nuanced – that the donor community was in favour of the development of 
pluralism within South Sudan’s political system, as it would in any other country 
transitioning from war to peace. Second, the stance of the U.S. government vis-à-vis the 
origins of the outbreak of the country’s current civil war negates the coup narrative 
perpetuated by the Government of South Sudan, in which the government’s disarmament 
of Nuer members of the Presidential Guard and targeted killings of Nuer in Juba in 
December 2013 were in response to Riek Machar’s alleged coup attempt. In fact, South 
Sudanese government officials found it offensive that the U.S. government denied that 
there was proof that a coup attempt occurred in December 2013.  
Normative Bias 
 
The research topic itself presented me with an unanticipated bias that was a result of the 
outbreak of conflict midway through my research. Overall, there were instances during 
my interviews in which there was a bias against the concept of military integration, due to 
strong opinions that integration was a bad idea and had caused the conflict in 2013. The 
topic of military integration had become more politicised in South Sudan, meaning 
interviewees may have had insights coloured by their regional/ethnic affiliations, may 
have wanted to downplay their own roles in sabotaging the process or cast blame on 
external actors for the collapse of the process, or for having had to pursue integration in 
the first place. There was also not only a civil-military divide on the costs and benefits of 
the process, but I also sensed the development of a narrative that the ethnic Nuer 
favoured integration because it brought their armed kinsmen into the SPLA en masse, and 
that the former Vice President Riek Machar personally favoured it because he thought he 
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might benefit from a ‘creeping coup.’ To be clear, the crafted narrative stipulated that the 
integration of mostly Nuer members of armed groups into the SPLA was an intentional 
move by Riek Machar to eventually take power by force. Such allegations tended to be 
isolated, and were likely derived from a need to perpetuate a particular narrative of the 
events leading up to the onset of civil war in December 2013. (That said, it is a matter of 
speculation that the perception that the SPLA had become numerically dominated by the 
Nuer may have given Machar the impression that he could successfully take power by 
force – a Plan B if his efforts to gain power legitimately through the internal organs of the 
SPLM did not work.)126 
Urban Bias 
 
One of the early concerns during fieldwork was the difficulty, cost, and safety concerns 
that accompanied conducting fieldwork in South Sudan outside of Juba. Originally, I 
would have liked to travel to the state governments in the areas that had been afflicted by 
armed group violence (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states), as well as the SPLA 
Division Headquarters in these regions. But due to border skirmishes with Sudan in 2012 
and the constant instability in these regions, I was unable to conduct interviews at these 
levels. As it subsequently turned out, due to the manner in which I had scoped my 
analysis at the strategic and operational levels, all the data and potential interviewees to 
which I needed access were in Juba. That said, potentially tens of thousands of SPLA 
defected and currently operate in Greater Upper Nile, which was a warzone for the 
duration of the fieldwork and data collection phase of my research. This study would 
have been enriched by their insights on the integration process and whether their decision 
to defect in December 2013 was in any way influenced by their experiences during the 
implementation of the integration process. That, among other things, is a potential topic 
for future analysis. 
Overcoming Bias 
 
In order to overcome the aforementioned biases, I started each interview with background 
questions not only to establish rapport with the subject, but also to gather clues that might 
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 56 
shed light on potential biases. These clues included their region of origin, ethnic group, 
kinship ties, and wartime military service. I also sought to avoid group interviews, which 
could have allowed dominant personalities to shape the opinions of others in the group, 
thus introducing bias into the discussion. After collecting interview data, I examined the 
interviewee’s statements for plausibility and potential inconsistencies, and corroborated 
information on the execution of the process across interviewees.  
 
Throughout the process of conducting interviews for this thesis, I triangulated data 
collected from these interviews with primary and secondary source documents and my 
own observations from the field, and ran some of the more controversial responses 
through other subject matter experts familiar with the case of South Sudan. These 
external validity checks highlighted potential contradictions and inaccuracies, thus 
allowing me to explicitly consider potential effects on substantive findings. 
Ethical Considerations 
 
Due to the sensitivity of my line of inquiry and the context in which I was conducting 
fieldwork after the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war, I paid a lot of attention to 
protecting the identities of my interviewees and to ensuring their comfort with speaking 
to me. Prior to interviews, participants were sent an information sheet and consent form 
that stipulated the nature of my fieldwork and reassured them of the measures I would 
take to protect their confidentiality. Based on the participant’s level of comfort discussing 
military integration with me, I gave them a choice as to where they would prefer the 
interview be held. Accordingly, some interviews were held in private homes and offices, 
while others were held in restaurants, coffee houses, and hotels. 
 
Although I initially gave participants a choice as to whether they would be fully or 
partially identified, or remain anonymous, I subsequently decided to keep the identities of 
all participants confidential due to the nature of the topic, and in order to facilitate a frank 
discussion of my thesis topic. My rationale was that military integration had become a 
controversial and potentially contentious process due to the role that the fragmentation of 
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the SPLA had played in accelerating the events of mid-December 2013 that led to the 
civil war. For this reason, I opted to put my interviewees at greater ease by offering 
blanket anonymity and only referencing them with general descriptions such as ‘former 
defence official’ or ‘SPLA officer’ as needed. 
 
Given the increasingly controversial topic of my thesis, I have not listed interviewees by 
name but have listed them anonymously with a description of the individual’s 
background and the date and geographic location of our interview. For my own records, I 
have the precise names, occupations, dates, and locations of my interviewees in a 
separate location from my thesis in order to protect the confidentiality of my interview 
subjects. 
Structure of Thesis 
 
Chapter One (Introduction) provides an overview of the structure of this thesis, as well as 
an explanation of why my topic is relevant and adds to the discourse on military 
integration as a means of addressing the threat posed by non-statutory armed groups. This 
chapter also includes the research questions and core argument for this thesis, and 
outlines my analytic approach, and discusses some of the constraints I faced in the 
process of conducting fieldwork in South Sudan.  
 
Chapter Two (Historical Context) gives a historical context of armed groups in South 
Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War and the peace negotiations that led to the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This chapter explains how civil 
war-era divisions within South Sudan and the exclusion of non-SPLA groups from the 
peace process created an imperative for the government to find ways to neutralize the 
threat these groups posed to stability in order to ensure that the referendum on South 
Sudan’s independence from Sudan could be held in 2011.  
 
Chapter Three (Review of the Literature on Military Integration) is an overview of the 
literature relevant to the case of South Sudan on engaging armed groups during the 
transition from war to peace, and the factors that tend to determine the success or failure 
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of military integration processes. This chapter examines the rationales that drive former 
combatants to seek political-military accommodation through integration; how military 
integration can be a transitional security measure; the practical application of dual track 
military integration and demobilisation processes; how an open-ended military 
integration process can provide incentives for defection or non-compliance; the 
importance of fostering cohesion along political, task, and social dimensions within a 
newly integrated military; the role of third parties in military integration processes; and 
whether or not military integration can lead to sustainable peace. Overall, this chapter 
situates my original analysis of the military integration process in South Sudan in the 
research in existing bodies of academic and practical literature.  
 
Chapter Four (Integration) argues that, in light of the divisions that permeated the 
southern resistance during the civil war and the goal of holding a referendum on self-
determination in 2011, the Government of South Sudan’s options to neutralize the threat 
posed by non-statutory armed forces were to either combat, ignore, or integrate them into 
the political and military structures of the new state. Accordingly, this chapter analyses 
the rationales behind the government’s decision to accommodate armed groups during 
the interim period, and covers the signing of the Juba Declaration in January 2006, which 
formalised the government’s amnesty and integration approach to armed groups and the 
means and modalities of the integration process. This chapter also gives an overview of 
some of the anti-government armed groups that proliferated after the April 2010 
elections, and how these rebellions contributed to the development of the government’s 
de facto open-ended integration process. This chapter concludes that military integration 
served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South 
Sudan, and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-
determination in 2011. 
 
Chapter Five (Transformation) places the military integration process in the broader 
context of efforts to restructure the security sector to transform the SPLA into a 
conventional military while simultaneously rightsizing the force by various means, 
including through DDR. This chapter argues that military integration was a foundational 
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aspect of SPLA Transformation, but failed efforts to rightsize the SPLA prevented 
demobilization initiatives from relieving the pressure on integration as a means by which 
to address the actual or latent threat of armed groups. The chapter also demonstrates that 
minimal foreign assistance was directed towards the military integration process, but was 
rather directed towards DDR and SPLA Transformation.  
 
Chapter Six (Disintegration) assesses the reasons why South Sudan’s military integration 
process disintegrated, and argues that integration was poorly-conceived and 
implemented, and received no meaningful support from third party actors that were more 
focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional 
military. The chapter concludes that due to the failed implementation of the process, the 
SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military 
from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines 
during periods of heightened political competition.  
 
Chapter Seven (Conclusions) consists of research findings and conclusions, and 




Chapter 2: Historical Context 
Introduction 
 
The roots of South Sudan’s military integration challenges lie in the factionalization of 
the southern resistance movement in the 1990s and the subsequent proliferation of armed 
groups in Southern Sudan opposed to the SPLM/A. This chapter offers an overview of 
the factionalism in Southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), 
demonstrating how non-SPLA splinter groups were co-opted by the Government of 
Sudan in order to weaken the southern resistance movement. This chapter sets the scene 
for understanding how the exclusive nature of the peace process that ended the Second 
Sudanese Civil War created an imperative for the government to seek political-military 
accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups so that they would be less inclined to be 
co-opted by the Government of Sudan, thus spoiling the chance for a referendum on self-
determination to be held, in accordance with the CPA. 
Anyanya versus the SPLA 
 
During the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), a primarily Nuer southern rebel group 
called Anyanya had fought for southern independence. Elements of this group did not 
agree with the terms of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the war, and resisted 
President Gaafar al-Nimeiri’s decision to create an autonomous region in the South.127 As 
a result of the steady disintegration of the peace agreement, remnants of Anyanya started 
to rearm in the Southern Autonomous Region in the late 1970s and came to be called 
Anyanya II. Like their predecessor Anyanya, Anyanya II was mostly Nuer and sought an 
independent South Sudan.128  
 
Thus, Anyanya II had already started fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the 
South prior to the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) in May 1983.129 From its founding, the SPLM/A sought to avoid the mistakes 
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Anyanya had made during the First Civil War – most notably, its explicit aspiration for 
South Sudanese independence, which alienated the movement from potential allies within 
Sudan and abroad. 130  Despite a preference on the part of many southerners for 
independence, SPLM/A founder John Garang did not conceive of the group as a 
separatist movement, but rather as a revolution aimed at transforming a united Sudan 
through the replacement of the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum 
with a secular, democratically elected government. Considering the regional and 
international context of the time, Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision was more likely to gain 
foreign support than a platform rooted in secession.131  
 
For reasons connected to personality, ideology, and leadership, tensions arose between 
Garang and the leaders of the separatist Anyanya II faction.132 The older generation of 
Anyanya veterans had held more senior military ranks to Garang at the end of the first 
war, and had been in the bush several years before the SPLM/A was created. As such, 
they believed they should have been the leaders of the new armed resistance in the 
South.133 Moreover, while Anyanya II’s platform was to fight for total liberation from the 
Arab Islamic north, the SPLM/A’s platform was a liberation struggle for a united, 
secular, and democratic ‘New Sudan’.134 Over time, what started as a political power 
struggle between Anyanya II and the SPLA, took on Dinka versus Nuer undertones; the 
SPLA was depicted as a Dinka movement, although it contained many Nuer.135 
 
The power struggle between Anyanya II and the SPLA was, in some respect, dictated by 
neighbouring Ethiopia, whose Derg regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam became a key 
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supporter of the SPLA. Ethiopia supported the southern resistance movement in Sudan 
because the Sudanese government gave support and sanctuary to rebels operating in 
Tigray, Wollo and Eritrea.136 In addition to allowing the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to have political offices 
in Khartoum, Sudan allowed them freedom of movement across Sudan’s border with 
Ethiopia. Mengistu allowed the SPLM/A to operate from Ethiopian territory based on the 
understanding that the movement’s charter was in line with the fight for social justice, 
equity, and the distribution of wealth and power that he believed his own government 
was pursuing.137 Ethiopian support to the SPLM/A also came under the condition that 
they avoided the separatist rhetoric of Anyanya II. Like Emperor Haile Selassie before 
him, Mengistu would not have supported a separatist movement in Sudan while facing a 
similar challenge with the Eritreans on the domestic front.138 Moreover, the peace 
agreement that had ended the First Sudanese Civil War had been signed in the Ethiopian 
capital, which was also the seat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose 
charter protected the territorial integrity of its member states.139 With its ‘New Sudan’ 
platform, the SPLA had access to rear bases in Ethiopian territory, and received arms, 
training, intelligence, logistical support, and direct combat assistance from the Ethiopian 
military, and political direction and backing from the communist Eastern Bloc.140  
 
By 1984, Anyanya II had been defeated and driven out of Ethiopia, and the SPLA, under 
Ethiopian pressure, had tracked down and killed the older more experienced Anyanya 
veterans who were staunch separatists. 141 Between 1988 and 1991, some elements of 
Anyanya II were absorbed into the SPLA, thereby contributing to the high point of 
southern unity.142 Meanwhile, the rump of Anyanya II that remained after it was expelled 
from Ethiopia and largely defeated by the SPLA, continued to attempt to gain control of 
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the armed resistance in the South.143 The Sudanese government provided support to 
Anyanya II in order to destabilize the SPLA, seeing the fractured group as a lesser evil to 
the much stronger SPLA.144 
Khartoum support of non-SPLA armed groups 
 
The use of pro-government (with the term ‘government’ in this chapter used to refer to 
the Government of Sudan during the civil war) armed groups to conduct raids and 
pacification patrols in parts of Sudan dates from 19th century. Yet, during the second civil 
war it was the scale of the government’s military and financial support for armed militias 
that distinguished this divide and rule strategy from its historical antecedents.145 It was, 
from the Government of Sudan’s point of view, a necessary strategy to compensate for 
the ineffectiveness and low morale of the Sudan Armed Forces and to curtail the wave of 
momentum of SPLA military offensives in the 1980s. Accordingly, successive regimes in 
Khartoum (Gaafar al-Nimeiri until 1985, Sadiq al-Mahdi between 1986 and 1989, and 
Omar al-Bashir since 1989) used divide and rule tactics to weaken the SPLM/A by 
funnelling arms, food, and other supplies to non-SPLA militias in the South. This meant 
the SPLA fought not only the SAF but also southern militias backed by Khartoum.146  
 
Comprised of primarily Nilotic (especially Dinka) ethnic groups, the SPLA caused 
resentment in areas outside main SPLA recruiting grounds, or in those controlled by 
government-aligned armed groups. In these areas, the SPLA tended to use higher levels 
of coercion against civilians, and was accused of being ill-disciplined, living off the land, 
and using harsh recruitment methods. 147  The SPLA’s conduct thus prompted the 
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formation of localized, ethnically-defined self-defence militias in parts of the South to 
resist the SPLA and to protect local communities that were caught up in the violence.148 
Before he was overthrown in 1985, Sudanese president Gaafar Nimeiri made a large sum 
of money available and instructed southern governors to further recruit and train militias 
to prevent the Dinka from dominating smaller ethnic groups and from spreading the 
rebellion across the South.149 Although these groups may have supported the SPLA’s 
liberation platform, their main objective was the defence of their communities; southern 
militias accordingly proliferated among the Mundari, Murle, Toposa, Zande, Madi, Fertit, 
and Acholi.150 The Government of Sudan’s methods of supporting non-SPLA armed 
groups to destabilize the South continued throughout the civil war, through the Interim 
Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and beyond South Sudan’s 
independence. 
The 1991 split 
 
Ethiopia under Mengistu was a satellite state of the Soviet Union; when it disintegrated, it 
had political repercussions for the SPLA, as Ethiopia had been its primary foreign 
supporter. Following the May 1991 fall of the Derg regime, the SPLA was expelled from 
western Ethiopia, their radio station was closed, supplies seized, training camps 
shuttered, and political headquarters in Addis shut down – and the files kept by the Derg 
on the SPLM/A were handed over to the Sudanese government.151 The new government, 
under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was hostile to 
the SPLA, as it had been supported by the previous regime. Furthermore, the EPRDF 
owed its ability to make a final push on Addis Ababa to the Sudanese government.152  
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When the National Islamic Front seized power in Khartoum in June 1989, the SPLM/A 
controlled approximately 90 per cent of the territory of southern Sudan, having benefitted 
from the support and secure supply lines provided by Ethiopia.153 However, the collapse 
of the Derg in May 1991 and the consequent loss of Ethiopian support slowed the 
SPLA’s momentum, causing Garang’s power to wane and giving some of his 
commanders more room to manoeuvre.154 Up to this point, the South-South divisions had 
failed to manifest mainly because the internal contradictions were weaker than the North-
South contradictions, which made the movement more cohesive than it would have been 
otherwise.155 But by the early 1990s, the internal contradictions within the SPLM/A that 
cut across ethnic and ideological lines had started to become more salient.156 Knowing 
Mengistu’s fall was imminent, Garang had hoped to strengthen his position by making a 
push for Juba, which required a significant shift of resources and manpower south 
towards the Equatoria region. This movement would leave Upper Nile, where Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol had been assigned as zonal commanders, dangerously exposed 
and soon to be cut off by the onset of rainy season.157  
 
In August 1991, when both the movement and its leader were at their weakest, Machar, 
Akol and Gordon Kong, all members of the SPLM/A Political-Military High Command, 
announced that Garang had been ousted as Chairman of the SPLM/A from the city of 
Nasir in Upper Nile. In Why Garang Must Go Now,158 complaints against the SPLM/A 
leader included Garang’s centralization of power and the stifling of genuine democratic 
debate. There had been tension over Garang’s absolute authority, which was in a sense 
necessary to ensure the cohesion of a movement that was becoming more diverse in spite 
of existing ethnic animosities. Additionally, the leaders of what came to be called the 
‘Nasir coup’ cited the fact that Garang had several prominent SPLA leaders arrested, 
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tortured, and executed for having political differences with him or with the movement.159 
The movement under Garang was characterized as lacking political structures, as the 
Political-Military High Command had only met once in eight years of existence, and 
decision-making was at Garang’s prerogative.160 The SPLM/A under Garang was also 
characterized as having failed to effectively wage a revolutionary people’s war. 161 
According to a subsequent press release on Garang’s removal, actions to remove Garang 
from the leadership of the SPLM/A were taken in order to “save the movement from 
imminent collapse.”162 However, in spite of the sentiments expressed in the Nasir 
Declaration, the coup leaders aspired to top leadership in the South, and their subsequent 
actions revealed their true motives to be parochial and tribal.163 In addition, the Nasir 
faction’s calls for human rights and democracy were further discredited by the fact that 
they, like the group from which they had split, committed human rights abuses.164 
 
The leaders of the Nasir faction were motivated by the opportunity to capitalise on a slew 
of aforementioned grievances against Garang in the South.165 Furthermore, the Nasir 
faction – also known as SPLM/A-Nasir – had ideological differences with Garang over 
the concept of a unified ‘New Sudan.’ By distinguishing themselves from Garang’s 
unionist rhetoric, Machar and Akol hoped other SPLA commanders would rally to their 
explicitly secessionist cause, which would appeal to many southerners.166 With the 
creation of new post-Soviet states and Eritrea’s imminent independence, the leaders of 
SPLM/A-Nasir perceived that the international order was changing in such a way that 
might favour outright sentiments in favour of the South’s secession from Sudan.167 
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However, contrary to their expectations, the Nasir coup did not receive the response its 
architects had anticipated. Although many SPLA commanders may have agreed with the 
Nasir faction’s grievances, they were more receptive to reform within the SPLA than to a 
change in leadership.168 The view that the timing was not optimal for a change in 
leadership was amplified by the SPLA’s weakened position in the aftermath of the loss of 
Ethiopian support, and of the SPLA’s rear base after the fall of the Mengistu regime.169 
Moreover, mobilization in support of the coup failed to expand beyond the Nuer and 
Shilluk areas of Upper Nile, and thus lacked popular support throughout much of the 
South.170 
 
Two factors gave the split within the SPLM/A an ethnic dimension, thus transforming 
what had originally been a conflict over leadership. First, as two of the three leaders of 
the Nasir coup (Machar and Kong) were Nuer and Garang was Dinka, and the troops that 
followed them were Nuer, the split was perceived as falling along Dinka-Nuer lines.171 
(Akol failed to get his Shilluk kinsmen to side with the Nasir faction, having allegedly 
alienated them when he was zonal commander in northern Upper Nile in 1987-88.)172 
Consequently, the SPLA and the Nasir faction took on a more Dinka and Nuer character, 
respectively.173 Additionally, some of the Nuer that supported the Nasir coup included 
many of the Anyanya II elements that had been absorbed into the SPLA in the late 1980s, 
and may have been motivated more by their ethnic identity than by their understanding of 
the ideals of the Nasir Declaration.174 Those that rose to the support of the Nasir coup 
were also motivated by personal animosity towards Garang and feelings of betrayal and 
injustice as a result of his defeat of Anyanya II in the early days of the rebellion.175 Many 
who had joined the SPLA after the peace and unification agreement of 1988 had still not 
recovered from the fact that the Nuer had failed to take leadership of the Southern 
rebellion from the Dinka, as the Anyanya II-SPLA conflict had been fought along Nuer-
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Dinka lines.176 Thus, the Nasir coup was also an opportunity for these individuals to 
challenge what they perceived to be ‘Dinka hegemony,’ which had generated a sense of 
marginalization and resentment within the movement. 177  Second, in an attempt to 
encourage fence-sitters to defect to SPLA-Nasir, Machar’s primarily Eastern Jikany Nuer 
and Lou Nuer fighters attacked Garang’s home turf in Jonglei State. Due to the 
indiscriminate slaughter of Dinka civilians during this offensive into primarily Dinka-
inhabited areas, his plan instead turned southern and international community opinion 
against the Nasir faction, thereby solidifying Garang’s control of the southern 
resistance.178 
 
The years following the split within the SPLM/A saw some of the worst atrocities of the 
broader north-south conflict and an unprecedented scale of displacement and killing 
between the Dinka and the Nuer.179 Both Garang, as leader of the SPLM/A-Mainstream 
(also called SPLM/A-Torit or the Torit faction), and Machar were perceived to have 
reached for the ‘ethnic card,’ from which the conflict devolved into warlordism.180 This 
dynamic ushered in a civil war in the South as a subset of the broader conflict with the 
Government of Sudan.181 
 
By 1994, the Nasir faction itself (also called SPLM/A-United) had fractured into tribal 
and regional splinter groups.182 Machar and Akol split in February 1994 when the latter 
was ousted as Secretary for External Affairs and Peace in the Interim National Executive 
Committee. Akol remained the de facto leader of SPLM/A-United, and Machar changed 
the name of his movement to South Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) 
between 1994 and 1997. Other SPLM/A splinter groups included the SPLA-Unity groups 
led by Cdr. William Nyuon Bany (assassinated in 1995), SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal led by 
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Cdr. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol (killed under mysterious circumstances in 1999), SPLA-Bor 
led by Cdr. Arok Thon Arok, and the Equatoria Defence Force led by Cdr. Theophilous 
Ochand.183 These splits of SPLM/A-United were a function of that faction’s inability to 
create an alternative leadership of the national liberation struggle as well as of its 
collaboration with the government in Khartoum.184 By the mid-1990s, the leaders of these 
SPLM/A splinter groups were fighting for personal survival,185 and many eventually 
became components of the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) in the late-1990s.186 
Continuation of Khartoum Support to Armed Groups 
 
Also responsible for transforming a North-South conflict into a South-South one was the 
Government of Sudan’s continued support to the loose assortment of SPLA splinter 
groups and tribal militias that emerged from the splintering of the SPLM/A.187 The goal 
of the ruling National Islamic Front regime in Sudan was to encourage factionalism by 
funnelling arms, food, large sums of money and other supplies to these groups, using 
them as proxies to compensate for the Sudanese military’s previous lack of success on the 
battlefield. Splits within the liberation movement allowed the NIF government to impose 
its ‘peace from within’ strategy, through which it promoted divisions within the South by 
co-opting factional leaders and giving them military and financial support, with the intent 
of starving the SPLA of grassroots support and weakening the South through 
Balkanization.188 In an attempt to prevent the emergence of a cohesive command 
structure with the political clout to represent southern interests, the Sudan Armed Force’s 
Military Intelligence maintained separate relationships with individual commanders of 
such SPLA splinter groups, even encouraging local-level commanders to challenge their 
superiors or form breakaway factions.189 Some commanders of non-SPLA armed groups 
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had formal commissions in the SAF, and were offered rewards of cash, cattle and houses 
in Khartoum to guarantee their acquiescence.190  
 
Like Anyanya II before it, SPLA-Nasir established an alliance of convenience with the 
NIF regime in Khartoum to fight what was now SPLM/A-Mainstream – in spite of its 
claims to be fighting for secession from Sudan.191 Without support from the Sudanese 
government, the Nasir faction had no means of resupplying their troops, and no access to 
arms and ammunition. In September 1991, Machar signed a protocol to coordinate 
military operations with the Government of Sudan, and further formalized this 
collaboration in the Frankfurt Agreement signed in January 1992.192 As a result of these 
agreements, Machar’s forces did not attack the SAF between 1991 and 1999.193 
 
Although reliance on a regime determined to thwart independence created a clear 
ideological dissonance with the Nasir faction’s secessionist platforms, the group saw 
Khartoum’s support as a means to fight the near enemy – the SPLA – before turning their 
attention to the far enemy – the Sudanese government itself. 194  This dissonance 
ultimately cost these the Nasir faction and other SPLA splinter groups their political 
credibility in the eyes of the international community and the people of South Sudan, and 
discredited their claims to be fighting for an independent South Sudan.195  
 
In addition to weakening the SPLM/A, the Government of Sudan sought to develop a 
‘cordon sanitaire’ around oil-producing areas in Western Upper Nile, from which many 
of Machar’s soldiers hailed.196 The Government of Sudan thus armed southern militia 
groups in order to displace proximate populations and expand the development of the oil 
                                                
190 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan. 
191 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan; Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars; LeRiche and 
Arnold, South Sudan. 
192 Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace; Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan. 
193 Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights. 
194  Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars; “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s 
Uncertain Peace,” Africa Report No 96 (International Crisis Group, July 25, 2005), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/The%20Khartoum-
SPLM%20Agreement%20Sudans%20Uncertain%20Peace.pdf; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan. 
195 Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan. 
196 Young, The Fate of Sudan. 
 71 
industry.197 Government proxies were encouraged to attack these areas in order to 
conceal the hand of the government, and to achieve what direct military action could not 
in terms of controlling the oilfields of the South.198 Between 1992 and 1994, the 
Government of Sudan was given free passage through SPLM/A-United territory, thus 
causing the SPLA to lose strategic territories, and enabling government forces to regain 
the offensive in the South. SPLM/A-Mainstream managed to recover by 1996, and 
launched a successful counter-offensive. In order to reverse this tide, the Government of 
Sudan attempted to mobilize some of the southern opposition to the SPLA and provide 
them with weapons to coordinate an offensive. When this plan failed, the government 
made southern militia leaders formally part of the SAF by reinstating their SAF 
commissions.199 
 
In April 1996, the Government of Sudan signed the Political Charter with the SSIM 
under Riek Machar and SPLM/A-Bahr al-Ghazal under Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and in 
April 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement incorporated the Political Charter into an 
agreement that also included SPLM/A-Bor, the Equatoria Defence Force, the South 
Sudan Independents Group (SSIG), and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP). The 
groups that signed these agreements called for a federal state, with provisions to call for a 
referendum for southerners to determine their political aspirations at some point in the 
future.200 These groups collectively adopted a new name – the United Democratic 
Salvation Front (UDSF), with the South Sudan Coordinating Council headed by Riek 
Machar. Additionally, these agreements brought non-SPLM/A armed groups in the South 
under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Forces, which would come to be the 
greatest military competitor to the SPLA in the South. Leaders who, by signing the KPA, 
pledged allegiance to the government in Khartoum, still had a measure of autonomy and 
separate lines of logistic support from the government in the areas in which they 
operated.201 Many had little in common with one another, save deep antipathy for the 
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SPLA’s dominance of the rebellion in the South.202 In addition to being head of the 
UDSF, Machar became the commander in chief of the South Sudan Defence Forces. In 
spite of the ambiguous and non-committal promises made in the Political Charter, 
Machar continued to fight the SPLA, primarily to preserve the Nuer as a political 
counterbalance to the SPLA.203 
 
In the late 1990s, an intra-Nuer civil war broke out in Upper Nile due to a rivalry between 
Riek Machar and Paulino Matip Nhial. Matip had been integrated into the Sudanese 
Armed Forces after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, but left for Ethiopia after rebelling 
in 1975. Between 1985 and 1986, he returned to Western Upper Nile and led Anyanya 
II.204 Due to the SPLA’s attacks on Anyanya II in 1983, Matip had not integrated into the 
SPLA, although some of his militia had been incorporated between 1986 and 1988.205 
Following the Nasir coup, Matip joined Machar’s breakaway faction in 1991, and his 
forces were incorporated into the SSDF following the Khartoum Peace Agreement.206 
 
However, forces aligned with Machar and Matip began fighting in September 1997 
following a contentious gubernatorial election in Unity State in which members of the 
state assembly voted overwhelmingly for Taban Deng Gai, the UDSF candidate. Matip’s 
preferred candidate lost, after which he refused to concede defeat. In December 1997, 
Matip began attacking Machar’s forces with the tacit approval of the Government of 
Sudan.207 He then formed the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A) in 1998, 
incorporating former Anyanya II and Bul Nuer forces, and supported by the Sudanese 
government. By April 1999, the Sudanese government shifted support from Machar to 
Matip because the former’s duplicity had caused him to lose credibility and alienate other 
southern militia leaders.208 After he failed to stem the forced displacement of civilians by 
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the Government of Sudan in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, many Nuer also eventually 
turned against Machar’s leadership.209 
 
The Sudanese government’s broader strategy was to stoke the flames of intra-Nuer 
fighting and develop individual military alliances with Machar’s rivals, thereby enticing 
them to challenge his leadership.210 The SAF Military Intelligence had a separate 
relationship with individual commanders, with the intention of preventing the SSDF from 
developing an overall command structure or political clout to apply pressure on the 
government to implement the provisions of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.  
Accordingly, the Sudanese government used Matip as a political counterweight to 
Machar in order to undermine the agreement.211 Wary of the UDSF’s self-determination 
agenda, the Sudanese government did not want Machar’s forces in control of the oilfields 
in western Upper Nile.212 Matip’s forces operated in Bul Nuer territory and provided a 
buffer against SPLM/A incursions into Blocks 1, 2, and 4 from their strongholds in Bahr 
al-Ghazal.213 The Government of Sudan also separately supported Gabriel Tanginye 
(defected from Machar in 1997), Gordon Kong Chuol (defected from Machar in 1999), 
Simon Gatwich Dual, and Garkoth Hothnyang operating across Upper Nile, as part of a 
strategy to divide the SSDF into smaller Nuer militias.214 After an April 2001 conference, 
the Nuer, Dinka, and Equatorian southern armed groups aligned with the Government of 
Sudan were unified under the SSDF under the general command of Paulino Matip.215 The 
addition of new groups included members of the Bari, Didinga, Dinka, Fertit, Mundari, 
Murle, Nuer, and Toposa communities, many of whom had started out as localized self- 
defence militias to protect their communities from the marauding SPLA. 216  The 
amalgamation of these groups under the umbrella of the SSDF significantly increased its 
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size, areas of control, and ability to disrupt the SPLA.217 These non-SPLA armed groups 
received little support from the government unless they were fighting the SPLA.218 The 
government’s handling of pro-government militias reflected their desire to prevent the 
emergence of a cohesive and effective representative of southern interests. 219  The 
rationale was that a referendum on self-determination could not be held in the South as 
long as the Nuer were fighting among themselves.220 
 
Throughout the war, the South-South divisions and intra-ethnic fighting allowed the 
Government of Sudan to cast the South as ‘ungovernable,’ and absolve itself of the blame 
for insecurity in the South – despite its historical marginalization of its peripheries and 
support for militia groups.221 The government’s approach was thus not only able to evade 
accountability, but also to prevent the development of political-military cohesion in the 
South.222 Throughout the 1990s, defections between pro-government militias and the 
SPLA were frequent. Once it became evident that the Government of Sudan did not 
intend for its Southern proxies to participate in the decision-making of the state, many 
defected back to the SPLA or acted as mercenaries to clear the path for oil exploration.223 
 
Riek Machar led the SSDF and the USDF until January 2000, when he resigned from his 
posts in the Government of Sudan as Assistant President of the Republic, Chairman of 
the Coordinating Council, and President of the UDSF and Commander-in-Chief of the 
United Democratic South Sudan Forces (UDSSF). 224  His rationale was that the 
government had failed to implement the Khartoum Peace Agreement, and with the 
collapse of peace from within, they had to give external peace processes another try.225  
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Machar then formed the Sudan People’s Defence Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF), 
which he led until his return to the SPLA in January 2002, when Machar and Garang 
reconciled, signing the Nairobi Declaration of Unity. The Nairobi Declaration formally 
merged the SPLM/A and the SPDF, which agreed to coordinate military operations 
against the NIF regime. The agreement also made Machar second-in-command of the 
SPLM/A, after which several of his soldiers joined the Government of Sudan’s forces 
rather than return to the SPLM/A.226 Machar’s return to the SPLM/A helped mitigate 
some of the divisions in the South in the months preceding the signing of the Machakos 
Protocol (July 2002), which was the first of many protocols that came to comprise the 
CPA.227 However, violence between the SPLA and its rivals in the South, such as the 
South Sudan Defence Forces and various ethnically defined local self-defence militias, 
subsequently increased.228 
OAGs and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 
There had been many attempts to negotiate an end to Sudan’s second civil war 
throughout the 1990s.229 After over a decade of false starts, the government and the 
SPLM/A signed the CPA in January 2005, brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD). Given its narrow focus on brokering peace between the 
National Islamic Front – and the National Congress Party (NCP) that succeeded it – and 
the SPLM, historian John Young has rather appropriately described the CPA as an 
“agreement reached on an acceptance of the lowest common denominator of the 
parties.”230 As a result, the CPA overemphasised the north-south dynamic of the conflict, 
and lacked explicit provisions for South-South peace.231 
 
On the part of the mediators of the peace process, there were concerns that expanding the 
participation in peace talks would make a process that was difficult to begin with too 
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complex, unworkable, and difficult to conclude.232 In fact, groups outside of the NCP and 
the SPLM/A, eventually referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the CPA, had 
repeatedly requested formal or observer status for the IGAD peace process.233 However, 
IGAD mediators erroneously assumed that each party would also represent the interests 
of the political opposition and armed groups in the North and the South, respectively.234 
Additionally, the signatories to the agreement likewise resisted expanded participation in 
the peace process. In the South, the NCP feared the SSDF, which Young claims was of 
comparable size to the SPLA, would make common cause with the SPLM/A, and did not 
trust them because they were southerners and continued to insist on the South’s right to 
self-determination as articulated in the Khartoum Peace Agreement. 235 The SPLM/A 
feared that bringing the SSDF into peace talks would undermine their claim of militarily 
controlling most of the rural South.236 Furthermore, they viewed groups like the SSDF as 
government-sponsored militias, whose equities should have been addressed by the 
Government of Sudan. 
 
The failure to accommodate non-NCP and non-SPLM/A representatives to the peace 
talks meant that the CPA firmly entrenched parties with no democratic legitimacy in 
power. Moreover, this approach created many potential spoilers to the peace process, and 
contributed to the subsequent conflicts that emerged in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue 
Nile in the North, and across the South, such as the post-2010 election rebellions and the 
outbreak of civil war in December 2013. 
 
As CPA negotiations progressed, the SPLA made several attempts to pursue 
reconciliation with the SSDF and other armed groups. Such attempts, however, were 
compromised by the legacy of wartime atrocities perpetrated by all sides, which 
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contributed to an environment of mistrust and antagonism. Furthermore, many armed 
group leaders harboured personal grudges against Garang as a result of his authoritarian 
leadership and his ideological preference for a united ‘New Sudan’, while Garang himself 
was often dismissive of non-SPLA armed groups, referring to them as Government of 
Sudan-sponsored militias.237 Indeed, as the bearer of a much-desired peace agreement, 
Garang believed himself to be in a strong negotiating position, and his intransigence with 
regard to the specifics of reconciliation efforts impeded their progress.238  
 
There is much speculation about Garang’s intentions towards armed groups as the CPA 
negotiations drew to a close and Southern Sudan entered the Interim Period of the peace 
agreement. For example, there has been speculation that Garang wished to militarily 
defeat his southern opponents, despite his failure to do so since the split within the SPLA 
in 1991, or that he wanted a minor insurgency in order to maintain control in the South.239 
There has also been speculation that Garang was concerned that the integration of such a 
large group of Nuer into the SPLA would have increased their leverage and dilute his 
leadership. This is why he may have opposed the collective integration of the SSDF into 
the SPLA, instead encouraging individual SSDF commanders to defect.240 These groups 
represented a political challenge to Garang, and with strong backing by the international 
community, he may have believed it was not necessary to accommodate them.241 
Regardless of what Garang’s approach would have been, his death in July 2005 left the 
issue of addressing the threat posed by OAGs to his successor. Salva Kiir, as the 
unexpected new leader of South Sudan, then had to act with urgency to meet the January 
2006 deadline set in the CPA’s Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security 
Arrangements for all members of OAGs not aligned with the SPLA to either demobilise 
or redeploy north of the border to be integrated into the SAF. 
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The Rumbek Affair 
 
In the weeks prior to the signing of the CPA, a high-profile rift emerged between Garang 
and his deputy Salva Kiir, as rumours circulated that the former intended to arrest and 
dismiss the latter as the SPLA’s second in command. Refusing to leave Yei, where he 
was based at the time, Kiir subsequently gathered senior SPLA commanders from his 
home area in Warrap state, who he believed would remain loyal to him.242 According to 
some explanations of this clash, Kiir started to form alliances with the support of the 
government in Khartoum, militia groups, and dissident southern politicians in order to 
confront Garang militarily.243 
 
As this standoff was in the waning days of CPA negotiations, there was an added urgency 
towards resolution, lest the fissure between Kiir and Garang threaten the impending 
signing of the peace agreement.244 Between November 29 and December 1, 2004, the 
senior leadership of the SPLM/A held an emergency conference in the town of Rumbek. 
According to the minutes of the meeting, which were subsequently leaked, several 
members of the SPLM/A leadership essentially expressed their lack of confidence in 
Garang and many of his commanders.245  Accusations levied against them included 
mismanagement of the movement, rampant corruption, lack of inclusive decision-making 
processes, failure to develop a governance system for the future of Southern Sudan, and 
delaying a dialogue with other southern opposition groups.246 Although it became clear 
during the course of the Rumbek meeting that several individuals within the movement 
shared Kiir’s grievances and had presented clear issues with Garang’s leadership, they 
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feared division on the eve of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
could not agree on a viable alternative.247 
 
Following the Rumbek incident, Kiir was replaced as Chief of Staff and retired from the 
SPLA, and was subsequently appointed vice president of the Government of Southern 
Sudan, which is how he came to succeed Garang upon his death just seven months later. 
Had Garang lived, there is speculation that it may have only been a matter of time before 
the next confrontation within the senior leadership of the movement.248 Notably, the 
grievances levied against Garang in 2004 mirrored the grievances articulated by the Nasir 
faction in 1991, and foreshadowed those raised against Kiir himself prior to the outbreak 
of civil war in South Sudan in 2013. The Rumbek incident presented a cautionary tale for 
pushing the resolution of the SPLM/A’s internal dissonance down the road, and 
demonstrated the fragility of political-military alliances in the South. 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter covered several themes that are relevant to understanding the background 
behind why the Government of South Sudan approached armed groups the way they did 
during the interim period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The first theme is the 
legacy of internal divisions within the southern rebellion – from tensions between 
Anyanya II and the SPLM/A in the 1980s to the splits within the SPLM/A in the 1990s to 
the falling out between Garang and Kiir on the eve of the signing of the CPA. The 
SPLM/A’s method of bringing in other armed groups is the second theme, from the 
integration of Anyanya II to coalescing into a unified group in advance of the signing of 
the CPA. The third theme is Khartoum’s support of non-SPLA armed groups in order to 
encourage factionalisation and weaken the SPLA, and how this led (as will be detailed in 
Chapter 4) the Government of South Sudan to have to outbid the Government of Sudan 
for loyalty of these rebel leaders during the interim period. Finally, the exclusive nature 
of the peace process, with only the SPLM/A as the representative of southern interests 
during the peace process, is the fourth theme. While restricted participation may have 
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simplified the negotiation process, it meant that the Government of South Sudan was 
behoved to negotiate a separate South-South peace and seek political-military 
accommodation with excluded parties for the purpose of peace and stability. Across these 
four themes, we can start to understand why the Government of South Sudan embarked 
on the path of military integration. 
 
In Chapter 4, I will discuss why the Government of South Sudan started down the path of 
political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups and how it dealt with the 
issues of factionalism, Khartoum’s divide-and-rule tactics, and an exclusive peace 
process covered in this chapter in the aftermath of the CPA. But first, in Chapter 3, I will 
provide a review of the literature on military integration during war-to-peace transitions, 




Chapter 3: Review of the Literature on Military Integration 
Introduction 
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the southern rebellion was fragmented during the 
Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) due to competition between Anyanya II and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the proliferation of SPLA splinter groups in the 
1990s. Moreover, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the National 
Congress Party in the North and the SPLM/A in the South not only excluded other 
political and armed opposition groups across Sudan, but also failed to account for peace 
among the various southern rebel movements that had been fighting each other 
throughout the conflict. In order to comply with the stipulations of the CPA and 
consolidate political-military power in advance of the 2011 referendum on self-
determination, the Government of South Sudan largely decided to seek political-military 
accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups by integrating them into the SPLA.  
 
This thesis uses the case of South Sudan to examine the role of military integration 
during war-to-peace transitions. As defined in Chapter 1, military integration is a peace-
building strategy that involves the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus 
of the state by incorporating or amalgamating armed groups into a statutory security 
framework.249 As will be detailed in Chapter 4, military integration in South Sudan 
included negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank 
assignment, and division assignment. This process was concurrent to a transformation of 
South Sudan’s defence sector, to be discussed in Chapter 5, which entailed both 
rightsizing and professionalizing the military. 
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This chapter draws upon a sparse, but growing body of theoretical and empirical analysis 
of military integration. The literature that drives this thesis situates the concept of military 
integration at the intersection of broader analyses of negotiated settlements to civil wars, 
provisions for accommodating potential spoilers during war-to-peace transitions, and 
post-conflict defence sector transformation. Within this literature, several themes emerge, 
which are relevant to understanding the role that military integration plays during the 
transition from war to peace: 
• the rationales that drive former combatants to seek political-military 
accommodation through military integration;  
• how military integration can be a transitional security measure; 
• the practical application of dual track military integration and demobilisation 
processes;  
• how an open-ended military integration process can provide incentives for 
defection or non-compliance;  
• the role of social, task, and political cohesion within a newly integrated military;  
• the role of third parties in military integration processes; and 
• whether or not military integration can lead to sustainable peace. 
 
In this chapter, I will give an overview of the literature on military integration, then 
provide insights on the relationships between this literature and the case of military 
integration in South Sudan between the 2006 Juba Declaration and the outbreak of civil 
war in December 2013. In so doing, I will highlight the contributions this thesis makes to 
the discourse on military integration. 
Overview of the Literature 
 
Some analyses of military integration tend to take a strategic-level approach and are, as a 
result, more theoretical than they are practical. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and 
Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008), for example, derive insights on the process of military 
integration from large-n quantitative studies, while others such as Møller and Cawthra 
(2007), Burgess (2008), Knight (2009), Colletta (2012), and Licklider (2014) use 
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qualitative analysis. Overlapping with this strategic-level perspective of military 
integration are studies by Walter (2002), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), Glassmyer and 
Sambanis (2008), Sriram (2008), and Toft (2009) that cover the potential benefits of 
integration and conceptualize military integration as one dimension of power-sharing, 
along with political, economic, and territorial power-sharing. Additionally, strategic-level 
analyses delve into models of military integration, such as Knight’s (2009) concept of 
incorporation versus amalgamation, Krebs and Licklider’s (2014) conceptualization of 
the magnitude of integration, and well as the extent of horizontal and vertical integration, 
Burgess and Licklider’s (2015) technocratic versus political integration, and Licklider’s 
(2015) hypothesis that individual integration may be more successful than collective 
integration.  
 
Other studies of military integration are case studies of one, and sometimes up to three 
countries that go into far more country-specific depth than the aforementioned studies. 
Here, we have Dennis (Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), Baaz and Verweijen 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), Gaub (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Nigeria), 
Hall (Philippines), Jowell (Rwanda), Karake (Rwanda), Kibasomba (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), Koekenbier (Lebanon), Jackson (Zimbabwe), Lucas (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), Malache and Macaringue (Mozambique), Rupiah (Zimbabwe), 
Rusagara (Rwanda), Samii (Burundi), Warner (South Sudan), Wilén (Burundi, Rwanda 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Williams (South Africa).250 However, of 
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these case studies, few delve into the specific means and modalities of the integration 
process, or how the process is executed from start to finish. This thesis will cover these 
aspects of integration for the case of South Sudan in Chapter 4. 
 
Some of the case study authors narrow their focus to a specific aspect of military 
integration. From the perspective of a practitioner, Dennis (1992) focuses on the role of 
British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATTs) in Mozambique, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe, and potential implications for South Africa, as it amalgamated armed groups 
into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) when apartheid ended in the 
early 1990s. Baaz and Verweijen (2013) highlight the drawbacks of an ‘open-door’ 
military integration process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Gaub’s (2010) 
study analyses multi-ethnic military cohesion in Nigeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Lebanon, while Koekenbier’s (2005) study of Lebanon’s multi-ethnic military before and 
after the 1975-1009 civil war derives insights for Iraq’s multi-ethnic security forces after 
the U.S. invasion in 2003. In separate analyses, Karake (2008), Rusagara (2011), and 
Jowell (2014) examine the Rwandan practice of ingando, a tool used to rebuild trust 
between Hutus and Tutsis after the genocide, when the Forces Armées Rwandaises 
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(FAR) were integrated into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Wilén’s (2015) analysis 
focuses on post-war professionalization, socialization, welfare-provision, and political 
education in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while Samii 
(2006) uses the case of Burundi to demonstrate the utility of a quota-based integration 
system during the post-civil war establishment of the Burundi National Defence Force 
(BNDF). Finally, Wilén, Birantamije, and Ambrosetti (2015) examine the temporarily 
stabilizing effect that Burundi’s involvement in peace support operations in Somalia and 
the Central African Republic since 2007 had on the military in the aftermath of 
integration. 
Rationales behind Political-Military Accommodation  
 
The literature on military integration details several justifications for why former 
combatants decide to share power along political, military, economic, and territorial 
dimensions following negotiated settlements to conflict. Accommodation through 
military power-sharing provides armed groups with an ‘insurance policy,’ or security 
guarantee, in case peace negotiations become derailed.  According to Møller and Cawthra 
(2007), this approach notionally mitigates the vulnerability of armed groups after they 
have disarmed and ceded control of occupied territory. Beyond peace negotiations, 
Walter (2002) asserts how the ability to defend armed group interests may mitigate the 
chance that rivals could exclude them from power or easily seize control of the state. At 
the same time, Krebs and Licklider (2015) dispel the myth that military integration 
provides security to vulnerable populations. Depending on the level of integration into 
the military and its operational capacity, some constituencies may still be vulnerable if, 
for example, they are severely under-represented in the military, concentrated in certain 
units, or if the military lacks the operational reach to protect them. 
 
The notion of an ‘insurance policy’ for armed groups participating in a military 
integration process is reflected in a handful of empirical cases: In South Africa, the 
retention of armed forces on the part of the apartheid-era government and the African 
National Congress (ANC) that succeeded them was seen as a psychological and symbolic 
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asset necessary to appease their respective constituents.251 Pending a political solution in 
Iraq that would ensure their security against other groups, militias were an ‘insurance 
policy’ before they eventually transitioned into the statutory security forces – in the 
legitimizing uniforms of the national forces – to further the sectarian interests of their 
masters.252 Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, members of integrated 
brigades retained parallel chains of command, which served as a potential fallback for 
political leaders who may have found the outcomes of the 2006 elections unfavourable.253 
 
Another rationale behind political-military accommodation is that containing formerly 
warring parties in a statutory security framework limits the manpower available for 
armed group mobilization. Based on the assumption that former combatants can be 
spoilers to the peace process, Berdal and Ucko (2009) argue that the demilitarization of 
non-statutory armed forces is meant to ensure that combatants do not return to conflict or 
otherwise undermine stability. According to Hall (2009) and Licklider (2014), limiting 
the manpower available for armed group mobilization through military integration can 
reduce the likelihood of armed conflict due to the fact that it makes it less likely that a 
new force can be readily used against either side. Alternatively, Licklider (2014) posits 
that military integration might make renewed civil war less likely in the aftermath of a 
negotiated settlement by reducing the fear among former antagonists or making the 
military less threatening to members of integrated groups. Indeed, with the reassurance 
that military power is unlikely to be used against them, Licklider argues that warring 
parties may be more amenable to taking risky steps toward resolving underlying 
disputes.254  
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Finally, military integration can introduce diversity into the armed forces, thereby making 
the military a symbol of national unity. According to Hall (2009), military integration in 
the aftermath of armed conflict can be a way to address identity-based conflicts and 
introduce diversity into the composition of the armed forces. Hall (2009) and Licklider 
(2014) argue that integration can make the military a ‘school for the nation,’ in the hope 
that collective experiences and sustained contact among formerly competing groups will 
erode communal boundaries and symbolize integration for society as a whole. 
Identity, Cohesion and Military Integration  
 
Uniting former enemies into one structure to work towards the common goal of securing 
the country notionally allows them to forge trust, build cohesion, and prevent the 
maintenance of competing allegiances (Hajayandi 2015). Within the literature on military 
integration, discussions of identity and cohesion within a newly reconstituted armed 
forces are relevant to the aforementioned concept of an integrated military having nation-
building potential or becoming a ‘school for the nation.’  
 
Some of this literature approaches the military as an effective vehicle for fostering 
national cohesion and integrating a country’s diverse population. This argument is 
predicated on the belief that participation in the military emphasizes collectivism rather 
than individualism, and thus facilitates integration (Gaub 2010). The military, according 
to Gaub (2010) is a collective endeavour that seeks unity, purpose, effectiveness, and 
functionality, similar to the characteristics Simonsen (2007) highlights as unifying factors 
within a country’s armed forces: the all-consuming nature of military life, the strict 
hierarchy and opportunities for meritocratic advancement independent of ethnic 
background, the perception of the military as the most modern institution in an 
underdeveloped country, and the shared notion of national service across ethnic groups.  
 
Simonsen (2007) argues that, if a new inclusive military can be built successfully, it may 
be able to contribute to the construction of a national identity that transcends the ethnic 
divisions of a post-conflict society – thus decreasing their salience and the risk of armed 
conflict. He describes the notion of military personnel returning home after military 
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service and disseminating their new ‘national’ inspirations to civilians in their areas of 
origin, who may thereby start thinking in terms of the shared interests they may have with 
other ethnic groups.255 
 
Simonsen (2007) posits that an ethnically representative military is less likely to pursue 
ethnically divisive goals. The author asserts that the integrative power of the military as a 
nation-building enterprise is contingent not only on its ethnic makeup, but also on its 
composition, effectiveness, and professionalism, and the nature of interethnic relations 
within the force. Berdal (1996) highlights that one of the major challenges in the 
aftermath of conflict is to overcome ethnic divisions, which may have been reinforced 
during the war. Berdal (2009) argues in subsequent analysis that it is necessary to pay 
particular attention to the ethnic composition of forces in order to gain legitimacy and 
prevent further destabilization. Therefore, Simonsen (2007) argues that ethnically-mixed 
units should be formed, trained, and deployed because ethnically segregated units serve 
to uphold ethnic divisions within the army – and possibly within society as a whole. 
 
Based on the literature on cohesion and military integration, I have derived three 
dimensions across which cohesion can be fostered during transitions from war-to-peace: 
political indoctrination, common professional orientation, and social contact. These three 
dimensions are not mutually exclusive, as cohesion can be fostered through multiple 
dimensions during a military integration process.  
 
Political indoctrination is the use of re-education to secure political control over potential 
adversaries and reify the socio-political reforms that military victory made possible – but 
certainly did not guarantee.256 While considering eleven cases of military integration 
Burgess and Licklider (2015) describe the ingando process that followed the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda as this type of ‘political model’ of integration, in contrast with the 
                                                
255 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Building ‘National’ Armies—Building Nations? Determinants of Success for 
Postintervention Integration Efforts,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (July 1, 2007): 571–90, 
doi:10.1177/0095327X06291347. 
256 Stephen F. Burgess and Roy Licklider, “Contrasting Models of Military Integration after Civil Wars” 
(International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 2015). 
 89 
‘technocratic model’ used in post-apartheid South Africa, which focused on conventional 
military training for former combatants. 
 
Krebs (2004) characterizes the military as an institution in which personnel are required 
to perform common tasks in a highly structured environment and in close quarters. 
Accordingly, cohesion fostered through common professional orientation refers to the 
development of a common purpose and a shared commitment to achieving a task 
(Simonsen 2007). Notably, Simonsen warns that in the most extreme cases, a lack of 
shared objectives may cause a force to disintegrate. 
 
Finally, cohesion fostered through social contact refers to emotional bonds between 
members of the armed forces (Simonsen 2007). The belief in the integrative power of 
socialization within an integrated military is predicated on the so-called ‘contact 
hypothesis’ – that contact at the individual level has a socializing effect on military 
personnel. According to the contact hypothesis, the armed forces bring together people 
from various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds in a collaborative spirit in 
pursuit of a common cause. This environment can be suitable for breaking down 
communal boundaries, suggesting that intense interaction among individuals of varied 
backgrounds can eliminate prejudicial attitudes and behaviour (Krebs 2004). As a 
proponent of the contact hypothesis, Gaub (2010) argues that life in the military may 
deconstruct or soften ethnic identification, thereby facilitating cooperation across ethnic 
boundaries erected due to conflict. Using this logic, she posits that multi-ethnic militaries 
contribute to social integration, with a secondary benefit of contributing to peace 
consolidation.257 Krebs (2004) disputes the explanatory power of the contact hypothesis, 
arguing that it is plausible but theoretically indeterminate. He goes on to argue that while 
meaningful contact may foster a sense of common destiny, familiarity may breed 
contempt, and may even foster the consciousness of difference. Regardless, he concedes 
that many leaders turn to the armed forces to help build cohesive national communities in 
the quest for national integration, although the vision of the military construct for 
building a national identity may be, in large part, misguided. 
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Rwanda’s use of ingando, a form of peacebuilding, best captures a model of efforts to 
foster a common political orientation during a military integration process. Rusagara 
(2004), Karake (2012), and Jowell (2014) in provide in-depth insight on ingando as a 
political model of indoctrination. In Kinyarwanda, ingando refers to a military 
encampment or assembly area where troops receive their final briefings before deploying 
on a military expedition and are reminded to put national interests above individual ones. 
During this process, former combatants unburden themselves emotionally by discussing 
the conflict in solidarity camps, and undergo intensive political education focusing on a 
pre-colonial Rwanda free from ethnic hatred, and with the unifying ideal of the pre-
colonial military as the defender of the nation. Then, former combatants are assigned to 
mixed units and undertake a joint military deployment, which provides additional 
opportunities to build trust. Finally, members of the armed forces return to their 
communities after joint deployments in the hope that the positive messages from their 
deployment will engender inter-communal trust. This civil-military follow-up is intended 
to address misperceptions and remove barriers to communication. Both Rusagara and 
Karake use ingando to explain how the Rwandan military was able to become more 
cohesive and even overcome the trauma of the 1994 genocide and the preceding decades 
of ethnic strife. In addition, Jowell (2014) highlights how the Rwandan Defence Force’s 
(RDF) emphasis on welfare and political education allowed peer group associations to be 
established, and helped forge cohesion, foster military ethos and strengthen national 
consciousness. 
 
The case of Rwanda also provides an example of an integrated military’s orientation 
towards a common professional task and purpose. Jowell (2014) characterizes how the 
modern-day Rwanda Defence Force originated with Rwandan members of the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, which then formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA) and invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPA then attracted Tutsi recruits during the 
Rwandan civil war (1990-1994) and then transitioned to the post-genocide Rwanda 
Defence Force, which integrated approximately 38,500 former members of the Forces 
Armées Rwandaises (FAR), previously the national military of Rwanda, between 1995 
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and 1998. Over time, the RPA and its successor, the Rwandan Defence Force, were able 
to accomplish what Rusagara (2009) characterized as ‘consolidation of the RDF through 
fire’ – defending against armed incursions by ex-FAR and Interahamwe from late 1994 
until 1996, and intervening against these forces in the neighbouring Democratic Republic 
of the Congo between 1996 and 1997, and again between 1998 and 2003. Furthermore, 
Jowell (2014) notes that receiving professional military education, training in the same 
cohorts, and fighting together allowed peer group associations to be established, and 
helped forge cohesion within the RDF. In addition, because troops deploying on 
peacekeeping operations trained together before and after deployments, peacekeeping, 
like offensive operations, provided additional opportunities for soldiers from different 
backgrounds to work together towards a common cause (Jowell 2014).  
 
The case of Burundi also provides an example of task cohesion – specifically how the 
involvement of a newly integrated military in peacekeeping operations can also improve 
cohesion. According to Wilén, Birantamije, and Ambrosetti (2015), the Burundian 
government used the newly-integrated Burundi National Defence Force’s involvement in 
peacekeeping operations as one way of addressing internal problems, easing tensions, and 
improving cohesion. The authors assert that the benefits the Burundian military received 
from its involvement in international peacekeeping – professionalization, national and 
international prestige, and financial compensation – also weakened the negative ties 
former combatants had formed during the civil war. In late 2007, Burundi became a troop 
contributor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and subsequently 
joined United Nations peacekeeping missions in Darfur, the Central African Republic, 
and Côte d’Ivoire. At a time when the simultaneous disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration and security sector reform processes were placing strains on the delicate 
ethnic balance of the BNDF, deployments to peacekeeping operations not only engaged 
the BNDF’s ‘surplus’ manpower, but also assisted the newly composed BNDF in 
building cohesion against a foreign enemy. As the AMISOM deployment was by far the 
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largest, the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab assumed the position of a common enemy 
around which the BNDF’s cohesion could be forged.258  
 
Finally, Samii (2006) and Gaub’s (2010) analyses on the use of quotas during military 
integration can provide a useful lens for understanding cohesion fostered through social 
contact. After examining the consequences of a quota-based military integration strategy 
in the aftermath of Burundi’s civil war (1994-2003), Samii (2006) found that the Burundi 
National Defence Force operated as a deeply integrated and cohesive institution at the 
macro levels as a result of the imposition of ethnic quotas during the process of military 
integration. Furthermore, at the micro level, he found that the contact that resulted from 
integration reduced the prejudices and ethnic salience among ex-combatants.259 This is 
contrary to the findings he cited from the field of social psychology, that such a method 
could intensify or ‘freeze’ conflicting ethnic identities.260  Like Samii, Gaub (2010) 
supports the idea that the use of quotas can be beneficial in calming fears and ensuring 
that the military has an equitable ethnic complexion. However, she argues that quotas can 
have negative side-effects by creating jealousy among those who do not benefit, 
reinforcing loyalty towards one’s ethnic group, perpetuating the concept of ethnic 
identity, and contradicting the ethos of a military constituted out of merit.261 
 
The empirical literature on the use of quotas in a military integration process details how 
these arrangements were implemented in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Hajayandi (2015) argues that it was necessary to address ethnic and regional 
imbalances in the Burundi National Defence Forces through security sector reform in 
order to prevent the killing of ethnic Hutu leaders in the future. As South Africa played a 
role as a mediator in Burundi, it pushed a model of quota-based integration based on its 
own experience with military integration during its transition to majority rule.262 The 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the Pretoria Protocol on Political Defence 
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and Security Power Sharing, and the Forces Technical Agreement established the concept 
of 50 per cent Hutu-50 per cent Tutsi quotas in the BNDF in order to overcome the 
country’s history of coups and instances of mass killing.263 In addition, the top officer 
echelon would have 60 per cent personnel from the old Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) 
and 40 per cent personnel from the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – 
Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), with the margin between these 
quotas to be made up with Hutu members of the FAB, combatants of other armed 
political parties, and new recruits.264  In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the main 
rebel factions agreed to merge using a quota system based on declared troop numbers.265 
The official quota of integrated brigades was 35 per cent from the Forces Armées 
Congolaises (FAC), 17 per cent from the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, 28 
per cent from the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma, 8 per cent from the Mai-Mai 
and 12 per cent from other groups.266 Each commander was to be assisted by two 
deputies from two different groups so that no one faction could have complete control 
over the chain of command.267 The division of positions in the national and regional 
command structures was also based on a quota system, yet the nomination of individual 
candidates and the distribution of non-senior positions often failed to follow transparent 
criteria.268  
Open-ended Military Integration 
 
The literature on military integration details several drawbacks associated with an open-
ended integration process. An open-ended military integration process can create 
incentives for armed groups to use violence to extract benefits from the state and advance 
their positions. Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011) argue that the military integration 
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process provides perverse incentives to those who spoil peace negotiations, thereby 
encouraging others to behave in a similar manner. In some cases, like in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Møller and Cawthra (2007) assert that military integration has 
actually contributed to insecurity, as members of integrated battalions appeared to 
respond, when they deemed fit, to orders from factional political leadership rather than 
from the transitional government. In their analysis of the military integration process in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Baaz and Verweijen (2013) detail how, in some 
instances of military integration, the process creates a ‘demonstration effect,’ showing 
that violence and disobedience can be translated into benefits. For example, in the DRC, 
commanders who had failed to obtain favourable positions during brassage took the 
initiative to defect from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(FARDC).269 (The French term brassage means ‘brewing’, and refers to the process of 
breaking the chain of command among integrated forces by mixing units for formation 
within the new FARDC). The authors argue that serial, or repeated, military integration 
created a class of military entrepreneurs with incentives to turn desertion, non-
integration, or violence into a political resource, thus reinforcing their position to 
negotiate re-entry into the government’s fold.270 With a lack of credible guarantees to 
sanction defectors, the fact that these individuals have been granted continuous rewards 
can have profoundly demoralizing effects on the troops that have decided to remain 
loyal.271 With no obligation to surrender arms caches, the permission to remain deployed 
in former zones of influence and maintain control of combatants, and a lack of military 
pressure on uncooperative parties, the costs associated with military integration on the 
part of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were rather low.272 
Conversely, potential rewards in the form of financial benefits, impunity for past crimes, 
high ranks, and lucrative deployment locations, were quite high.273 The imbalance 
between costs and rewards led Baaz and Verweijen (2013) to conclude that the relative 
                                                
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese 
Army”; Baaz and Verweijen, “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse.” 




ease with which army deserters could integrate back into the FARDC from a better 
negotiating position played a role in their decision to desert. 
 
Shortcomings in justice and accountability have sometimes been associated with open-
ended military integration processes, as former combatants are perceived as having been 
‘rewarded’ with integration into a country’s security forces. Berdal and Ucko (2009) note 
that in the aftermath of violent conflict, there is often tension between the need to balance 
reconciliation and stability with legitimate demands for justice. Dudouet, Giessmann, and 
Planta (2012) assert that the best way to increase public confidence in the state’s new 
security institutions and build cohesion between former combatants is for all forces to be 
vetted for past war crimes and human rights violations. Similarly, Alden, Thakur, and 
Arnold (2011) note that there are often concerns that individuals responsible for serious 
abuses against civilians must be brought to justice instead of being rewarded. 
 
This tension between justice and accountability and the imperative for military 
integration has manifested differently across various cases of military integration. In 
Colombia, the pursuit of justice for political crimes was not a priority, as most 
combatants, leadership, and rank and file received full pardons for political crimes. 
Guáqueta (2009) notes that there was a sense that this approach was fair, given the flaws 
of the state and some of the ‘objective’ causes behind the rebellion. Jackson (2011) adds 
that, during the integration process in Zimbabwe, there was no vetting for human rights 
violations. Similarly, Baaz and Verweijen (2013) detail how armed groups in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo decided against a vetting process for integration into 
the FARDC. Although the final peace agreement included an amnesty exempting war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, limited efforts were made to implement 
these provisions of the agreement.274 Select armed group leaders – Thomas Lubanga of 
the Union of Congolese Patriots, Mathieu Ngudjolo of the Congolese Revolutionary 
Movement, and Bosco Ntaganda of the Congress for the Defence of the People – 
received amnesty and were integrated into the FARDC. However these individuals were 
subsequently handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to face charges of 
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war crimes. In such instances, Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011) argue that the pursuit of 
justice can lead to mistrust, potentially derailing future amnesty and military integration 
arrangements. 
Military Integration as a Transitional Part of Security Sector Reform 
 
The concept of military integration as a foundation of broader security sector reform is 
absent from much of the literature, and Krebs and Licklider (2015) note that the 
international community’s guides for peace-building and security sector reform lack a 
substantive discussion of military integration. The reason for this, they argue, is due to 
the historical circumstances in which SSR emerged – during relatively peaceful 
transitions to democracy across Europe and Latin America in the 1990s. With a focus on 
transforming formerly authoritarian security forces into those subject to civilian oversight 
during a peaceful transition, there was no need for these guidelines to address the 
integration of armed groups into a statutory security framework.  
 
Some of the literature on military integration, however, characterizes the role that 
military integration plays as a transitional, short-term means by which to contain 
potential spoilers in a statutory transitional security framework. Colletta and Muggah 
(2009) characterize five carefully timed and phased Interim Stabilization Measures 
(ISMs) that can occur between the signing of the peace agreement and its eventual 
implementation, and may accompany Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration. These ISMs include involvement in a civilian service 
corps; military or security sector integration; transitional security forces; semi-
autonomous and decentralized local community forces; or combined military integration 
and civilian reintegration programs.275 Colletta and Muggah assert that the key benefit of 
these ISMs is to convert potential spoilers into stakeholders and take former combatants 
off the battlefield. In this respect, ISMs improve the management of statutory and non-
statutory armed forces, and reduce insecurity by attempting to break the negative 
command relationships of armed groups that are now contained in a transitional security 
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structure. ISMs can also simultaneously prevent the emergence of security vacuums 
during a war-to-peace transition.276 The authors also note that these ISMs can build 
confidence and trust between formerly warring parties, and buy time for the development 
of more favourable social, political, and economic conditions.  
 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to black majority rule provides a useful 
empirical example of how an integration process both coexisted with, and fed into a 
broader security sector reform process. During this process, potential spoilers were 
transformed into stakeholders, negative command relationships were broken, and a post-
apartheid military emerged following the concurrent integration process and reforms to 
the security sector.  
 
Military integration in South Africa was a three-year process that often required political 
interventions from President Mandela and other political elites.277 South Africa’s 1993 
Interim Constitution provided the framework for a singular National Defence Force that 
would be under parliamentary and civil control. 278  Accordingly, the South Africa 
National Defence Force was created by amalgamating the combatant forces of the South 
Africa Defence Force (SADF), Umkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the African 
National Congress), the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (the armed wing of the Pan 
African Congress), and the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC) forces 
from the apartheid era black homelands. A Transitional Executive Council was 
established in late 1993, and one of its sub-councils was the Sub-Council on Defence. 
This entity was responsible for not only maintaining oversight over the armed forces 
during the pre-election phase and the period of transition to majority rule between April 
and May of 1994, but also initiating the planning required to create a new, integrated 
South African National Defence Force. 279  South Africa also had a Joint Military 
Coordinating Council (JMCC), which was responsible for the management of pre-
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integration strategic planning.280 The JMCC was chaired by the South African Defence 
Force chief and the chief of staff of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) on a rotating basis.281 
Representatives on the JMCC were drawn from the SADF, MK, and five other armed 
groups, but in practice, the SADF and MK either co-chaired these committees or 
dominated proceedings.282 The JMCC had working groups to handle issues in service-
specific or functional areas such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and 
finances.283 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence authored a White Paper on National 
Defence in 1996, which articulated a strategy and resourcing plan for the integration 
process, and completed a Defence Review process that provided a blueprint for 
integrating the military and restructuring the defence sector. 284  The fact that the 
integration process was streamlined into South Africa’s security sector reform process 
may have contributed to the success of both processes during South Africa’s transition to 
majority rule. 
Dual Track Military Integration and Demobilisation 
 
Military integration is a distinct process from disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration – the process through which ex-combatants are reintegrated into civilian 
society. However, military integration is a process that can take place prior to, or even 
concurrent to DDR, the provision of livelihoods opportunities, and broader social, 
political, and economic assistance to ex-combatants.285 According to Glassmyer and 
Sambanis (2008) and Jackson (2011), military integration can provide an economic 
incentive for ex-combatants, who might otherwise renew hostilities, to keep the peace by 
providing them with employment. As there is a strong economic incentive for individuals 
to take part in the military integration process to gain employment in the reconstituted 
military, Knight (2011) advises that military integration should not be conceived or 
planned separately from the civilian reintegration process. Indeed, while military 
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integration can reduce the DDR caseload, civilian reintegration programs are sometimes 
used as a substitute for military integration when the funding to support DDR is 
forthcoming.286 
 
Case studies on Burundi and the DRC detail a ‘dual track’ approach to military 
integration. From 2004 to late 2005, 7,000 forces of the National Council for the Defence 
of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy assembled in cantonments, where 
they were immediately merged with 40,000 Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) into integrated 
units. Then, from late 2005, the force was rightsized towards a target of 25,000 army and 
20,000 police, which included the demobilisation of 14,000 soldiers (5,000 from the FAB 
and 9,000 from the CNDD-FDD).287 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo the 
processes of military integration and DDR were also linked. The main rebel factions 
amalgamated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) 
were the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), Movement for the Liberation 
of the Congo (MLC), Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani (RCD-K)/ Rally for 
Congolese Democracy-Movement for Liberation (RCD-ML), Rally for Congolese 
Democracy-National (RCD-N), and Mai-Mai. As military integration and DDR were 
concurrent, these processes were jointly organized by the National Commission for 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER) and the Structure Militaire d’Intégration 
(SMI) under a system called tronc commun (dual-track).288 Under the tronc commun, 
former combatants were given the choice of reintegrating into civilian life or integrating 
into the national army.289 The SMI was responsible for former combatants who wanted to 
integrate into the FARDC. 
 
In its entirety, this process included a census of all former combatants, disarmament at 
assembly points located throughout the country, and transfer to one of at least ten 
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orientation centres. There, they would be selected to either demobilise and return to 
civilian life or to integrate into the FARDC. Those who chose the latter were then sent for 
training at one of six military integration centres, called Centres de Brassage.290 At these 
centres, they would be issued standard FARDC equipment and weapons and undergo 45 
days of basic training. 291  Aside from instilling basic military principles into ex-
combatants, the purpose of brassage was to ensure that old loyalties were broken down 
and that a unified chain of command was established. 292  After brassage, former 
combatants were officially integrated into the army and assigned to one of 18 FARDC 
brigades across the country.293 
Role of Third Parties 
 
Of the 128 civil wars that took place between 1945 and 2006, 40 per cent called for some 
element of military integration.294 Licklider (2014) posits that the increase in military 
integration arrangements can be attributed, inter alia, to the involvement of mediators in 
said settlements. Indeed, according to Hartzell (2014), military integration is often 
implemented due to pressure from the international community – sometimes in the face 
of considerable local resistance. In fact, she asserts that it is likely that the international 
community plays a particularly significant role in increasing the likelihood that military 
integration will be agreed to as part of the civil war settlement.295  
 
Integration can be a turbulent process, implemented in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict when many states remain weak. In this context, Walter (2002), Hoddie and 
Hartzell (2003) and Burgess (2008) assert that third party actors such as bilateral donors 
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or international organizations can help supervise, monitor, and verify compliance with 
the agreement if they are perceived by warring parties to be objective. These authors add 
that third parties can supplement the confidence necessary to fully implement the peace 
agreement by reducing mutual suspicion during the implementation process and by 
helping overcome the actual or perceived political bias of extant security forces.296 In 
addition, third-party actors may be able to distribute observers more easily throughout the 
country without threatening warring parties (Walter 2002), and may be able to 
compensate for gaps in knowledge or technical competence (Dudouet, Giessmann, and 
Planta 2012). 
 
Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta (2012) argue that the involvement of third party actors 
contributes to a sense of minimized risk associated with engaging in the peace process. 
The authors posit that armed groups can notionally divest themselves of the ability to 
defend themselves while relying on the protection provided by a neutral, trusted outside 
force, which can provide objective, non-partisan standards during a rather contentious 
process. However, Walter (2002) asserts that the implementation of peace agreements is a 
function of the confidence that warring parties have in the commitment of third-party 
actors to serve as verification and enforcement of implementation. If either side does not 
believe that third parties will honour their commitments, combatants may perceive 
promises to monitor and protect as empty, and could refuse to abide by the agreement.297 
 
Based on the literature on war-to-peace transitions, I have identified three potential roles 
for third-party actors during the negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, 
fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment stages of military integration 
processes. In these contexts, third party actors can be mediators during peace 
negotiations; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring 
force; or providers of financial, logistical, or technical assistance.298 
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From the empirical literature on military integration, we see that third party actors have 
been mediators during the negotiation phase of integration. In Tajikistan, Torjesen and 
MacFarlane (2009) note that the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 
(UNMOT) monitored developments in-country and facilitated dialogue between warring 
parties.299  
 
The literature also demonstrates how third party actors can provide a stabilising force, 
such as peacekeepers or ceasefire monitors, to deter former combatants from resuming 
full-scale hostilities during an integration process. The United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which preceded the current United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 
was partially tasked with ensuring the integration or disarmament of all rebel factions in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.300 In Burundi, the Pretoria Protocol stipulated that 
there would be an internationally supervised DDR process that would commence with the 
cantonment of forces followed by a training program for new forces.301  Drawing upon its 
own experience with military integration, South Africa provided substantial technical 
assistance for Burundi’s integration process.302 With the endorsement of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1375 (2001), a South African Protection Support 
Detachment of 800 troops officially operated under the auspices of the African Union 
(AU). Subsequently, the Organisation of African Unity/African Union mandated the 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was staffed by soldiers from South 
Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, to oversee the cantonment and disarmament of 
combatants.303 Additionally, despite lacking the authority to constrain warring parties, an 
Implementation Monitoring Committee was comprised of six Burundians designated for 
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their integrity, two representatives of the parties to the Arusha Agreement, and one 
representative each from the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity/African 
Union (AU), and the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi.304 This committee was 
responsible for monitoring and coordinating implementation of the peace agreement. 
 
Finally, the literature details how third party actors can provide financial, logistical, or 
technical assistance to a military integration process.305 Specifically, in several cases of 
military integration, third-party actors have deployed teams of trainers to provide 
intensive ‘bridging training’ to integrated forces. In post-conflict contexts in which 
former combatants are likely have diverse training backgrounds and operational (i.e., 
conventional vs. asymmetric) experience, such training is provided to bridge gaps 
between statutory and non-statutory armed forces that may prevent key leadership roles 
from being filled by integrating forces. In addition, bridging training can not only 
increase the professionalism of the non-statutory armed forces being integrated, but it can 
also maintain the level of professionalism within the security force that is absorbing 
them. 306  In the post-conflict context of mistrust and animosity, third party actors 
providing bridging training can also act as impartial brokers of the integration process – 
albeit without the size or political will to necessarily deter the outbreak of violence.  
 
In cases of military integration from Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe, BMATTs were deployed to provide bridging training to integrated forces. 
Their presence ensured that former combatants believed the integration process was 
conducted in an inclusive, transparent, and fair manner, especially when it came to the 
matter of adjudicating how ranks were harmonized across the new military force. 
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As previously mentioned, the integration process in Zimbabwe benefitted from the 
presence of a British Military Advisory and Training Team, which was able to engender 
trust and build confidence during the integration process.307 The original mission of the 
BMATT in Zimbabwe was to help select and train a cadre of leaders and instructors who 
would then train the rank and file.308 Accordingly, a BMATT trained senior and mid-
level officers and NCOs before integrating and subsequently deploying them to remote 
areas.309 In July 1980, four officers each from the Rhodesia Security Forces, ZANLA, 
and ZIPRA spent two weeks doing an assessment and bonding exercise before visiting a 
British military training facility at Camberley for a familiarization course on conventional 
force functions.310 Although former members of the Rhodesia Security Forces possessed 
a framework for the administration and command and control upon which a new military 
could be established, it was completely mistrusted by rebel forces. In this context, the 
BMATT acted as an ‘honest broker’ at the top levels of defence management to ease 
tensions between erstwhile enemies and enable progress within the integration process.311 
Moreover, the BMATT was able to play a mitigating role, for the most part, when 
violence broke out between factions in early 1981.312 Although the BMATT was not 
originally established to provide a presence in all training establishments in which 
integration was being conducted, Dennis recommends that BMATT should have had a 
presence on the ground to train and advise at training establishments and to act as neutral 
umpires.313 
 
Aside from Zimbabwe, a BMATT was involved in modern-day Namibia after South 
West Africa gained its independence from South Africa in 1990. BMATTs played an 
instrumental role in training the Namibian Defence Force, which was the amalgamation 
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of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which was the military wing of the 
South West African People’s Organization, and the South West African Territorial Force 
(SWATF). In addition, a BMATT was invited to post-apartheid South Africa to arbitrate 
the creation of the South Africa National Defence Force. There, integrated forces were 
fast-tracked through training through affirmative action to reduce the gap between those 
with conventional military experience and those who lacked it.314 The remainder of the 
integration process focused on educating and training all members of the SANDF to meet 
international standards of competence and professionalism.315  
 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was a multilateral, rather than unilateral 
actor that provided support to the military integration process. The United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo oversaw and provided logistical 
support for the Structure Militaire d’Intégration to transfer former combatants to the 
Centres de Brassage. 316  With MONUC overseeing the brassage process, newly-
integrated brigades received ‘on-the-job training’ by carrying out operations in 
conjunction with experienced soldiers from troop contributing nations.317 MONUC and 
its successor, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, provided limited technical and logistical support, while the European Union’s 
security sector reform mission assisted with biometric identification. Besides these 
initiatives, there was little direct donor involvement in the implementation of the DRC’s 
integration process.318 The reason for this was that some key figures and military advisors 
close to President Joseph Kabila were not receptive to foreign involvement in the 
integration process, as it was perceived to be meddling in internal affairs. 319 
Consequently, foreign donors also made few efforts to influence the military integration 
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process until the Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23)320 rebellion between 2012 and 2013, 
which commenced as a mutiny of former rebels from the National Congress for the 
Defence of the People (CNDP) who had been integrated into the FARDC, against the 
Congolese government.321 
 
Within the literature, there is no conclusive evidence that third party actors can ensure the 
success of a military integration process. Licklider (2014) cites the example of South 
Africa to highlight that the presence of third party actors is not necessary for success, 
while citing the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to demonstrate that 
the involvement of such actors is also insufficient to prevent failures. For one, Berdal 
(1996) warns that external actors cannot force the formation of basic trust and willingness 
to forego war aims in pursuit of compromise. In addition, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) 
raise the question of whether the number of third-party troops is sufficient to provide 
security and arbitration of the peace agreement, and guarantee that violators of the 
ceasefire will be punished. Moreover, Walter (2002) argues that when there is an unequal 
balance of power between warring parties, a stronger type of intervention capable of 
using force is necessary. Burgess (2008) cites an insufficient level of external 
involvement as contributing to the unravelling of peace processes and the failure of 
military integration in Angola. He argues that donors failed to seriously consider the 
long-term integration of ex-combatants, and instead focused on upcoming elections after 
the Bicesse Accords were signed in May 1991.322 Berdal (1996) also cites the example of 
Angola’s 1992 elections as an example in which external assistance, pressure, or support 
could have prevented Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) from rejecting an electoral outcome that did not result 
in bringing him to power.  
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In this chapter, I have discussed what the literature on military integration says about why 
former combatants decide to seek political-military accommodation with their former 
enemies through military integration; how military integration can be a transitional 
security measure; the practical application of dual track military integration and 
demobilisation processes; how an open-ended military integration process can provide 
incentives for defection or non-compliance; the role of social, task, and political cohesion 
within a newly integrated military; and the role of third parties in military integration 
processes. Now, I will discuss how these themes relate to South Sudan’s experience with 
military integration between 2006 and 2013, and highlight the contributions this thesis 
makes to the existing body of literature on military integration. 
 
In both the northern and southern parts of Sudan, many armed groups and political 
opposition had been excluded from the peace process between the National Congress 
Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. In South Sudan, armed groups 
outside of the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army armed 
groups were required by the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Agreement 
on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements to either be incorporated into the 
security forces (i.e., Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife) of Sudan or South Sudan or be 
reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.323 In this context, non-
SPLA armed groups accordingly had to find a way to mitigate their isolation from the 
peace process, as they could not be perceived as opposed to the long-awaited peace that 
was quite popular in the South.324 By bringing OAGs into the governing structures of the 
South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing these armed groups an ‘insurance 
policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South. At the same time, by 
seeking political-military accommodation with such groups, the Government of South 
Sudan was attempting to rectify the exclusive nature of the CPA and reduce the 
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possibilities for such groups to become spoilers of the peace agreement and derail the 
referendum on self-determination.325 The ability for non-SPLA armed groups to partake 
in South Sudan’s post-CPA political dispensation parallels arguments made by several 
authors that having access to a share of state power offers former combatants an 
‘insurance policy,’ and minimizes the risk of the new military being used against either 
side (Walter 2002, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Møller and Cawthra 2007, Sriram 2008 
Hall 2009, and Licklider 2014). 
 
When the CPA was signed, some armed groups, such as the South Sudan Defence Force 
possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities and strategic locations to become 
spoilers, and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of the territory of South Sudan.326 
Thus, the integration of the groups referred to in the CPA as Other Armed Groups made 
logistical sense in order to outbid Khartoum for their loyalty during the Interim Period.327 
In addition, by reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of 
South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support 
of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail 
the referendum on self-determination.328 In this respect, the case of South Sudan parallels 
arguments made by Berdal and Ucko (2009), Hall (2009), and Licklider (2014) that 
military integration can be a means by which to limit the manpower available for armed 
group mobilization. 
 
However, despite the parallels between the literature on military integration and South 
Sudan’s experience following the Juba Declaration, there are several major divergences 
to the notion of integration as an ‘insurance policy’ for former combatants. In 2012, a 
militia of young Dinka men called the Mathiang Anyoor from President Kiir’s home 
region of Greater Bahr al-Ghazal was created as a parallel security force within the 
SPLA. The formation of this ethicised security force outside the chain of command of the 
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Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA General Staff may have 
indicated that the President and his inner circle no longer trusted the integrated SPLA to 
protect their interests. Furthermore, the subsequent integration of this parallel security 
force into the Presidential Guard eroded trust within the Government of South Sudan and 
the military, and was viewed as a betrayal of the SPLA’s attempt at integration.329 The 
outbreak of conflict in December 2013 and the subsequent targeting of Nuer SPLA and 
civilians by the country’s security forces on the basis of their ethnicity was a strong 
indication that being a part of the SPLA was insufficient to prevent state security forces 
from eventually being turned against them. Thus, the formation of parallel security forces 
negated the protection that multiple authors argued that formerly warring parties would 
have had within an integrated military. 
 
Up until the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, one could argue that military 
integration made the barrier higher for the SPLA to pursue ethnic agendas. However, the 
formation of parallel security forces, the ethnic fragmentation of the SPLA, and the 
targeting of ethnic Nuer when the war broke out render this hypothesis invalid for the 
case of South Sudan. As I have argued in the previous paragraphs, integration served a 
critical purpose between the signing of the CPA and the referendum on self-
determination. However, as I will argue in Chapter 6, the collapse of political power-
sharing arrangements, the flawed implementation of the military integration process, and 
the establishment of parallel security forces outside the SPLA chain of command 
eventually contributed to the disintegration of the military integration process. These 
factors mitigated the extent to which the SPLA was deterred from using force along 
political or ethnic lines when the civil war broke out in 2013, and undermined the 
protection that should have accompanied membership in the SPLA. 
 
Another element missing from analyses of post-peace agreement integration is the idea 
that seeking political-military accommodation with armed groups was the ‘least bad’ 
choice, which the case of South Sudan demonstrates. After the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement was signed, I argue that the Government of South Sudan faced three choices 
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vis-à- vis adhering to the requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the threat 
that non-SPLA groups posed to stability: The government could have attempted to fight 
these armed groups, ignore them and accept that the government did not have a 
monopoly on the use of force in South Sudan, or pursue a political-military 
accommodation with them.  
 
Accordingly, one of my contributions to the literature is that for South Sudan during the 
Interim Period, accommodating armed groups through military integration was the ‘least 
bad’ choice, which allowed the government to ease over divisions in the South in the 
runup to the 2011 referendum on self-determination. During this time period, it would 
have been difficult for the government to militarily defeat non-SPLA armed groups. The 
SPLA had not been able to defeat these groups during the South-South struggles of the 
1990s, and the size and strategic location of such groups would have made them difficult 
to defeat. Even if it had been possible to defeat these armed groups militarily, the 
continuation of South-South conflict would have further destabilized the South during a 
period when southern unity was critical. In addition, both protracted conflict or ignoring 
the existence of non-SPLA armed groups would have provided additional opportunities 
for Khartoum to continue destabilizing the South during the Interim Period. It is for these 
reasons that South Sudan demonstrates how integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice 
during a war-to-peace transition. By allowing South Sudan to temporarily overcome its 
history of factionalism and ethnic conflict in order to consolidate political-military power, 
the military integration process averted a potential civil war in the South. Integration thus 
contributed to a marked decline in insecurity during the Interim Period of the CPA, and 
ensured that the region remained stable enough for the referendum on self-determination 
to be held, thus paving the way for South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011.330 
 
Within the literature on military integration, the process is believed to help make the 
national military more diverse, and a symbol of national unity (Hall 2009 and Licklider 
2014). Moreover, the nature of the military as an institution supposedly lends itself to 
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being a natural integrator (Simonsen 2007). Based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature, I derived three dimensions across which cohesion within a national military is 
manifested during war-to-peace transitions: Political Indoctrination (Rusagara 2004, 
Karake 2012, Burgess and Licklider 2015), Professional Orientation (Krebs 2004, 
Simonsen 2007, Jowell 2014, Wilén, Ambrosetti, and Birantamije 2015), and Social 
Contact (Samii 2006, Simonsen 2007, and Gaub 2010). Due to the ethnic nature of the 
SPLA’s split in the 1990s and the group’s behaviour in the Equatoria region throughout 
much of the conflict, members of non-SPLA armed groups included mostly Nuer and 
some Equatorians. Integrating these forces into the SPLA made the military a more 
diverse force, reversing some of the ethnic fallout of the 1991 split.  
 
However, contrary to the literature on militaries being ‘natural integrators,’ the SPLA did 
not appear to make much progress at fostering cohesion across the political, professional 
orientation, and social dimensions. In terms of political ideology, the Marxist ideology 
that was pervasive in the early years of the SPLA and allowed it to receive support from 
the Marxist regime in neighbouring Ethiopia dissipated after the end of the Cold War and 
the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in 1991. In addition, after the CPA was 
signed, the anti-North sentiment that had galvanized much of the South and helped 
overcome the internal contradictions of the movement dissipated and there was no new 
ideology or nationalist concept to fill that void. The SPLA’s history of civil war-era 
factionalism, detailed in Chapter 2, contributed to its post-independence inability to truly 
transcend ethnic divisions to create a national South Sudanese identity, and a cohesive 
national military.331 Issues that had been divisive in the South included the competition 
for dominance of the southern rebellion between SPLM/A and Anyanya II, the 1991 split 
within the SPLM/A and the ethnic massacres and population displacements that followed, 
and the Government of Sudan’s ‘peace from within’ counterinsurgency strategy that 
further destabilized the South by funneling support to SPLA splinter groups.332 As a 
fractured post-CPA South would have threatened the opportunity to vote in the 
referendum on self-determination and thus play into the Government of Sudan’s hands, 
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the prevailing rationale was to address internal fissures among southern political factions 
and ethnic groups after independence.333 Consequently, shortly before independence, 
these divisions between disparate ethnic groups and political factions bubbled to the 
surface. 
 
In terms of cohesion through common professional orientation, the continuous cycle of 
integration and the competing loyalties of integrated forces made it difficult for the SPLA 
to pursue unified aims. One of the implications of this was that the SPLA lacked a 
consistent approach to preventing or responding to inter-ethnic conflict, leading to 
confusion about its role and mandate.334 The salience of ethnic identities within the SPLA 
made it such that the military could not be trusted to act as a cohesive national army 
when addressing conflict between the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle. For example, according to 
Human Rights Watch, during the SPLA’s disarmament and counterinsurgency campaigns 
in Greater Upper Nile, there were reports of ethnic Lou Nuer, Murle, and Toposa soldiers 
defecting to carry out revenge attacks on rival ethnic groups, returning to their home 
areas, or being reluctant to fight members of their own ethnic groups.335 One of the 
reasons for their reluctance to engage in fighting in these areas may have been because 
they feared entangling their families in blood feuds.336 In terms of social contact 
cohesion, the Ministry of Defence and the SPLA recognized that the military had a 
cohesion problem and established Reorganization Committees and planned the 
subsequent Battalion Reset to ‘mix’ forces from South Sudan’s three major regions (Bahr 
al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria). Ultimately, the SPLA’s failure to foster cohesion 
within its ranks lends credence to Krebs’ (2004) rebuttal of the contact hypothesis, that 
familiarity may breed contempt, rather than affinity.  
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The SPLA did not use quotas during the integration process, so it is not possible to test 
Samii (2006) and Gaub’s (2010) hypotheses on their utility except to posit how quotas 
might have had an impact in this case. The majority of OAG members and members of 
subsequent armed groups were Nuer. The SPLA’s lack of quotas meant that even though 
they were only 16 per cent of the population, the Nuer quickly became a majority within 
the SPLA due to the post-Juba Declaration integration process. According to one 
analysis, one of the reasons that violence quickly took on an ethnic dimension in 
December 2013 was due to a widely held perception that one ethnic group dominated the 
army hierarchy.337 Arguably, this imbalance may have contributed to the development of 
parallel security forces to protect the interests of the political elite, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. That said, the verdict on the use of quotas to ensure diversity 
within an integrated military is mixed. Applying Samii and Gaub to the case of South 
Sudan, quotas could have made the SPLA more cohesive by reducing prejudices and 
ethnic salience (Samii 2006), but they could have also contradicted the notion of a 
military where entry and promotion were not based on merit, but on identity (Gaub 
2010). 
 
Overall, one could argue that the SPLA’s cohesion and ethnic representation were 
undermined by the open-ended nature of the military integration process. When Alden, 
Thakur, and Arnold (2011), Baaz and Verweijen (2013), and Møller and Cawthra (2007) 
wrote about integration, they discussed how integration can provide a perverse incentive 
for defection, which is a low-cost, high-reward enterprise. However, these authors do not 
address one of my arguments in this thesis, that the dynamics that developed between a 
class of rebellion entrepreneurs and those who eschewed rebellion and remained loyal to 
the SPLA may have eroded cohesion within the new military. Due to repeated cycles of 
rebellion and the degree to which the Government of South Sudan placed a premium on 
‘buying peace,’ South Sudan’s integration process became de facto open-ended. Knowing 
how important it was for the government to bring them back into the fold, armed group 
leaders were able to become entrepreneurs of rebellion. The case of South Sudan 
demonstrates that open-ended military integration encouraged defections, which is 
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particularly paralleled in Baaz and Verweijen’s (2013) analysis of armed groups in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the case of South Sudan 
demonstrates how repeatedly rewarding defectors through this open-ended process 
contributed to tensions within the SPLA and eroded what little cohesion existed within 
the new military. In this respect, I argue that an open-ended military integration process 
also prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on 
fostering cohesion within the new national military. South Sudan’s failure to ‘graduate’ 
from the integration process undermined efforts to transform the military, leaving it prone 
to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition. In its failure to 
‘graduate’ from the integration process, the SPLA remained a confederation of armed 
groups rather than a national military – an unfavourable departure point for establishing a 
statutory security force for what would become the Republic of South Sudan. 
Furthermore, missing from the literature is how the open-ended military integration 
process became an opportunity cost for security sector reform (SPLA Transformation) 
due to the rising personnel costs imposed by the government’s drive to ‘buy peace.’ 
 
Integration complicates issues of justice and accountability, and can be perceived as 
rewarding those who contributed to the conflict in the first place (Berdal and Ucko 2009; 
Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011; Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta 2012). This is 
especially the case when former combatants may not be held accountable for past human 
rights violations and for essentially committing treason with their multiple rebellions 
against the state before they are ‘rewarded’ with material or financial benefits during the 
process of integrating into the military. In fact, efforts to bring members of armed groups 
to justice can also contribute to mistrust and potentially derail the integration process 
(Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011). In the case of South Sudan, neither the government 
nor the international community held the leaders of armed groups accountable for 
rebelling against the government or committing human rights violations. In fact, the 
absence of accountability has been cited as one of the weaknesses of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, and this has contributed to perpetuating the cycle of impunity during 
the Interim Period, through South Sudan’s independence, and well into the civil war that 
broke out in 2013.  
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The outbreak of conflict in South Sudan reveals the dangers of constructing a security 
sector on an unstable foundation. The concept of military integration as a foundation of 
security sector reform during transitions from war to peace is relatively new, and Krebs 
and Licklider (2015) explain why this process is only now entering the contemporary 
discourse on security sector reform. The authors point out that security sector reform as a 
concept has not accounted for military integration due to the context in which SSR 
emerged. I would argue that, when applied to post-peace agreement environments such as 
South Sudan, this shift in how the concept of SSR has changed is important because the 
foundation (military integration) is often overlooked for both the government undertaking 
the SSR process as well as for third-party actors attempting to reform a country’s security 
sector in the aftermath of conflict. Later in this thesis, I argue that military integration in 
South Sudan should have been approached as a foundation of SPLA Transformation. The 
disconnect between integration and SPLA Transformation meant that both the SPLA and 
the international partners that committed to establishing South Sudan’s security sector did 
not approach integration as a foundation for broader security sector reform. Military 
integration in South Sudan was approached as an end in and of itself, rather than as a 
stage to implement en route to eventual security sector reform. This is contrary to how 
the process is characterized by Colletta and Muggah (2009) as an interim, transitional 
measure to temporarily contain former combatants so that they do not become spoilers 
during war-to-peace transitions. Integration is useful as a transitional measure to address 
short term security dilemmas, but as this case demonstrates that it is not designed to be an 
endstate for security forces during war-to-peace transitions.  
 
Military integration provides an economic incentive to remain in the military (Glassmyer 
and Sambanis 2008 and Jackson 2011), which is why integration and demobilisation 
should not be planned separately (Knight 2011). In South Sudan, the Juba Declaration 
preceded the implementation of the first phase of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration by at least two years. In the meantime, there were tens of thousands of 
former combatants integrated into the SPLA and the other organized services. Many of 
these were integrated on a continuous, or even repeated basis due to the proliferation of 
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armed groups, which counteracted efforts to rightsize the SPLA. In South Sudan, I argue 
that the failure of demobilisation initiatives to get off the ground, along with the open-
ended nature of the military integration process, increased pressure on the integration 
process as a means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed groups. This 
example highlights the need to link military integration and demobilisation initiatives, so 
that as a country is amalgamating armed groups into a statutory security force, it 
simultaneously has the means in place to off-ramp them if it is determined that the 
military needs to be rightsized. This particular dynamic between integration and 
demobilisation is not reflected in the existing literature. 
 
Military integration tends to be implemented due to pressure from the international 
community (Hartzell 2014). Bilateral or multilateral third party actors can add confidence 
to fully implement the peace agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), verify compliance 
with the peace agreement (Walter 2002, Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, Burgess 2008), and 
compensate for gaps in knowledge or expertise (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012). 
The presence of third parties can also minimize the perceived risk of participating in the 
peace process (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012).  
 
As will be detailed in Chapter 5, third-party actors such as the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland provided technical, financial, and logistical assistance to the 
process of defence sector transformation. However, none of these actors played a direct 
substantive role, either individually or as a collective, in the process of integrating armed 
groups into the SPLA, which included negotiation, cantonment and verification of 
parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignments. Specifically, none 
of these third parties fulfilled the role as a neutral arbiter or provider of bridging training 
– that is, training specifically targeting the integrated forces to bring them up to the 
standard of the military into which they were integrating. 
 
The United Nations Mission in Sudan was a guarantor of the CPA between Sudan and 
South Sudan, but was not explicitly intended to play this role within South Sudan. In fact, 
before the outbreak of conflict, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
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was discredited as a guarantor of security due to armed group violence in Jonglei and its 
inability and perceived unwillingness to protect civilians. The inability of UNMISS and 
its predecessor UNMIS to prevent communal violence in Jonglei state and other parts of 
South Sudan may have contributed to the perception that the United Nations was not truly 
a guarantor of security between armed groups and the government in South Sudan. 
Regardless, the UN mission chaired a ceasefire Joint Military Commission to halt 
fighting between SAF- and SPLA-aligned contingents of the Joint Integrated Units in 
Malakal in November 2006. The United Nations Mission in Sudan was also a mediator 
during ceasefire negotiations with Gatluak Gai, and deployed forces in support of David 
Yau Yau’s integration in 2011. Additionally, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
witnessed the surrender of two armed group leaders and 200 of their men in Upper Nile 
in May 2012. UNMISS also transported members of armed groups to be integrated from 
remote areas to cantonment sites, assisted with screening and registering them, and 
supported the logistics of ceasefire negotiations between David Yau Yau and Murle 
leaders.  
 
Within the literature on military integration there is some scepticism with regard to 
whether third parties can ensure the success of a military integration process. Trust 
between formerly warring parties should develop organically and cannot be forced from 
the outside by third parties (Berdal 1996). Furthermore, Burgess (2008) attributes failure 
to insufficient third party involvement, while Licklider (2014) argues that such 
involvement can be insufficient to guarantee success. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) and 
Walter (2002) question the balance of power among former combatants, and whether a 
third party would have sufficient power to punish violators of the peace agreement. 
 
Does Military Integration Work? 
 
The literature on the utility of military integration tends to be centred on the factors 
contribute to the successful implementation of a military integration process and whether 
the process can lead to sustainable peace. However, as military integration is 
implemented concurrent to other peacebuilding measures, it is difficult to isolate specific 
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effects in order to determine whether the integration process contributed to success or 
failure.338 Indeed, Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) question the utility of the term 
‘military integration,’ referring to it as “a catch-all phrase that describes a wide array of 
policies, which work in very different ways and therefore can be expected to have 
different effects under different conditions.” Cautioning that failed integration is both a 
cause and a symptom of the failure of the broader peace process, the authors challenge 
the premise that military integration is an effective peace-building mechanism because 
many integration agreements are poorly structured and not fully implemented. 339 
Similarly, Krebs (2014) conceives of the failure of military integration as an important 
early indication that the peace process is in decline, but not as the fundamental cause of 
renewed violence.340  
 
While calling attention to the dearth of theoretical or empirical analysis as to what 
constitutes ‘good’ military integration, or under what conditions integration leads to 
beneficial post-conflict outcomes, Krebs and Licklider (2015) find no evidence of 
causality between military integration and an outcome of sustainable peace.341 For 
example, they argue that combatants who are already inclined to negotiate a settlement 
are also prepared to make costly concessions – therefore integration does not 
independently result in post-war stability.342 Rather than shaping the preferences and 
actions of former combatants, Krebs and Licklider claim that military integration simply 
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reflects the incentives confronting political actors.343 In another analysis, Krebs (2014) 
argues that military integration is the result of rather than the cause of peace.344 
 
On the contrary, based on 16 cases of military integration, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) 
argue that the successful implementation of the process within five years of the 
termination of a conflict increases the prospects for lasting peace. The authors argue that 
military integration may make renewed civil war less likely because it is a costly 
commitment that signals ‘conciliatory intent’ on the part of warring parties. This is 
attributed to the fact that warring parties are genuinely committed to peace, and are 
willing to absorb the high costs associated with compromising on power-sharing.345 
Indeed, the implementation of military power-sharing agreements demonstrates a 
willingness to compromise the original war aims of the signatories, and withstand 
challenges from within their own groups.346 
 
Overall, the literature is inconclusive when it comes to whether or not military integration 
works. Based on the case of South Sudan, I would argue that there needs to be a temporal 
consideration of the process’ success or failure. Considering the outcome – the outbreak 
of civil war in December 2013, one may assume that military integration in South Sudan 
was unsuccessful. However, it is insufficient to cast blame on the integration process, as 
the outbreak of war was not sparked by the integration process, but rather by a political 
crisis. Between 2006 and 2010, military integration diminished the risk of armed conflict 
in the South. Integration thus worked for the period of time in which there was a strategic 
imperative to consolidate political-military power. In this sense, this thesis demonstrates 
that military integration can play a stabilizing role during war-to-peace transitions as a 
short-term, transitional measure. However, integration can also play a destabilizing role 
depending on the manner in which it is implemented and the military’s ability to 
transition out of this phase. 
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In order to understand the role that integration played during South Sudan’s aborted 
transition from war to peace, I will examine the means and modalities of integration 
between 2006 and 2013 in Chapter 4. Then I will provide an overview of the concurrent 
defence sector reform process in Chapter 5 in which the SPLA was rightsizing and 
transforming into a conventional military, followed by an assessment of why the 










Chapter 4: Integration 
Introduction 
 
By the time the CPA was signed, over 50,000 men were members of up to fifty armed 
groups that included rivals to the SPLA such as the South Sudan Defence Force and local 
self-defence militias.347 Referred to in the CPA as Other Armed Group, these groups had 
been excluded from the peace negotiations and posed a latent threat to CPA 
implementation in the South, including the goal of holding a referendum on self-
determination in 2011. 
 
Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army had been integrating 
other rebel groups operating in what was then Southern Sudan. This was especially 
necessary considering the legacy of factionalism covered in Chapter 2 – from competition 
between Anyanya II and the SPLA to the splintering of the SPLA after 1991, Khartoum’s 
support of non-SPLA armed groups to OAG exclusion from the CPA peace process, and 
the dispute between John Garang and Salva Kiir in Rumbek in the weeks before the CPA 
was signed, which highlighted the intra-SPLA divisions that would continue to plague the 
South. These divisions are the context for understanding why, when presented with the 
choice between fighting, ignoring, or accommodating armed groups, the government 
chose to accommodate armed groups during the Interim Period of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. This chapter further explores these rationales, demonstrates how the 
2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration formalized what would become the 
government’s ‘amnesty and integration’ approach to some armed rebellions, and presents 
empirical data on the military integration process in South Sudan between 2006 and 
2013. 
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement established a six-year interim period, after which 
southern Sudan would have the opportunity to vote in a referendum in January 2011 to 
either remain united with Sudan or become the independent Republic of South Sudan. In 
accordance with the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Permanent Ceasefire 
and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, armed groups 
outside of the SPLA and the SAF were prohibited from operating in Sudan. 348 
Accordingly, members of OAGs were offered the choice to either be incorporated into 
the security forces (i.e., Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife) of Sudan or Southern Sudan 
or be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.349 Per the subsequent 
Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, parties to the peace 
agreement were to establish an OAGs Collaborative Committee within 15 days of the 
signing of the CPA to manage the integration process.350 In addition, within twelve 
months of the signing of the CPA – by January 2006 – all members of OAGs not aligned 
with the SPLA were expected to have demobilised or to have redeployed north to be 
integrated into the SAF.351 
 
After the CPA was signed, there were fears that if a deal were not reached between the 
SPLM/A and the OAGs, Khartoum would continue to support non-SPLA groups in the 
South, making the region ungovernable, and thus undermining the implementation of the 
peace agreement during the interim period of the CPA.352 Faced with both legal and 
practical imperatives to address non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of South 
Sudan could either attempt to fight them, accept that it did not possess a monopoly on the 
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use of force in the South, or attempt to reach a political-military accommodation with 
them. The government largely chose to reach a political-military accommodation with 
non-SPLA armed groups, which involved absorbing or integrating them into the SPLA. 
Juba Declaration  
 
After the CPA was signed, South-South Dialogues were held in an attempt to rectify civil 
war-era divisions. During these dialogues, John Garang’s statements assured OAGs of a 
general and unconditional amnesty, necessary, he argued, to ensure implementation of the 
CPA and facilitate unity, peace, and stability.353 In the part of his speech where he 
discussed Principles for Integration of OAGs, he also vowed they would receive equal 
treatment with other SPLA forces, equal chances for participation in the SAF and SPLA’s 
Joint Integrated Units, participation in DDR, participation in training to take place both 
locally and abroad, recognition and harmonization of ranks, and absorption into the other 
organized forces and civil service.354 Although Garang had also stated the SPLM’s 
willingness to integrate the OAGs into the security sector and the civil service, or to 
allow them to participate in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
program, the issue of accommodation between the SPLA and OAGs remained unresolved 
until Garang’s death in July 2005 – possibly due to divergences as to how integration 
would work in practice.355  
 
Relations between the SPLM/A and the SSDF showed marked improvement in the 
aftermath of Garang’s death as his successor, Salva Kiir, was more amenable to South-
South dialogue.356 As president of Southern Sudan, Kiir prioritised finding ways in which 
the SSDF could buy into the CPA and later, as president of the independent Republic of 
South Sudan, became instrumental in accommodating former adversaries into the 
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structures of the new post-CPA polity.357 Recognizing the threat that these armed groups 
posed to the stability of southern Sudan, Kiir negotiated a settlement with the SSDF, after 
which he issued the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006. Its terms 
included an immediate cessation of hostilities; a declaration of amnesty to cover any 
criminal acts committed during previous periods of hostilities; the integration of the 
SPLA and the SSDF in the formation of a unified, non-partisan army; and an appeal to 
forces outside the SPLA and the SSDF to join the process of unity and reconciliation.358 
The Juba Declaration formalized the SPLA’s ‘amnesty and integration’ approach to 
armed groups that had existed since the movement’s inception, and became the primary 
vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan.359 
 
Many members of OAGs chose to integrate into the SPLA, swelling its ranks to between 
140,000 and 200,000 soldiers – more than twice the size of a military that a future 
potentially independent South Sudan would need and could afford. Some remained part 
of the SAF, as was their prerogative per the CPA. Others, such as groups commanded by 
Matthew Puljang, Bapiny Monytuiel, James Gai Yuach, and Gatluak Gai, avoided 
integration into either the SPLA or the SAF and maintained open lines of communication 
with Khartoum, yet largely refrained from violence to avoid derailing the referendum that 
would determine whether Southern Sudan remained part of Sudan or became the 
independent Republic of South Sudan.360 
 
In line with the Juba Declaration, SSDF Chief of Staff Paulino Matip became deputy 
commander-in-chief of the SPLA until his death in August 2012. Other former armed 
group commanders also acquired prominent posts: Clement Wani (former commander of 
the Mundari forces) became the Governor of Central Equatoria, Ismail Konyi (former 
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SSDF commander in Jonglei) became the Government of Southern Sudan’s Presidential 
Adviser on Peace and Reconciliation, and Sultan Abdel Bagi (former SSDF commander 
in Northern Bahr El Ghazal) became an adviser on border conflict resolution.361 
 
At the outset of the process, there were questions regarding what the SPLA actually 
represented, and what kind of force armed groups were actually integrating into. When 
the Second Sudanese Civil War ended, the SPLA was a non-salaried volunteer army 
estimated to have between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers. In the months leading up to John 
Garang’s death in July 2005, some elements of the SPLA had started adopting 
conventional military formations, at least on paper, and were starting to possess the 
attributes of a national army.362 This was a transition from the SPLA’s modus operandi 
during the Second Sudanese Civil War, during which the SPLA had few standing military 
formations and would assemble ad hoc forces for each battle.363 By Garang’s design, the 
SPLA depended on his personal control from top to bottom.364 Seeking to prevent the 
emergence of cohesive, professional units that could potentially provide a base from 
which internal rivals could mobilize, he neutralized his military high command by 
maintaining complete control over weapons and supplies and dealing directly with select 
commanders.365 Garang thus retarded the development of military capacity and cohesion 
within the SPLA by resisting the development of institutions within the political-military 
spheres of the liberation movement.366 Consequently, the SPLA was quite factionalized at 
the outset of the integration process.  
 
Article 151 (2) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan stipulated 
that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army “…shall be transformed into the South Sudan 
Armed Forces, and shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, 
professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as 
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established under this Constitution and the law.”367  Transformation from the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army to the South Sudan Armed Forces would have signaled a clean 
break between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, originally the political wing of 
the armed guerrilla movement which became the country’s ruling political party, and the 
national military of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.  
 
Nonetheless, while the SPLM and the SPLA were supposed to be legally distinct as the 
independent Republic of South Sudan began to take shape, they maintained ‘enduring 
and structural links’ and were never completely disaggregated from one another.368 One 
reason is that the armed movement had always been dominant to the political wing since 
the founding of the liberation movement in 1983, which arguably led to the militarization 
of governance and politics in South Sudan.369 Another reason is that the party and the 
military had become synonymous due to the fact that the political leadership of the SPLM 
was comprised of many old guard military leaders.370 Finally, due to the lack of cohesion 
within the SPLA, parts of the military would identify with particular political leaders.371 
As a result of all these factors, political factionalism was often expressed within the 
military – as demonstrated by the political crisis within the SPLM that led to the outbreak 
of the South Sudanese civil war in December 2013.372 
 
Rationales behind military integration in South Sudan 
 
Between 2006 and 2010, the GoSS amnesty and integration policy that emerged from the 
Juba Declaration became the basis of internal stability in South Sudan, greatly 
diminishing the threat that OAGs posed as spoilers to the peace process.373 Indeed, like 
many OAGs, the South Sudan Defence Force had been excluded from the peace process, 
yet possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities and strategic locations to become 
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spoilers, and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of the territory of South Sudan – 
including some of the areas vital to oil production.374  
 
By allowing South Sudan to temporarily overcome its history of factionalism and ethnic 
conflict in order to consolidate political-military power, military integration contributed 
to a marked decline in insecurity during the Interim Period of the CPA.375 By some 
analyses, the Juba Declaration may have been of equal or even greater importance than 
the CPA itself in both averting a potential civil war in the South and ensuring that the 
region remained stable enough for the referendum on self-determination to be held, thus 
paving the way for South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011.376 
 
During his independence day speech on July 9, 2011, President Kiir stated:  
“It is my ardent belief that you are aware that our detractors have already written 
us off, even before the proclamation of our independence.  They say we will slip 
in to civil war as soon as our flag is hoisted.  They justify that by arguing that we 
are incapable of resolving our problems through dialogue.  They charge that we 
are quick to revert to violence.  They claim that our concept of democracy and 
freedom is faulty. It is incumbent upon us to prove them all wrong! On this note, I 
would like to again declare a public amnesty to all those who may have taken up 
arms for one reason or another to lay down those arms and come to join your 
brothers and sisters to build this new nation.”377  
 
By reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of South Sudan 
limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA 
armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation by renting the allegiances 
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of southern militias, thereby derailing the referendum on self-determination. 378 
Outbidding Khartoum to purchase the loyalties of armed groups in the South appeared to 
have been successful for some period of time, as members of Sudan’s ruling party had 
allegedly complained that they had been priced out of the market.379  
 
At the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Government of South Sudan needed to 
consolidate political-military power and create a more unified front in the South in 
preparation for the referendum on self-determination. While the CPA had secured peace 
between its signatories, the National Congress Party in the North and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army in the South, it did not address divisions within the South 
that were tied to competitions over leadership of the southern rebellion, perceptions of 
ethnic marginalization between the Dinka and the Nuer, and personal animosities towards 
SPLM/A leader John Garang’s style of leadership. Moreover, there were tensions over 
the fact that Garang did not conceive of the SPLM/A as a separatist movement, but rather 
as a revolution aimed at transforming a united ‘New Sudan’ through the replacement of 
the ruling NCP (formerly the National Islamic Front) regime in Khartoum with a secular, 
democratically elected government. Furthermore, the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement 
(KPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and non-SPLA armed groups, although 
never implemented nor granted regional or international legitimacy, served as a model for 
the CPA – especially its provision for a referendum on southern self-determination. Non-
SPLA armed groups used their participation in the KPA as justification for why they 
deserved greater recognition during peace negotiations, seeing as the SPLM/A’s platform 
was for a united Sudan. Moreover, veterans of Anyanya II and SPLA splinter groups 
resented that they had been militarily defeated as secessionists by Garang’s unionist 
cause, which was subsequently abandoned once he died in July 2005.380 
 
Given the civil war-era divisions in the South, political-military accommodation with 
non-SPLA armed groups was a means by which to signal a genuine commitment to peace 
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and a willingness to compromise. After Garang’s death, Kiir held a series of informal 
meetings with SSDF leadership in Khartoum in August 2005 to indicate his willingness 
to reach accommodation between the SSDF and the SPLM/A.381  He subsequently 
appointed several SSDF members as ministers, commissioners, members of regional 
assembly and state legislatures.382 By bringing OAGs into the governing structures of the 
South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing these armed groups an ‘insurance 
policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South. Integrating them into 
the SPLA through the subsequent Juba Declaration offered them a mutually reinforcing 
power-sharing arrangement that was arguably necessary due to the exclusion of OAGs 
from the CPA negotiations. While the CPA was popular in the South, its protocols in fact 
stipulated the dissolution of OAGs, and these groups accordingly had to find a way to 
mitigate their isolation from the peace process, as they could not be perceived to be 
opposed to the long-awaited peace.383 Political power-sharing granted these groups a 
share of the new political dispensation in the South, while military integration made the 
forcible disarmament of OAGs an exception rather than the rule. Overall, the military 
integration process formalized by the Juba Declaration was a reasonable short-term 
approach to stabilisation and played a large role in preventing fissures within the southern 
rebellion from coming to the fore during the Interim Period. 
Means and Modalities of Military Integration 
 
When asked about the United Nations as a guarantor for the CPA, John Garang stated 
that the South’s only guarantee was organic:  
 
“The fact that Southern Sudan will have its own separate army during the interim 
unity in addition to the integrated forces and other security forces, is the only 
fundamental guarantor and indeed the cornerstone for the survival of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”384 
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After the CPA was signed, there was to be a formal process of military integration 
between Sudan and southern Sudan during the Interim Period, the details of which had 
been explicitly stated in the CPA. Per the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements, 
equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces and SPLA would comprise Joint Integrated Units 
with a total force strength of 39,000 soldiers during the interim period of the peace 
agreement. These JIUs were intended to demonstrate national unity and serve as a 
nucleus of a future national army should Southern Sudan vote for unity over 
independence in 2011. Parties to the peace agreement were also to establish a Joint 
Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency of Sudan, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of 
the SAF and the SPLA, their deputies, and senior officers from both forces. The JDB was 
responsible for coordination between the SAF and the SPLA and for command of the 
JIUs. The subsequent Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities and Appendices spelled out the command and control, composition and 
organization, training, and detailed deployment for the JIUs. In spite of the thorough 
means and modalities of military integration, JIUs were characterized more by their 
collocation than by their true integration, which was unsurprising given the expectation 
that Southern Sudan would vote for independence in 2011.385 Compared with the notional 
SAF/SPLA integration within the JIUs, the CPA did not articulate the means and 
modalities to drive and manage the process within southern Sudan.  
 
The Juba Declaration, which formalized military integration in South Sudan, in theory 
articulated how the process would be implemented. The SSDF Chief of Staff, the late 
Paulino Matip would assume the figurehead post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 
SPLA, and in consultation with Kiir as Commander-in-Chief, a High Political Committee 
would be created to oversee the implementation of the agreement. A Military Technical 
Committee was to be established, reporting to the High Political Committee, to handle 
the integration of the SSDF into the command structures and component units of the 
SPLA, harmonise ranks, deploy forces, and handle issues of demobilisation and 
downsizing in accordance with the provisions of the CPA. Finally, an Administrative and 
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Civil Service Committee was to be established to deal with the integration of the SSDF’s 
non-military personnel into national and state government.386 
 
Most amnesty and integration processes in South Sudan were initiated by the Office of 
the President and the Ministry for National Security, which made the political decision to 
offer amnesty to armed group commanders and negotiated the terms of integration 
deals.387 The currency of these negotiations took the form of military promotions, 
positions in government, cash, cars, houses, free accommodation during the integration 
period and promises of regular salaries once forces were integrated.388 The type of 
amnesty and integration package leaders of armed groups received was contingent on 
their specific ‘threat potential’, which could be understood in terms of a commander’s 
ability to secure external funding or to mobilise fighters.389  
 
Once amnesty and integration negotiations were finalised, the Ministry of Defence and 
Veterans Affairs (MoDVA) and the SPLA were instructed to integrate the agreed number 
of armed group members. Rather than submitting armed groups to the DDR process, the 
government preferred to integrate them into the SPLA in order to dilute their cohesion 
before deciding whether or not to include them in a larger pool of DDR candidates at a 
later date.390 This approach was based on the theory that integrated armed groups that 
were well absorbed within SPLA command and control would pose less of a threat if and 
when they were demobilised.391 
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Although the amnesty and integration process seemed straightforward, it had many 
moving pieces and potential points of failure, and there was no single part of the national 
government responsible for overseeing the entire process from inception to completion. 
Amnesty and integration negotiations could include stakeholders from SPLA 
commanders, government ministers, and members of state and local government – 
depending on their previous relationships with armed group commanders, the area in 
which the rebellion was taking place, or the particular grievance at hand.392 If too many 
stakeholders became involved, this led armed group leaders to attempt to increase the 
value of their integration package, further drawing out the negotiation process.393 
Moreover, there were repeated instances in which an armed group commander would 
accept amnesty, but subsequently renege on the integration deal, possibly in order to 
recruit additional men and improve their negotiating position.394 
 
As there was no standing committee to manage South Sudan’s continual integration 
processes, each of the committees established for the integration of various armed groups 
may have been different in their execution of the process. 395  Nonetheless, once 
negotiations with armed groups were concluded, the integration process generally had 
four stages: 
 
First, the President issued a directive to the SPLA’s Chief of General Staff to convene a 
committee charged with integrating an armed group into the SPLA. 396  Once the 
committee has been selected from the SPLA and the leadership of the integrating forces, 
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the President would sign off on its composition.397 The Chief of General Staff then issued 
guidance to the committee on how the integration process should be executed, including 
rank adjustments, age and education requirements for integration, the limits on the 
number of soldiers accepted into the SPLA and other organized forces, budget and 
logistics for the movement of forces, and where to send those deemed unfit for service.398 
The committee itself would also begin to set out the budget and timelines for the 
integration process, as well as determine the screening requirements for integration into 
the SPLA.399 
 
Second, the leaders of the armed groups would submit lists of forces to be integrated into 
the SPLA, and the committee would visit assembly sites to verify the parades of 
integrating forces.400 During the integration process, the SPLA was responsible for 
housing and feeding armed groups as they awaited integration.401 While these forces did 
not receive salaries, some were apparently given money and other tokens to demonstrate 
that the government was committed to integration.402 Starting in 2011, the government 
decided to separate armed group leaders from their troops by bringing the former to Juba, 
as they believed that leaders would be less concerned about extracting benefits for their 
troops if they themselves were taken care of in the capital.403 In addition, while armed 
groups had previously remained in their home areas for the duration of the integration 
process, post-2011 integrations saw these forces transported out of their home areas to 
avoid agitation and also ensure that local non-combatants could not join the assembled 
armed groups in order to reap the benefits of the integration process.404 
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Third, the integration committee would interview members of the armed groups at their 
cantonment sites in order to determine their placements.405 Often, due to time constraints, 
only officers would be interviewed by the committee, while the remainder of the soldiers 
would just be checked for their physical fitness.406 Those interviewed were asked their 
preference for which organized service (SPLA, South Sudan Police Service, Prisons, or 
Fire Brigade) they wished to join, or whether they would like to become a part of the civil 
service or go through the DDR program.407 Due to the size restrictions of the organized 
services, sometimes they had to be persuaded to pursue one track over the others.408 The 
committee was then responsible for negotiating which of the integrating forces would be 
officers in the organized forces and which would not, but the ultimate decision was 
determined by the SPLA members of the committee. 409  Due to the continuous cycle of 
integrations, after the initial round of post-Juba Declaration integrations, the criteria for 
rank assignment was changed so that it would account for integrating forces having the 
appropriate number of officers per formation.410 For example, the leader of an armed 
group integrating with 500 combatants would hypothetically be entitled to the rank of 
Colonel with a Leftenant Colonel as a deputy, while the leader of an armed group 
integrating with 3,000 combatants would be entitled to the rank of Brigadier General with 
a Colonel as a deputy.411 Yet in spite of the required officer-to-soldier ratios for 
integrating forces, the President could still alter rank allocations during the subsequent 
stage of integration.  
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Finally, the integration committee would submit a list of recommendations to the SPLA 
Chief of General Staff with the integrating forces’ name, age, previous rank, education, 
training, proposed rank, and remarks on prospective assignments (i.e., infantry, signal 
corps, engineering corps, police force).412 For final approval, this integration report was 
then sent to the President, who would then make alterations to rank assignments if he saw 
fit, in an attempt to encourage the compliance of armed group leaders with the process.413 
Then, the president would issue a decree announcing the outcomes of the integration to 
SPLA units.414 At this point, the committee’s work would be complete, and it would then 
fall to the SPLA Deputy Chiefs of General Staff for Administration, Training, and 
Operations to calculate the salaries of integrating forces, arrange their transport to 
training centres, and assign them for deployment across various SPLA Divisions.415 
Although the work of the integration committee had been completed, the SPLA had no 
metrics to indicate when members of an armed group could be deemed ‘integrated,’ as 
opposed to simply being collocated with other SPLA troops. 416 As a result, the military 
remained divided along ethnic and factional lines.417 
 
Aside from the committees that were stood up to manage the integration of OAGs into 
the SPLA, there was an effort, started in 2006, to ‘mix’ SPLA forces so that they could 
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eventually transcend regional and ethnic identities.418 During the civil war, fighters 
tended to stay around their home regions, which is why they needed to be mixed within 
the SPLA in order for it to eventually develop the ethos of a national army.419 The intent 
behind this initiative was to mix units from the squad level on up with forces from the 
three major regions of South Sudan (Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile), so that 
there would be mixed divisions of troops from all over the country plus a support 
battalion with a tank unit, artillery unit, and engineering to complete the brigade.420 These 
newly mixed formations would then be sent for training and deployed on operations.421 
Unfortunately, however, reorganization was unable to break the relationships between 
former rebel commanders and the fighters they once led.422 
 
The aforementioned tradeoffs the government made in order to buy peace in the 
immediate aftermath of the CPA were worthwhile, as military integration succeeded in 
averting large-scale conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the OAGs in 
the period that immediately followed the CPA.423 However, the flawed implementation of 
the integration process affected its success as a long-term stabilization measure, and 
eventually contributed to its disintegration in 2013. 
2010-11 Rebellions 
 
The amnesty and integration approach that emerged from the Juba Declaration provided 
an element of stability during the Interim Period. However, the Government of South 
Sudan’s response to the assortment of armed groups that proliferated in Unity, Upper 
Nile and Jonglei State after the April 2010 elections demonstrated its enduring 
commitment to use military integration to co-opt the armed opposition. Over time, this de 
facto open-ended approach to military integration would incentivize a cycle of defection-
integration-defection. It would result, as detailed in Chapter 6, in increased pressure on 
                                                
418 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official B, Juba, South Sudan, August 19, 2014. 
419 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan. 
420 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official B, Juba, South Sudan. 
421 Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan. 
 137 
the military integration process and an opportunity cost for SPLA Transformation due to 
the increased cost of paying salaries. 
 
The elections held in April 2010 were for the national Government of Sudan and the 
regional Government of Southern Sudan, and were part of the process of CPA 
implementation. In Southern Sudan, elections for the presidency, the legislative 
assembly, governorships and state assemblies could have been a means by which those 
excluded from the peace process, such as civil society and other political parties, could 
attempt to influence the shape of the potentially independent future state, albeit 
indirectly.424  
 
However, during the candidate selection process that preceded the elections for the 
presidency, the legislative assembly, governorships and state assemblies, the SPLM was 
accused of handpicking unpopular parliamentary and gubernatorial candidates who had 
not been chosen by the people residing in various constituencies. In so doing, the SPLM 
Political Bureau damaged some of its relationships within the party.425 In response, over 
300 individual members of the SPLM stood as independents against officially sanctioned 
SPLM candidates.426 During the elections themselves, there were also allegations of 
fraudulent and exclusionary practices, and of intimidation and vote-rigging.427 Although 
some independents, such as Angelina Teny, wife of then-Vice President Riek Machar, 
and Peter Adwok Nyaba had previously been threatened with expulsion from the party, 
they were compensated with government posts after their losses in the election.428 
 
Focused on the referendum on self-determination in January 2011 and the possibility of 
southern independence six months hence, the international community was reluctant to 
criticize the conduct of the SPLM during the electoral process.429 Concerned that the 
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conduct of the elections should not undermine the peace process, referendum, and 
possible independence of South Sudan, many donors turned a blind eye to the flawed 
electoral process.430 
 
By the time South Sudan finally reached independence on July 9, 2011, there was a 
proliferation of armed groups operating in the Greater Upper Nile region. In sum, the 
rebellions that emerged after the elections were a function of the mismanagement of the 
political processes in South Sudan.431 Disenchanted with their exclusion from the new 
political dispensation and their lack of success at the ballot box, some concluded that 
armed violence was the only option for any disenfranchised group wishing to influence 
South Sudan’s system of governance.432 Following the election, at least three individuals 
subsequently began armed rebellions with grievances linked to the undemocratic method 
in which the SPLM handled the April 2010 elections – Lieutenant General George Athor, 
Colonel Gatluak Gai, and David Yau Yau. 
 
Lieutenant General George Athor, a Dinka SPLA officer, had served as former Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Political and Moral Orientation and commander of the 8th Division in 
Jonglei prior to resigning from the military so that he could stand in the 2010 elections as 
an independent candidate for governor of Jonglei state. The SPLM discouraged Athor’s 
candidacy and backed incumbent governor Kuol Manyang Juuk; after his electoral defeat, 
Athor began an insurrection. Prior to the January 2011 referendum, Athor signed a 
ceasefire agreement with the GoSS, but violated it once the referendum results were 
announced the following month. In May 2011, he proclaimed the creation of a South 
Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and claimed to command other militia 
leaders in other southern states, such as Peter Gadet, Gordon Kong, and Sultan Abdel al-
Bagi.  
 
Colonel Gatluak Gai, a Nuer SPLA officer, was in the Unity state prisons guard and had 
been expecting county commissioner post if independent candidate Angelina Teny had 
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defeated incumbent Taban Deng Gai to become governor of Unity state.433 After Taban’s 
victory, Colonel Gatluak attacked an SPLA camp in May 2010 because he believed the 
electoral process was flawed. President Kiir offered him amnesty in September 2010. 
 
David Yau Yau, a former a theology student from the Murle ethnic group, ran 
unsuccessfully as an independent candidate for the Gumuruk-Boma constituency in the 
state assembly in Jonglei. Despite his lack of prior military or militia experience, he led a 
rebellion in Pibor County in Jonglei between May 2010 and June 2011, and received 
weapons from Khartoum via George Athor. Aside from his election-related grievances, 
Yau Yau’s rebellion may have been motivated by internal Murle politics, or as he 
claimed, the underdevelopment and marginalization of Pibor County.434 
 
Peter Gadet also started a rebellion in 2011, but his motivations were not tied to political 
grievances, but rather to perceived ethnic marginalization within the SPLA and the 
associated lack of promotions. Gadet is a Nuer from Unity state who left the SPLA with 
Riek Machar during the 1991 split and eventually became key commander in Paulino 
Matip’s South Sudan Unity Movement/Army.435 His forces mutinied against Matip in 
September 1999, allegedly over his disgust at intra-Nuer fighting while the Government 
of Sudan exploited oil in Nuer areas.436 After rejoining the SPLA in 2000, he re-defected 
to the Khartoum-backed South Sudan Defence Forces in late 2002 over disagreements 
with the SPLA’s military discipline.437 After the Juba Declaration, he became the SPLA’s 
Chief of Air Defence, which was the most senior former SSDF position in the SPLA 
aside from Paulino Matip, who was deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLA until his 
death in August 2012.438  
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Following a round of officer promotions and reshuffling in October 2010, it was clear 
that former SSDF were being marginalized and being removed from posts that required 
decision-making.439 Gadet became the Deputy Commander of the 3rd Division in Warrap 
State – a position he considered a demotion.440 Gadet claimed that there were two lists of 
SPLA officers: original members of the SPLA, who received regular promotions and had 
priority for training, and officers who had, at one point, defected and thus lacked the 
confidence of SPLA leadership and were not assigned positions of responsibility.441 
 
Accordingly, Gadet’s subsequent re-defection was motivated by the belief that he and 
other capable former SSDF commanders had been overlooked for promotion, while 
lower-ranking, primarily Dinka officers were given higher ranks and more influential 
posts.442 In April 2011, he issued the Mayom Declaration,443 in which he accused the 
government of corruption and nepotism, reneging on 2010 South-South Dialogue 
agreements, mismanagement of the SPLA and biases in its promotions, and exclusionary 
political practices. The Mayom Declaration also called for liberation from the unjust rule 
of the SPLM. Gadet then became the leader of the South Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SSLM/A), an umbrella group of Nuer militias operating in Mayom 
county in Unity state. 
 
Rhetoric aside, in many cases the primary goal of armed group leaders was to increase 
their own power within state institutions, rather than improving them for the betterment 
of their communities.444 The leaders of armed groups accordingly leveraged their threat 
potential to extract benefits from the state and increase the amount of patronage under 
their control, as well as increase their own personal wealth. 
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These rebellions coincided with ongoing Dinka-Nuer-Murle communal violence in the 
Greater Upper Nile region, where small-arms proliferation, the availability of young male 
fighters, the inability of the government to provide security, and the security forces’ 
heavy-handed and uneven civilian disarmament campaigns fanned local grievances 
among ethnic groups and against the state.445 Unlike the armed movements led by the 
likes of Athor, Gai, Yau Yau, and Gadet, these groups tended to be ethnically defined 
local militias more concerned with the protection of their communities and property from 
rival ethnic groups than with attaining political power. Yet, boundaries between these 
groups were sometimes blurred, as this type of ethicized armed group violence was at 
times directed by disgruntled politicians and military officers who were able to capitalise 
on the local grievances of ethnic militias or localised conflicts over resources (i.e., cattle, 
land, fishing/grazing rights) to gain manpower for their armed groups to further 
destabilise South Sudan.446 For example, Athor was able to lead a multi-ethnic coalition 
of armed groups across the country, including Lou Nuer youth, even though he was 
ethnic Dinka from Pigi county in Jonglei.447 Lou Nuer youth who received weapons and 
ammunition when they joined Athor’s rebellion in 2010 then joined White Army 
formations that attacked Murle-inhabited Pibor in December 2011.448 As during the civil 
war, the government in Khartoum provided these rebellions with funding, weapons, and 
logistical support.449 
 
In response to this proliferation of armed groups, President Kiir continued to extend 
amnesties to those taking up arms against the South Sudanese state, reiterating this in his 
speech marking South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011.450 By the end of 2011, the 
government was able to neutralize these armed groups through a combination of coercion 
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and political-military accommodation: Having refused multiple government overtures to 
persuade him to return to the fold, George Athor was killed in an ambush in December. 
In February 2012, soldiers loyal to Athor signed a cease-fire with the government, and in 
March, the government signed an agreement to integrate approximately 1,800 SSDM/A 
forces into the SPLA.451 Gatluak Gai accepted Kiir’s independence day amnesty in July 
2011 and agreed to sign a ceasefire and integration plan, but he was subsequently killed 
by one of his deputies under suspicious circumstances. Approximately 450 of his 
supporters were subsequently moved from Koch County, Unity State to an SPLA facility 
in Mapel, Western Bahr al-Ghazal State, presumably to be integrated.452 David Yau Yau 
accepted the government’s amnesty in mid-2011 and began to integrate approximately 
200 of his forces in Pibor into the SPLA in Eastern Equatoria State.453 Peter Gadet 
returned to the SPLA in August 2011 with just under 1,000 soldiers that were relocated to 
SPLA barracks in Mapel in Western Bahr al-Ghazal by November. Some of his senior 
commanders notably refused to join the integration process, and the SSLM/A was led by 




In the context of southern factionalism and the exclusion of non-SPLA groups from the 
CPA negotiations, the military integration process formalized by the Juba Declaration 
was a reasonable short-term approach to ‘buy peace’ in the South. The government’s 
decision to pursue military integration is reflected in the themes discussed in the review 
of the literature in Chapter 3. First, integration demonstrated the Government of South 
Sudan’s conciliatory intent, and its commitment to work towards peace in the South 
(Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Colletta, 2012). Referred to as Kiir’s ‘large tent’ policy, 
amnesty and integration was a form of patronage intended to demonstrate the nascent 
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state’s inclusivity, as well as prevent insurrections that would destabilize it. Second, 
integration offered non-SPLA armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ in case the peace 
process failed, and provided mutually reinforcing forms of political-military 
accommodation to consolidate power and create a more unified front in preparation for 
the referendum on self-determination (Walter, 2002; Møller and Cawthra, 2007; Hartzell 
and Hoddie, 2008, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). In so doing, the government made 
forcible disarmament of such groups the exception rather than the rule. Third, integration 
helped contain potential spoilers in a statutory security force, thereby reducing the 
manpower available for the Government of Sudan undermine CPA implementation in the 
South through its support to such groups (Berdal and Ucko, 2009; Colletta, 2012; 
Licklider, 2014). In sum, the Government of South Sudan chose political-military 
accommodation through military integration because fighting groups that held 20 per cent 
of the South’s territory and would be continually resupplied from Khartoum would have 
made the South ungovernable and could have thwarted the implementation of the CPA, 
including the referendum on self-determination. This is why, in this particular period of 
time, military integration was the ‘least bad’ option for the government to pursue when 
faced with the choice to fight, ignore, or seek political-military accommodation with 
armed groups.  
 
Partly as a result of military integration, South Sudan was able to avoid full-scale civil 
war during the Interim Period by temporarily overcoming the wartime factionalism that 
was described in Chapter 2. Yet, the durability of the integration process proved 
vulnerable to the deterioration of the political atmosphere in South Sudan. The conduct of 
the ruling SPLM during the 2010 elections undermined the government’s claims to be 
committed to peace during the Interim Period, and negated integrated groups’ insurance 
policy against marginalization. As a result, some individuals who had been excluded 
from South Sudan’s new political dispensation resorted to armed violence. In addition, 
the concurrent marginalization of former OAG elements within the SPLA provided a 
justification for armed rebellion against the government during the 2010–2011 
timeframe, and supplied armed group commanders with an ample supply of manpower.  
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Despite the government’s short-term successes, the underlying factors that perpetuated 
the cycle of armed group proliferation – namely legitimate political grievances, 
opportunism, and greed– remained, leaving the government’s approach to neutralising 
armed groups open to multiple vulnerabilities. For one, during this timeframe, military 
integration became de facto open-ended, which increased pressure on the military 
integration process – especially as rebel leaders became entrepreneurs of rebellion in 
response. Integration thus became an end in and of itself, rather than a transitional 
security mechanism that Colletta and Muggah (2009) argue can be a useful interim 
measure during war-to-peace transitions. The open-ended nature of the process also 
undermined efforts to reduce the parade of and professionalize the SPLA, which will both 
be discussed in Chapter 5. Continual integration undermined SPLA Transformation and 
cohesion so that the SPLA was never able to graduate from the integration process. 
 
The apparent shortcomings of South Sudan’s attempts at political-military 
accommodation are critical points of departure for the massive and concurrent 
transformation of the country’s defence sector. The processes of rightsizing and 
professionalizing the SPLA and CPA-mandated Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration will be discussed in Chapter 5, followed by an analysis of the disintegration 
of the military integration process in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5: Transformation 
Introduction 
 
In order to understand the role than military integration played in South Sudan’s 
transition from war to peace, we must understand the context in which integration was 
occurring. Concurrent to the process of bringing disparate groups under the banner of the 
SPLA as described in Chapter 4, the SPLA was undergoing a process of defence sector 
transformation. This transformation included two processes: reducing the parade of the 
military through Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, among other 
demobilization measures, and transforming the SPLA from a guerrilla force into a 
professional, conventional, and modern military. These processes were disjoined from the 
military integration process and aimed to build a new security sector upon an unstable 
confederation of armed groups into which additional armed groups were being 
continually integrated.  
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, this chapter offers an overview 
of South Sudan’s attempts to ‘rightsize’ the SPLA – finding a balance between military 
effectiveness and affordability in terms of force structure, composition, and size.455 This 
chapter covers the efforts to reduce the parade of the SPLA and the impediments that 
confronted such efforts. In so doing, it sets the stage for demonstrating how both the de 
facto open-ended nature of the integration process, as covered in the previous chapter, 
and failed efforts to rightsize the SPLA prevented demobilization initiatives from 
relieving the pressure on integration as the primary means by which to address the actual 
or latent threat of armed groups. Second, this chapter details the transformation of the 
SPLA, and gives an overview of the support that multiple security donors contributed to 
this process. In so doing, it highlights the fact that SPLA Transformation and the foreign 
assistance that supported the process did not specifically address the issue of the 
integration of armed groups into the SPLA. This chapter therefore illustrates how efforts 
to transform South Sudan’s security sector post-CPA were being built on an unsound 
foundation. In addition, this chapter illustrates how the continual influx of personnel and 
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the inability to off-ramp them into the civilian sphere  meant that the SPLA’s resources 
were being spent on salaries for its personnel and not on transformation into a cohesive 
national military.  
Background 
 
After the CPA was signed and concurrent to the military integration process, South Sudan 
embarked on a defence transformation process that included rightsizing and transforming 
the SPLA. Although the primary mechanism through which the SPLA was to be 
rightsized was DDR, the Government of South Sudan also conceptualized Wounded 
Heroes, Pensions, and Civil Works Corps programs that were supposed to provide 
additional off-ramps for the SPLA’s excess manpower.456 
 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration was originally mandated by the CPA’s 
Protocol on Security Arrangements / Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements. 
The United Nations Mission in Sudan supported South Sudan’s demobilization process 
during the Interim Period through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
1590 (2005), which authorized the UN to assist in the establishment of a DDR program 
called for in the CPA. The original mandate for its post-independence successor, the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, similarly called for the UN to support the 
development and implementation a DDR strategy under UNSC Resolution 1996 
(2011).457 
 
According to the South Sudan Development Programme, 2011-2013, the opportunity cost 
of the oversized SPLA was the allocation of resources that could have been put towards 
the development of the new country.458 Intended by the donor community to reduce the 
cost that military expenditures imposed on the Government of South Sudan’s budget and 
allow the government to deliver a peace dividend to the population after decades of war, 
the optimal execution of the process could have provided sustainable livelihoods and 
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fractured the command and control of armed groups – all as a means of reducing the 
likelihood of a recurrence of armed conflict. According to the South Sudan DDR 
Commission, the South Sudanese military would eventually be able to “turn around its 
reputation as a ‘welfare army’ to being ‘fit-for-purpose’ in defending the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.”459  
 
Concurrent to the rightsizing process, the SPLA was to transform from an unpaid 
guerrilla army and establish conventional military organization and procedures, acquire 
formal military training, advice, and technical support, and establish a non-partisan 
military force subordinate to civilian authority. This transformation effort was done with 
the support of multiple foreign donors and under the assumption that the SPLA would 
either be merged with the Sudan Armed Forces or become the national military of an 
independent South Sudan at the end of the Interim Period. Accordingly, the intent behind 
SPLA transformation was for the SPLA to become professional, disciplined armed forces 
capable of providing a source of security for all the people of South Sudan, underpinned 
by a sustainable policy, institutional and legal framework enshrining the principles of 
civil control, accountability and transparency.460 The aforementioned rightsizing efforts 
thus bolstered the ongoing transformation process, as a military that was ‘adequate, 
affordable, and appropriate’ would be better suited to address the country’s internal and 
external threats, and play a new role as guarantors of peace in South Sudan.461 
 
One of the rationales behind defence sector transformation was for the SPLA to evolve 
from being a consumer of security to a force that contributed to the country’s security. 
During the Interim Period, over 80 per cent of defence spending was on salaries, and 
approximately one-third of the government budget was spent on the SPLA.462 (The latter 
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figure excluded other elements of the security sector such as police, prisons, and 
wildlife.) Reducing the parade of the SPLA therefore had the potential to make additional 
resources available to support the defence sector transformation process, especially as too 
much of the budget was spent on personnel salaries, at the expense of investments in 
training, improving logistics, procurement of equipment to improve mobility and 
sustainment, and construction of infrastructure.463 
 
Within the security sector, the size and the cost of the SPLA had operational implications, 
as the SPLA was unable to be proactive in the face of internal security challenges.464 
Better tactical mobility could have allowed the SPLA to increase its presence throughout 
the country to respond to or deter violence, while better strategic mobility could have 
allowed the SPLA to deploy forces to sustain conventional operations while avoiding 
being spread too thin to be effective.465 Soldiers were poorly equipped, and the SPLA 
tended to deploy its forces to remote areas without sufficient supplies to sustain 
themselves. As a result of these operational challenges, the SPLA was at increased risk of 
preying on the communities it should have been protecting.466 
 
The government’s response to insecurity in Greater Upper Nile, particularly in Jonglei 
state, also illustrated the necessity for, and potential benefits of defence sector 
transformation. Local conflicts in South Sudan had been catalysed by cattle-raiding, 
small arms proliferation, perceptions of marginalization by the state, food insecurity, 
poverty, the breakdown of traditional authority structures during the war, lack of roads 
and basic infrastructure, conflicts over property, land, and water, inaccessible justice 
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systems, and politicized ethnic identities.467 The government’s response to insecurity in 
Jonglei and other parts of South Sudan was a combination of local reconciliation and 
peacebuilding dialogues and voluntary/coercive disarmament campaigns. The SPLA, 
however, was either unable, or in some cases, unwilling to intervene in intercommunal 
violence, as they were not adequately prepared or equipped with the expertise or 
resources to conduct such operations successfully.468 Considering the lack of SPLA 
cohesion previously detailed in Chapter 4, the military’s array of ethnic and regional 
allegiances was also an impediment to its ability to intervene in communal conflicts. In 
fact, during previous instances of large-scale armed conflict in Jonglei state, the SPLA 
instructed local commanders not to intervene to stop the attacks. On one hand, the SPLA 
feared that armed civilians would have outnumbered and outgunned the security 
forces.469 On the other, there had also been fears that soldiers would join in the violence 
along ethnic lines if permitted to intervene.470 The SPLA’s inability to protect civilians 
from communal violence and respond to security threats encouraged citizens to take 
matters into their own hands, and caused local conflicts to escalate rapidly. Absent 
security guarantees that would extend SPLA protection to the population, the civilian 
population had few incentives to cooperate with the government’s disarmament 
campaigns, which perpetuated the cycle of violence in the country.471 
 
With all these factors in mind, defence sector transformation had the potential to allow 
for a reallocation of resources within the security sector – or even towards non-security 
sectors. Following the reduction of the SPLA parade, a more efficient allocation of 
resources within the security sector could have freed up funding to train a streamlined 
and professionalized force on human rights and civilian protection, and to improve the 
SPLA’s operational capabilities to respond to internal and external threats. Reduced 
defence expenditure could have also allowed the government to concentrate on building 
the capacity of civilian institutions to promote economic growth and development. 
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Nonetheless, the financial burdens associated with the SPLA’s ever-ballooning parade 
presented an opportunity cost for these efforts.  
Initiatives to Rightsize the SPLA 
 
The actual parade of the SPLA has been subject to varied and unconfirmed estimates, but 
was believed to be in excess of 200,000 by the time the civil war broke out in 2013. After 
the international community rejected the SPLA’s declared parade of up to 300,000 troops 
following the integration of several thousand armed group personnel in 2005-2006, the 
military’s actual force strength was estimated as being no more than 40,000 troops.472 
The SPLA eventually settled on an estimated parade of 90,000, yet by 2011, the parade of 
the SPLA was estimated to be approximately 200,000.473 The SPLA expanded to a 
payroll of between 210,000 and 240,000 soldiers in 2011, with an additional 90,000 in 
the other organized services.474 However, an internal SPLA audit at one point detected a 
minimum of 40,000 ghost soldiers out of whatever the exact parade of the force was at 
that time.475 
 
The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) started in 2006 and was replaced by the Multi-
Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP), which was to run from January 2009 to June 2012 
and target 90,000 ex-combatants.476 The DDR programme offered financial incentives, 
such as reinsertion grants and food ration vouchers, and participants were allowed to 
choose from a range of vocational training activities such as small business management, 
mechanics, agriculture and livestock management, as well as adult education, including 
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literacy training.477 However, the first phase of DDR in South Sudan was largely regarded 
as a failure, as only 12,525 of the SPLA’s original caseload entered the program.478 Most 
of these were Special Needs Groups (SNGs) that consisted of the elderly, the disabled, 
and women and children associated with the armed forces.479 
 
With an ambitious caseload of 150,000 people (80,000 from the SPLA and 70,000 from 
the other organized services), the South Sudan DDR Commission developed the National 
DDR Program (NDDRP), which was to be implemented between 2012 and 2020. From 
the standpoint of the SPLA’s Transformation Programme 2012-2017 which required a 
reduction in force of approximately 80,000 personnel by the year 2017, surplus 
manpower was to be funnelled into the DDR program, and the SPLA’s Administration 
Branch was to help develop DDR selection criteria, articulate management procedures, 
and establish initial lists of personnel selected for DDR.480  
 
Starting in April 2012, the second phase of DDR was supposed to have a pilot of 4,500 
former combatants across ten training centres, which was subsequently scaled down to a 
pilot of 500 people at a transitional facility in Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal state.481 
Between April and September 2012, approximately 290 former combatants out of the 
target caseload of 500 were demobilized, verified and registered at the facility.482  The 
government committed to paying the salaries of former combatants for up to 12 months 
after demobilization; reintegration would include three months of training, the teaching of 
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literacy, numeracy, and life skills, and psychosocial support.483 Meanwhile, UNMISS 
support enabled the construction of three DDR centres in Mapel (Western Bahr el-Ghazal 
State), Torit (Eastern Equatoria State) and Pariak (Jonglei State) as well as the 
construction of ten national DDR offices for training and outreach.484 The transition 
facilities were to be capable of handling caseloads of up to 500 ex-combatants each at 
any one time over a three–month period.485 
 
While the majority of the SPLA’s surplus manpower was to go through the DDR process, 
some was channelled towards the Other Organized Forces, such as the South Sudan 
Police Service (SSPS), Prisons, Fire Brigade, and Wildlife. In addition, some of the 
SPLA’s non-essential forces could have gone through nascent initiatives such as the 
Wounded Heroes Program, Pensions programs, and Civil Works Corps.  
 
In 2006, the SPLA established a Wounded Heroes program to care for soldiers who had 
sustained injuries during the civil war and were no longer on active duty.486 The program 
covered between 20,000 and 30,000 former combatants living in 18 assembly areas 
throughout South Sudan;487 some were above the statutory age for service and others 
were simply unfit for military service.488 Not only were those deemed Wounded Heroes 
likely to refuse to enter the DDR program, but the SPLA would not put them through the 
initial attempt at DDR as it did not provide sufficient rewards considering their 
contributions to the liberation struggle.489 After independence, the Government of South 
Sudan attempted to fine-tune the Wounded Heroes program so that it would cease being a 
dumping ground for able-bodied personnel deemed non-essential to the military.490 
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The government also considered the establishment of pensions programs to gradually age 
out soldiers of retirement age. In recognition of their service and sacrifice during the 
liberation struggle, the National Freedom Gratuity Fund offered a one-off payment to 
SPLA generals who had not been channelled through the DDR program.491 In addition, 
under the proposed National Military Pension Fund, all members of the SPLA would 
receive pensions based on their service since the CPA was signed (January 9, 2005), 
when the SPLA transitioned from a voluntary, non-salaried liberation group.492 These 
programs were to be designed to pay for themselves. For example, soldiers would 
contribute 8 per cent of their salaries and the government would contribute 17 per cent, 
and the soldier would receive 65 per cent of their active duty SPLA salary when they left 
the military.493 However, implementation was held up by the need for an actuarial 
valuation to determine the affordability and sustainability of these programs, which 
would have been determined by the actual size of the SPLA, and the health and projected 
retirement ages of active duty soldiers.494 
 
Finally, the Government of South Sudan considered the creation of Civil Works Corps so 
that the military’s excess manpower could contribute to the development of the country’s 
infrastructure. This concept was predicated upon the need to shift away from the 
traditional one-time DDR reinsertion package, towards a more sustainable support 
program for former combatants. Under this hypothetical program, 50,000 able-bodied 
former combatants were to be trained in specialized, income-generating skills such as 
agriculture, carpentry, construction, livestock management, mining, petroleum, plumbing, 
and river dredging.495 
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Rightsizing initiatives such as DDR, Civil Works Corps, Wounded Heroes, and pensions 
programs were intended to run parallel to and be closely coordinated with the execution 
of SPLA Transformation. Collectively, these programs were to be key enablers for 
transforming the SPLA from a guerrilla army to a professional, conventional, and non-
partisan force, as the presence of non-essential personnel was not only a constraint on the 
force’s operational capabilities but also a drain on its resources.496 Transformation, 
therefore, was contingent on the SPLA’s ability to undertake a sizeable reduction in 
force, as well as on the absence of major conflict with Sudan, and South Sudan’s ability 
to recover from the impact of the austerity budgets of 2012, which was a result of the oil 
pipeline transit fee dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. 
 
Written in anticipation of the military’s strategic post-independence challenges, the SPLA 
White Paper on Defence was published in 2008.497 The White Paper articulated the need 
for the SPLA to transform from a guerrilla force into a professional, conventional, 
modern military, whilst consuming a declining proportion of the national budget 
expenditure over time. In 2011, the SPLA Chief of General Staff signed additional 
strategic guidance, Objective Force 2017 and the Transformation Programme 2012-
2017, which were also linked to the 2008 SPLA White Paper, SPLA Act, Transitional 
National Constitution, National Security Strategy, and Military Strategy. 498   
 
The purpose behind Objective Force 2017 and the Transformation Programme 2012-
2017 was to guide the development of the SPLA between 2012 and 2017, inform national 
security/defence policy implementation, help prioritize and provide a framework for 
security assistance to be provided by foreign donors, and monitor the development, 
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progress, and implementation of transformation programs. 499  Objective Force 2017 
described the overall operational capability of the force desired in 2017, including 
structure, size and processes (command and control, management, training, sustainability 
and readiness). The Transformation Programme 2012-2017 laid out a coordinated and 
sequenced programme with timescales and costs to transform the SPLA from its post-
CPA form into the ‘Objective Force’ by the year 2017.  
 
SPLA Transformation thus involved four major activities: enhancing operational 
capabilities, education and training of SPLA personnel, improving SPLA values and 
standards, and rightsizing the parade of the SPLA to 120,000, per the force requirements 
articulated in these documents.500 Phase I (2012) was Preparation, in which command and 
control structures, facilities, capabilities, and resource requirements for implementation 
would be set up. 501  Phase II (2013-2017) was to be Implementation, in which 
transformation would be implemented through the concurrent and coordinated 
management of the core (i.e, sector command headquarters, infantry forces, mechanized 
force, logistics, soldiers’ education, rightsizing, and air defence) and supporting (i.e., 
general headquarters transformation, combat support including armour, artillery, anti-
tank, engineering, signals, medical, training, administration, moral orientation, 
inspectorate, Commando Brigade, air force, strategic reserves forces, and military police) 
programs.502  
 
Included in the Transformation Programme 2012-2017 were plans to establish a 
mechanized division and logistics brigade, a Junior Staff College in Malou, a sector 
headquarters in Mapel, Lainya Logistic Training Centre, and a Military Academy in 
Owinykibul.503 Also included were plans to develop medical facilities and capacity, hold 
basic Commando training in New Kush, improve management and control of the SPLA 
budget, and remove non-effective personnel from operational units. As part of SPLA 
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Transformation, Training and Advisory teams were to be embedded in the Sector and 
Division headquarters throughout the Transformation program in order to provide on-the-
job training and advice to headquarters staffs.504       
 
Having recognized the need to develop a cohesive military with national character, the 
SPLA sought to transform infantry battalions through a standardized ‘Reset’ program of 
instruction at one of three training centres in each of South Sudan’s regions: Sector 1: 
Mapel (Bahr al-Ghazal), Sector 2: Pariak (Greater Upper Nile), and Sector 3: Owinykibul 
(Equatoria).505 Through this Reset, SPLA units would be screened during the course of 
three to five months to ensure soldiers were fit for service and be oriented with the SPLA 
Act, Rules and Regulations, and the Rule of Law, thereby addressing the military’s 
ballooning parade and enhancing its warfighting capabilities. The Reset plan506 laid out 
three potential courses of action: Under the first, there was to be one brigade (~3,000 
soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over the 
course of five years. Under the second course of action, there would be two battalions 
(~1,500 soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over 
the course of ten years. Under the third course of action, there would be one battalion 
(~750 soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over the 
course of twenty years. When the civil war broke out in December 2013, plans were 
being finalized as to which course of action the SPLA would follow in its efforts to 
‘reset’ the force. 
Foreign Assistance to South Sudan’s Security Sector 
 
Prior to 2007, there was a gap in donor support to and engagement with South Sudan’s 
security sector, and many decisions had already been made, which set the course for the 
scope of foreign engagement after this time period.507 By this point, the post-Juba 
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Declaration integrations were already underway, which may explain why foreign 
assistance was not specifically directed to support the military integration process. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the South Sudanese and the international community saw 
integration as a purely internal military affair, thus believing that the process did not 
warrant external financial, technical, or logistical assistance.508  
 
After 2007, the leading contributors to developing the South Sudanese security sector 
were the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland, in addition to the UN 
missions.509  All of these third-party actors focused on aspects of SPLA Transformation, 
but none included specific provisions for support to the aforementioned stages of the 
military integration process (negotiation, cantonment and parade verification, fitness 
screening, and rank and division assignment).  
Role of United States 
 
The United States provided the majority of support to the SPLA’s transformation process. 
While it was governed by Sudan, which was under U.S. sanctions, assistance to South 
Sudan’s security sector was done under a presidential waiver.510 Military assistance was 
thus non-lethal, and focused on military education and training. For example, in 2009, 
SPLA officers commenced professional military education in the United States.511 The 
United States also facilitated command staff training, sought to train Non-Commissioned 
Officers through a ‘train-the-trainer’ approach, and provided assistance with power 
generation, vehicles and communications equipment, and the construction and renovation 
of infrastructure including SPLA Headquarters, some divisional headquarters and training 
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facilities, the infantry training school, and assembly points.512 The United States also 
advised the SPLA in the development of Objective Force 2017 and the Transformation 
Programme 2012-2017, as well as the aforementioned conceptualization for the ‘Reset’ 
training that was derailed by the outbreak of conflict in December 2013. 
 
Since 2008, the United States had a Ministry Advisory Training Team (MATT) in South 
Sudan, through which State Department-funded contractors provided training and 
mentorship to the staff and leadership of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs 
and the SPLA at the operational and tactical levels.513 The goal of the MATT program 
was to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Ministry of Defence staff and leadership 
to effectively manage the transformation of the guerrilla SPLA into a conventional 
military operating under the Ministry as the civilian authority within the government, and 
address fundamental weaknesses in extant staff procedures and planning efforts.514 While 
embedded in the Ministry, the MATT provided support in the areas of strategic defence 
planning, personnel readiness and force planning, financial management, veterans affairs, 
military production, acquisition, procurement, and logistics, public affairs, and 
inspections.515 
Role of United Kingdom 
 
There was some overlap between the assistance the United States offered to the SPLA 
and that offered by the United Kingdom. Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
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provided assistance in the drafting of the Defence White Paper and SPLA Act.516 
Training offered by both countries was in basic command and staff skills, internal 
security, counterinsurgency, close protection, and medical and communications skills.517 
However, the UK acknowledged that it had fewer resources available to support defence 
transformation in comparison with the United States, and accordingly opted to focus on 
the development of human capital at the strategic level, rather than focusing on 
implementation at the operational and tactical levels like the United States.518 
 
The UK began working with the SPLA from late 2006 through 2007 during a series of 
consultations on the SPLA White Paper on Defence, which led to a broader program of 
support for SPLA Transformation. 519  The goal of the subsequent Security Sector 
Development and Defence Transformation Programme (SSDDTP) was to provide 
support to the SPLA Transformation process and support the development of broader 
South Sudanese government security decision-making structures and relevant oversight 
institutions. 520  Between February/March 2009 and December 2012, the SSDDTP 
provided advisory support to the development of the Government of South Sudan’s 
security decision-making architecture, and helped improve the linkages between the 
Ministry of SPLA Affairs/Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA and 
the demarcation of the financial responsibilities between these entities. The SSDDTP also 
focused on improving SPLA command and control structures; training strategy and 
policy; logistics management, asset management, human resource administration; the 
development of information management systems; internal communications and civil 
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education; and monitoring, evaluation and reporting. 521  The Security and Defence 
Transformation Programme (SDTP) was the successor to the SSDDTP, and was to run 
from May 2013 until October 2015, until it was cancelled in April 2014 due to the 
outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war.522 The SDTP was to focus on strengthening civilian 
oversight of the military and making it more accountable, as well as on defence 
transformation and the development of a National Security Policy architecture.523 
Role of Switzerland 
 
The Government of Switzerland’s relatively smaller Security Sector Reform Project 
focused improving discipline and respect for human rights through the dissemination and 
implementation of codes of conduct and support to the military justice system.524 The 
project, which commenced in March 2008 and ran until 2012, involved a small team from 
the Swiss Armed Forces working on promoting and implementing international norms 
and democratic control of armed forces, transferring knowledge in International 
Humanitarian Law/Law of Armed Conflict, improving the reliability of and rule of law 
within the SPLA, and providing advice for the development of the Dr. Garang Memorial 
Military Academy.525  
 
Role of UNMIS/UNMISS 
 
As previously detailed in this chapter, the United Nations Mission in Sudan had a 
mandate that included assisting in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration program called for in the CPA.526 After South Sudan’s independence, 
UNMIS, which had also included assistance towards rule of law, police, prisons, and 
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judiciary, transitioned to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.527 The mandate of 
UNMISS included supporting the Government of South Sudan in peace consolidation, 
assisting it in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and 
resolution and the protection of civilians, helping the authorities develop the capacity to 
provide security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice 
sectors in the country.528  
 
In spite of the social and political importance of the SPLA in South Sudan, neither 
UNMIS nor UNMISS was mandated to support SPLA Transformation, aside from the 
development of a military justice system, which contributed to improving the SPLA’s 
values and standards.529 The Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support Office 
(ROLSISO) under UNMISS was comprised of the Justice Advisory, Military Justice 
Advisory, Corrections Advisory, and Security Sector Reform sections, which were 
responsible for working with the South Sudanese government and other 
national/international partners to reform the police, justice, corrections, and military 
sectors. 530  UNMISS provided training for SPLA Military Police on investigations, 
arrests, search and seizure procedures, and prison management and provided technical 
support to the SPLA’s Directorate of Military Justice on the review of the SPLA Act and 
its regulations.531  In addition, UNMISS focused on capacity-building within the SPLA’s 
Directorate of Military Justice and the Military Police to strengthen their coordination 
mechanisms.532 The UN also trained the SPLA on the marking, registration and physical 
security of small arms and also trained junior and mid-level SPLA officers issues such as 
accountability mechanisms, international humanitarian law, human rights, and children in 
                                                
527 Bennett et al., “Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010.” 
528 “UNMISS Mandate.” 
529 Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during 
a Civil War”; Rands and LeRiche, “Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic 
Violence.” 
530 “Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support” (United Nations Mission in South Sudan, July 15, 
2013), http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4056. 
531 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan” (United Nations, 
June 20, 2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/366; United Nations 
Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan” (United 
Nations, March 8, 2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/140. 
532 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,” June 20, 2013. 
 162 
armed conflict.533 UNMISS collaborated with the African Union, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom, to provide technical training and logistical support to the government’s 
national consultations on a draft National Security Policy.534 Through capacity-building 
and training, the UN’s Security Sector Reform section supported the governance and 
oversight of South Sudan’s security sector and supported the government in reforming 
the national security institutions and policy by advising at the ministerial level.535 
Transformation Impediments 
 
Efforts to rightsize the SPLA should have reduced the cost the SPLA imposed on South 
Sudan’s budget and allowed the SPLA to focus on transformation. However, efforts to 
demobilise ex-combatants and reform the security sector fell victim to several 
impediments. 
 
In South Sudan, the implementation of DDR programs was inhibited by disagreements 
with the donor community over the objectives and modalities of such programs, as well 
as over ownership of the process.536 Specifically, across the donors, DDR planners and 
implementers (UNMIS/S, the UN Development Program, and the South Sudan DDR 
Commission), the Government of South Sudan and the SPLA, there had been indications 
that these stakeholders had different needs, priorities, and commitments. 537  These 
stakeholders viewed the process as a means to different ends, from improving security 
and socioeconomic conditions to reducing the amount of money the country spent on 
SPLA salaries.538 Moreover, there were concerns that DDR ‘best practices’ from other 
programs were being prioritized when the reality was that these may have been 
inapplicable to the post-CPA context of South Sudan, given the SPLA’s sense of 
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responsibility for its soldiers – many of whom fought for the liberation of the South for 
over two decades. 539  Due to the failure of DDR stakeholders to transcend these 
disagreements, the program suffered from inertia, bureaucratic mismanagement, poor 
coordination and disagreements within the donor community and implementing partners 
over the shape and outcomes of future DDR programs, a lack of capacity to plan and 
implement the process, and reluctant financial support from the donor community.540 
Implementation challenges were arguably exacerbated by the Government of South 
Sudan’s austerity measures following its January 2012 decision to cease oil production 
over a dispute with Sudan regarding oil pipeline transit fees. 541  These measures 
complicated the government’s ability to finance its other demobilization initiatives, 
compounded the shortage of economic alternatives to remaining in the SPLA, and may 
have contributed to the lack of buy-in on the part of the government and SPLA. 
 
Because the DDR process was donor-driven, the government had little ownership of or 
buy-in to the process. 542 In spite of the military’s understanding that a reduction in force 
was a key enabler for SPLA Transformation, the Government of South Sudan and the 
SPLA were arguably the biggest obstacles to the implementation of DDR programs.543 
Indeed, Government of South Sudan’s rhetoric often failed to match its actions.544 On a 
very practical level, the Government of South Sudan was concerned about the social and 
political implications of significant reductions in force, concerned that former combatants 
would not receive sufficient reintegration benefits to neutralize their threat potential.545  
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The ideal time to reduce the parade of the SPLA through DDR would have been before 
the Government of South Sudan’s 2006 decision to start paying the SPLA salaries. For 
many soldiers, the post-CPA SPLA was the first time they had ever received regular 
salaries, and large numbers of extended family depended on this income.546 For many 
former combatants who had spent their lives fighting in the war, staying in or integrating 
into the SPLA was the safest option, considering the lack of alternative livelihoods 
available in South Sudan in light of a damaged agricultural sector and a virtually non-
existent private sector.547 There was no pension scheme in place, and reintegration 
benefits were never able to compete economically with the salaries former combatants 
would receive from remaining in the employment of the SPLA or of the other organized 
services. While the one-time DDR reinsertion grant was the equivalent of $360 USD, the 
South Sudan Legislative Assembly voted to double the SPLA’s salaries to $150 per 
month shortly after the Juba Declaration, and later raised it to $220 per month by the time 
of the 2011 referendum.548 Both pay raises were to prevent the Government of Sudan 
from using southern militias to disrupt the referendum on self-determination. After the 
referendum, the SPLA’s pay ranged between $300 and $500 per month.549 The decision 
to transform the SPLA into a salaried military reduced the financial incentives for former 
combatants to demobilize and face seriously limited employment prospects outside of the 
military.550  
 
After decades of marginalization and conflict, South Sudan’s underdeveloped and 
undiversified economy had limited absorptive capacity for former combatants, and did 
not provide alternative livelihoods that could absorb the soldiers that the SPLA needed to 
demobilise. Consequently, there was a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated into 
poverty, and that the government and the donor community had not managed 
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expectations vis-à-vis civilian life as an alternative to the SPLA.551 Former combatants 
were reluctant to forego relatively reliable salaries for the economic uncertainties of 
civilian life.552 Soldiers being demobilized from the SPLA had to overcome not only their 
limited skill profiles, but also the country’s low economic base and limited capacity to 
absorb their labour.553 This economic reality made demobilization a huge political risk – 
especially when it came to angering the SPLA’s core fighters if they were forced to 
demobilize.554 Thus, wary that unemployed ex-combatants would contribute to insecurity, 
the SPLA ensured greater security by retaining and paying soldiers instead of forcibly 
ejecting them, as there were not viable livelihoods for the tens of thousands of former 
combatants in need of civilian employment options.555 In the context of what was 
described as a ‘very weak economy and very strong SPLA,’ having the SPLA continue to 
pay soldiers as they were gradually reintegrated into civilian life may have been 
pragmatic and responsive to local demands.556 In some cases, however, some soldiers 
would have to be pushed into the DDR process, since the prospects for earning a living 
outside the SPLA as an uneducated former combatant were bleak.557 
 
Another impediment to the implementation of DDR in South Sudan was that there was a 
sense that the CPA was merely a ceasefire, and there was substantial uncertainty as to 
whether Sudan would actually allow South Sudan to hold the referendum on self-
determination called for in the CPA. During both the Interim Period and during border 
skirmishes with Sudan in 2012, the fear that the SPLA would need to draw upon excess 
manpower to defend the South decreased the incentive for the military to take the DDR 
program seriously.558 This sense of insecurity was exacerbated by post-2011 allegations 
that South Sudan was providing support to SPLM/A-North in the Nuba Mountains and 
Blue Nile state across the border in Sudan, and counter-allegations that the Government 
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of Sudan was providing support to armed groups operating in the Greater Upper Nile 
region of South Sudan.  
 
In addition, so long as true victory – independence from Sudan – had not yet been 
achieved, and the SPLA was still considered to be the guarantor of South Sudanese 
sovereignty, reducing the size of the SPLA could not be a serious prospect.559 As a result, 
senior officers had no significant commitment to DDR, as they wished to avoid losing 
valuable manpower during the pre-referendum period.560 Indeed, in hindsight, it was 
widely agreed that, while its future with Sudan still hung in the balance, the SPLM/A was 
not ready for the first phase of DDR.561 This was evident in the more active and leading 
roles the South Sudanese government and security forces played during the post-
independence DDR planning, motivated by an economic imperative to rightsize the 
SPLA to approximately 120,000 personnel.562 Moreover, DDR was not perceived by the 
government or by the SPLA as part of the defence sector transformation process that 
improved the future operational effectiveness of the SPLA.563 
 
Considering the economic and security impediments to reducing the parade of the SPLA, 
the force actually grew between 2005 and 2013.564 The SPLA’s growth during this time 
period can be partially attributed to the lack of a centralized personnel management 
system to track the recruitment process, as successive efforts to establish such a record of 
SPLA manpower had been unsuccessful.565 In addition, the 2006 Juba Declaration and 
President Salva Kiir’s subsequent amnesties towards groups that had since rebelled 
against the government resulted in the integration of tens of thousands of former 
combatants into the SPLA. The SPLA also had to integrate 15,000-20,000 members of 
the SAF and SPLA components of the CPA-mandated Joint Integrated Units, which were 
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comprised of combatants who, while aligned with the North, identified as southerners and 
would likely opt to remain in or return to the South.566 The approximate cost of 
integrating these individuals into the SPLA would have been about 200 million South 
Sudanese Pounds per year.567 
 
Finally, pervasive conflict and insecurity also drove SPLA recruitment drives.568 During 
the low-intensity conflict along the border with Sudan in 2012, the SPLA mobilized new 
recruits to join the military in case the conflict escalated. 569  Furthermore, SPLA 
recruitment drives used relatively high and consistent salaries as a pre-emptive measure 
to target ‘at risk’ male youth who might otherwise be recruited by militia groups or 
become involved in the cycle of Murle-Nuer-Dinka communal violence that afflicted the 
Greater Upper Nile region.570  
Conclusions 
 
Defence sector transformation in South Sudan was done under the assumption that the 
SPLA would be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces in the event of a referendum 
vote for unity, or would become the national military of the Republic of South Sudan in 
the event of a vote favouring independence. Following the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, the government of what was then Southern Sudan faced the 
monumental challenge of constituting a security force out of a guerrilla movement with 
various armed factions, while professionalizing the military and demobilizing tens of 
thousands of former combatants. These processes occurred in a particularly challenging 
context in which Southern Sudan was emerging from decades of war, ramping up a 
massive state building enterprise, and combatting internal and external security threats – 
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and overcoming poor infrastructure, financial and human resource constraints, and the 
influx of tens of thousands of armed group members.571 
 
This transformation of the SPLA was a massive undertaking, and a reduction of force 
through initiatives such as DDR, a Pensions scheme, a revised Wounded Heroes program 
and Civil Works Brigades, was to be a key enabler of this effort. However, neither of 
South Sudan’s two attempts at DDR, which was supposed to address the bulk of the 
SPLA’s rightsizing imperative, were able to play a significant role in rightsizing the 
SPLA or in its transformation during the interim period of the CPA. 572  Despite 
recognizing the economic imperatives behind reducing the parade of the SPLA, DDR 
planning failed to compensate for the political and military necessity of inclusion in the 
SPLA as a means of political accommodation and service delivery.573 In particular, the 
Government of South Sudan was concerned about the social and security implications of 
demobilizing former combatants into poverty – especially amid rampant insecurity across 
the South, and amid ever-deteriorating conditions along its border with Sudan. This threat 
of further insecurity actually caused the SPLA to go on a recruitment drive to bolster 
their defences against the North and employ at risk male youth who could otherwise be 
targeted for militia recruitment. The lack of alternative livelihoods combined with the 
fact that SPLA salaries were available and relatively more reliable in the long term than 
reintegration benefits meant there were few incentives for former combatants to pursue 
DDR. The failure of demobilization initiatives meant that the size and cost of the SPLA 
remained a burden to the country and limited the extent to which the SPLA could press 
forward with Transformation.  
 
Several of South Sudan’s demobilization initiatives either never progressed beyond the 
conceptual phase or were poorly implemented. If such programs had been implemented, 
they could have helped address the ballooning parade of the SPLA, which consumed 
resources that could have been devoted to allowing the government to be operationally 
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capable of addressing both internal and external sources of instability. The failure of 
various initiatives to reduce the parade of the SPLA increased pressure on an already 
complex military integration process as a means by which to address the actual or latent 
threats posed by armed groups in South Sudan. These factors contributed to the inability 
of DDR and other civilian reintegration initiatives to be a ‘release valve’ for the SPLA. 
Combined with the government’s open-door integration process described in Chapter 4, 
ineffective demobilization initiatives compounded pressure on the military integration.574 
As a result, the failure to rightsize the SPLA, combined with the government’s decision 
to integrate armed groups as described in earlier chapters, meant that the SPLA’s finances 
were dominated by salary payments to non-essential personnel, at the cost of the eventual 
professionalization of a leaner force.  
 
As referenced in the review of the literature in Chapter 3, Krebs and Licklider (2015) 
argue that the context in which the concept of security sector reform emerged does not 
account for the more recent phenomenon of military integration in modern conflicts. 
When applied to the case of South Sudan, this meant that military integration was 
overlooked as a distinct, foundational aspect of SPLA Transformation, and that while the 
processes of military integration (negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, 
fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment) and SPLA Transformation 
were concurrent, the processes overviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 occurred in a disjointed 
manner. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on the use of military integration during war-to-
peace transitions identifies three potential roles for third-party actors: mediators during 
peace negotiations; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire 
monitoring force; or providers of financial, logistical, or technical assistance.575 As 
articulated in this chapter, the United Nations missions, the United States, United 
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Kingdom, and Switzerland supported the transformation of the SPLA in a range of ways. 
These initiatives included articulating a strategy for what many assumed would be the 
national armed forces of an independent South Sudan, organizing the military into units 
that were operational and conventional, and developing its support elements and 
infrastructure. These third party actors also assisted in developing the capacity for the 
executive direction of such a force from the Ministry of SPLA Affairs and its successor, 
the Ministry of Defence, including management and administration, rule of law, and 
military justice. However, while there was ample foreign assistance to rightsizing and 
transformation, there was limited foreign assistance specifically directed at the technical 
or financial aspects of military integration process, which included negotiations, 
cantonment, verification of parade, screening, rank and division assignment. For the most 
part, third-party actors focused on what was traditionally conceptualized as DDR and 
SSR – with the end result being that the military integration process was disconnected 
from the success of both efforts to rightsize the SPLA and the broader professionalization 
of the force. Moreover, there was limited foreign assistance that was specifically devoted 
to technical or financial aspects of integration.  
 
During South Sudan’s transition from war to peace, military integration should have been 
the foundation from which defence sector transformation took place. However, as this 
chapter has argued, there was a disconnect between the military integration process and 
concurrent defence sector transformation efforts; integration outpaced rightsizing 
initiatives, and was not considered a departure point for defence sector transformation. As 
a result, I argue that efforts to reform the new national military were built on an unstable 
foundation, making the security sector prone to destabilization, as was the case during the 
2010-11 rebellions, or making it prone to collapse, as was the case during the intra-SPLA 
tensions leading up to the political rupture that led to the outbreak of conflict in 
December 2013. As such, the SPLA was never able to ‘graduate’ from the integration 
process and create a cohesive national military.  Due to the continuous integration 
process, ineffective rightsizing initiatives, and the disjointed integration and 
transformation processes, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development prone to 
fragmentation – a scenario that played out as a result of the steady erosion of political 
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power-sharing arrangements. South Sudan’s example demonstrates how military 
integration should have been the foundation for security sector reform, and as we will see 
in Chapter 6, serves as a cautionary tale for what could happen if this aspect of defence 
sector transformation is overlooked during a transition from war to peace. 
  
In the next chapter, I will discuss how the disconnect between integration and 
transformation, an open-ended military integration process, ineffective rightsizing, and 
the dearth of foreign assistance specifically focused on the integration process 
contributed to the disintegration of the military integration process – and whatever 







Chapter 6: Disintegration 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 argued that military integration may have served a critical purpose during the 
interim period of the CPA and contributed to a certain level of stability in South Sudan. 
Thus, integration was arguably the least harmful choice considering the factionalism 
within the southern rebellion, the Government of Sudan’s support to non-SPLA armed 
groups, and the need to consolidate political-military power and mitigate the threats that 
OAGs posed during the Interim Period. However, military integration became open-
ended, which created a class of rebel entrepreneurs. Chapter 5 subsequently detailed the 
concurrent efforts to reduce the parade of, and professionalize the SPLA. These processes 
were disjointed from the military integration process, which meant that the SPLA was 
being constituted on an unstable foundation. Combined with failed demobilization 
initiatives, open-ended integration increased pressure on the integration process and 
prevented the SPLA from moving on from integration to focus on Transformation, which 
left the SPLA as essentially a confederation of militias with competing loyalties. In this 
respect, integration, which was relatively stabilizing in the short term, proved 
destabilizing in the long term when it became and end in and of itself rather than a 
transitional measure en route to broader security sector reform. 
 
This chapter analyses the factors that contributed to the disintegration of the military 
integration process, including situational constraints that were outside of the control of 
the Government of South Sudan, as well as design flaws in the implementation of the 
process. This chapter also discusses how these flaws contributed to the disintegration of 
the process as South Sudan’s civil war broke out. 
Background 
 
In practice, military integration in South Sudan was not a particularly standardized 
process; there was no clear strategy or guidelines for how armed groups should be 
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integrated.576 This may have been attributed to the fact that between 2006 and 2013, 
South Sudan faced concurrent and competing imperatives in its governance, economic, 
and security sectors, and arguably had limited bandwidth to design and implement a 
military integration process that would address the threat posed by armed groups.577  
 
During the six-year Interim Period of the peace agreement (2005-2011), the CPA’s 
protocols needed to be implemented in cooperation with the government in Khartoum. 
After decades of marginalization, South Sudan also had to create structures and 
procedures to govern the autonomous region that it had been granted in the CPA, and 
prepare governing institutions in case the region’s citizens voted for independence in the 
2011 referendum. Complicating matters, South Sudan shut down oil production in 
January 2012 due to disagreements with the Government of Sudan regarding oil pipeline 
transit fees. For an economy that was 98 per cent dependent on oil revenues, this meant 
that many of the processes that required financing, including military integration, were 
short of funding. 
 
The CPA had ended half a century of civil war in Sudan, but there remained concerns 
that the agreement was merely a ceasefire, prompting the SPLA to maintain a wartime 
posture. Indeed, skirmishes along their common border in the spring of 2012 raised 
concerns that a new conflict would erupt. The security environment was continually non-
permissive in the Greater Upper Nile region, which witnessed multiple instances of 
ethnic conflict and cattle-raiding, including the SPLA’s fight to disarm the White Army 
militia in 2006, and a succession of Khartoum-supported armed groups in 2010 and 2011. 
 
Finally, between 2005 and 2006, the SPLA was transitioning from a guerrilla army into a 
more conventional force with military formations.578 Further complicating this transition 
was the fact that there were three militaries in Sudan/South Sudan during the Interim 
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Period of the CPA – the SAF, the SPLA, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).579 Per the 
CPA, there was to be a formal process of military integration between the SAF and the 
SPLA, and the JIUs were established with the intent of demonstrating national unity and 
serving as a nucleus of a future national army should South Sudan vote for unity over 
independence in 2011.580 However, JIUs were characterized more by the collocation of 
SAF and SPLA troops than by their true integration, which was unsurprising given the 
expectation that South Sudan would indeed vote for independence in 2011.581 
Design Flaws of South Sudan’s Military Integration Process 
 
The successful implementation of military integration within five years of the termination 
of a conflict is believed to increase the prospects for lasting peace.582 Yet, as military 
integration is implemented concurrent to other peace-building measures, it is difficult to 
isolate its specific effects in order to determine the success or failure of the process.583 
Nonetheless, the structure of military integration is believed to hold the key to the 
successful implementation of the process, as some integration agreements fail because 
they are poorly structured and not fully implemented.584 The flaws of the design of the 
military integration process in South Sudan will be discussed in additional detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
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Lack of strategic guidance 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the success or failure of military integration 
agreements derives from the manner in which the process is managed.585 A well-managed 
integration process may ensure that major parties to the conflict are able to dictate a 
strategy and allocate resources for the integration process.586 On the contrary, as a result 
of insufficient strategic planning and guidance, the SPLA’s military integration process 
was not well-managed. There were no quotas placed on the integration of former 
combatants from various regions or ethnic groups, which meant the new military became 
ethnically and regionally lopsided in favour of the Nuer who had been members of non-
SPLA OAGs during the civil war. There were also insufficient efforts to foster cohesion 
along political, task, and social lines, which would have been critical, given the SPLA’s 
history of factionalism and the fact that South Sudanese identity was centred around 
collective opposition to the North, which became a less relevant rallying point in the 
post-secession period. In sum, the SPLA’s military integration process was short-sighted 
and devoid of a vision on what the endstate of the process should look like. This meant 
that the military was unable to allocate sufficient resources to support the process, 
establish criteria to determine when armed groups had been successfully integrated, or 
determine how the integration process dovetailed with the defence sector reform efforts 
detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
Despite the fact that the process had been concurrent to the release of the SPLA’s post-
CPA strategic guidance, these documents included rather limited detail on the 
implementation of military integration. The integration of OAGs was only mentioned in 
passing, if at all in the 2008 SPLA White Paper on Defence,587 the 2009 SPLA Act,588 the 
SPLA Transformation Strategy Part I: Objective Force 2017 Concept589 and Part II: 
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Transformation Programme 2012-2017,590 or the Battalion Reset plan.591 Furthermore, 
there existed no implementation plan that laid out the long-term vision of military 
integration, timelines for execution, budgetary requirements, or measures of progress.  
 
In addition, despite the fact that South Sudan’s military integration process was continual, 
there were no standing management and support structures to facilitate integration. 
Instead, each time an armed group was to be integrated into the SPLA, a new integration 
committee would be stood up and dissolved when the process had been completed. While 
it is possible that a new committee would be required to account for potentially unique 
local and ethnic sensitivities during the integration process, the absence of a standing 
committee meant that the process started from scratch each time, and would not 
necessarily leverage past experience to improve the execution of future integrations.592  
 
Although the amnesty and integration process seemed straightforward, it had many 
moving pieces and potential points of failure. In addition, there was no single body within 
the national government that was responsible for overseeing the process from start to 
finish. Negotiations could include stakeholders from SPLA commanders to government 
ministers, members of local government and church organisations, depending on their 
previous relationships with armed group commanders, the area in which the rebellion had 
been taking place, and the particular grievance at hand.593 Yet if too many stakeholders 
became involved, this could lead armed group leaders to seek to increase the value of 
their integration packages, further drawing out the negotiation process.594 Moreover, 
there had been repeated instances in which an armed group commander would accept 
amnesty, only to subsequently renege on the integration deal, possibly in an attempt to 
recruit additional men or to improve his negotiating position.595 
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Limited third-party involvement 
 
Many states are weak in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and integration can be a 
costly, technically demanding, and turbulent process – from negotiation to cantonment 
and verification of parade, to fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment. 
In this context, the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 stipulated that third party actors can 
act as mediators during peace negotiations; providers of financial or logistical assistance; 
guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force to act 
as a deterrent to violence; or provide teams of trainers to increase the professionalization 
of integrated forces so they may eventually qualify for senior ranks in the reconstituted 
military.596  
 
While foreign assistance may generally be helpful in the implementation of a military 
integration process, it may also be insufficient to prevent failure.597 Yet, in light of the 
concurrent post-CPA challenges and limited guidance and structures to manage 
integration, foreign support for integration could have facilitated the implementation of 
the process in South Sudan. Instead, despite foreign engagement in parts of South 
Sudan’s security sector – from mediating ceasefires to DDR to SPLA Transformation – 
there was limited foreign support to the military integration process. Consequently, 
efforts by the international community to transform South Sudan’s security sector were 
built on the unsound foundation of a fragmented military. 
 
While the donor community had pushed the concept of military integration between the 
North and South in terms of the Joint Integrated Units, South Sudan’s status as an 
autonomous and not yet independent region prior to 2011 made it awkward for 
international donors to get involved in the SPLA’s military integration process – lest they 
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be accused of implicitly supporting the dismemberment of Sudan.598 Indeed, the SPLA’s 
status as a military within the autonomous region of Southern Sudan meant that donors 
had to be careful not to overstep the bounds of impartiality, as the JIUs were intended to 
meet internal security needs during the interim period, in accordance with the provisions 
in the CPA.599 Consequently, the SPLA had minimal contact with the donor community 
prior to 2007/2008, and received limited foreign assistance specifically directed towards 
assisting with the integration process, which had already commenced by 2006.600 
 
As previously detailed in the survey of foreign support to South Sudan’s security sector 
in Chapter 5, the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the UN missions all 
contributed to various aspects of the SPLA’s transformation and professionalization. Yet, 
these countries did not play the aforementioned roles that third party actors have played 
in the previous cases of military integration detailed in Chapter 3. One explanation for 
this is that the actual process of military integration in which members of armed groups 
were assembled and accommodated while the SPLA committees verified their parades 
may have been too expensive for the international community to fund.601 Another 
explanation draws on the assertion made by Krebs and Licklider (2015), who argue that 
the definition and understanding of security sector reform has changed since it was 
initially conceptualised. Accordingly, third party actors may not have been cognizant of 
the fact that the transformation they proposed for South Sudan’s security sector needed to 
specifically account for the integration of non-statutory armed forces before commencing 
the transformation of the statutory national military. Alternatively, there may have been 
normative or legal restrictions on funding non-statutory armed forces before they had 
advanced through the vetting and rank assignment processes of integration. 
 
Of the foreign actors contributing to shaping South Sudan’s post-CPA security sector, 
both the United Nations Mission in Sudan and its successor, the United Nations Mission 
in South Sudan at times played the roles of mediator and guarantor of security between 
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the Government of South Sudan and the leaders of armed groups, and provider of 
logistical support to the integration process. This is despite the fact that the integration of 
armed groups into the SPLA was not a direct area of focus under the mandates of these 
missions. In one instance, the UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Committee played 
a key role in bringing fighting between elements of the SAF and the SPLA in Malakal, 
Upper Nile in November 2006 to a halt after fighting had erupted from a series of 
skirmishes between the SPLA Joint Integrated Unit contingent and SAF-aligned other 
armed groups.602 On a handful of occasions, the UN missions also acted as a mediator 
between the Government of South Sudan and the leaders of armed groups. In 2011, 
UNMIS provided support to ceasefire negotiations with Gatluak Gai in Unity state,603 and 
UNMISS witnessed the surrender of over 200 members of armed groups and their two 
commanding generals in Upper Nile in May 2012, after which they were reportedly 
integrated into the military.604 Due to security concerns, the UN was unable assume a 
third party verification role in Mayom county where fighters under Peter Gadet awaited 
integration into the SPLA.605 However, the UN missions supported some integration 
processes by providing logistical assistance, which involved transporting members of 
armed groups due for integration into the SPLA from remote areas often accessible only 
by helicopter to cantonment sites, then screening and registering them. Specifically, the 
UN provided support to the Government of South Sudan for the relocation of 
approximately 1,000 of Peter Gadet’s forces, just over 200 of David Yau Yau’s forces, 
and an unknown number of Gabriel Tanginye’s forces in 2011. 606  UNMISS also 
supported the logistics behind ceasefire negotiations, for example, facilitating the travel 
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of over 50 Murle leaders in January 2013 to initiate contact with David Yau Yau and 
conduct outreach activities with local communities after Yau Yau’s second rebellion.607 
 
In spite of these contributions, neither UNMIS nor UNMISS were intended to, or 
designed to, act as guarantors of security during the military integration process in South 
Sudan. Indeed, inter-ethnic violence across Upper Nile and Jonglei states and the 
predation of the Lord’s Resistance Army on the populations of Central and Western 
Equatoria demonstrated how challenging it was for these missions to carry out even those 
activities that were indeed in its mandate – namely, to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence in line with their Chapter VII mandates.608 During the Interim 
Period as well as in the aftermath of independence, there were outbreaks of inter-ethnic 
violence between the Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka communities and the Murle in Jonglei 
state, which resulted in over 3,500 deaths.609 The overwhelming majority of clashes took 
place between the Lou Nuer and the Murle, and were driven by uneven disarmament 
campaigns, cattle rustling, the abduction of children during raids, manipulation of ethnic 
violence by opportunistic politicians, and the importance of revenge in the absence of 
state protection and means of accountability. 
 
Partially because of its inability to protect civilians, there was a lack of trust between the 
UN missions and the Government of South Sudan. By some assessments, UNMIS only 
started to act on its protection of civilians mandate in 2009, which was four years into its 
deployment.610 Furthermore, the mission’s inability to protect civilians targeted by the 
Sudanese government in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile in the last weeks of the 
CPA in 2011 meant that its successor faced inherent distrust in the will and ability for the 
UN to intervene when the security situation deemed necessary in the new Republic of 
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South Sudan.611 Another impediment for UNMISS was that the mission’s transition from 
UNMIS, which had a headquarters in Khartoum, was never truly socialized so as to 
engender trust with South Sudan’s security forces.612 This led to the perpetuation of 
mutual distrust between UN troops and South Sudan’s security forces, the latter of which 
may have believed that UNMIS reports on the South were being channelled to Sudanese 
security forces.613 
 
Like its predecessor, UNMISS was criticized for not being more proactive at deterring 
inter-ethnic violence and protecting civilians.614 Some troop contributing countries were 
said to be risk-averse and reluctant to adhere to a protection of civilians mandate. In 
addition, there was a shortfall of troops below the mandated level of 7,000, and 
insufficient personnel trained in the protection of civilians.615 Both UN missions suffered 
from significant capacity and capability challenges that inhibited their response to threats 
against civilians. For one, with few paved roads, South Sudan’s terrain was difficult to 
expand UN access and reach.616 The UN missions also lacked a riverine capability and 
had insufficient logistical assets, such as military aircraft, to deploy and support troops.617 
Furthermore, for a period of time, UNMISS was only allowed to fly one mission per 
week due to new safety restrictions imposed as a result of the SPLA shooting down a UN 
helicopter in December 2012.618 These mobility challenges limited the ability for the UN 
missions to deploy on a substantial scale in multiple parts of a conflict-prone country.619 
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Finally, the UN missions had trouble getting the Government of Sudan to grant access to 
certain parts of the country in which the SPLA was conducting military operations.620 
These SPLA-imposed restrictions in movement meant that the UN missions could not 
make use of their mandates to protect civilians.621 Moreover, South Sudanese civilians 
did not see the UN as a neutral actor due to the perception that the mission was unable or 
unwilling to challenge the South Sudanese government on key issues related to its 
mandate.622 This sentiment was confirmed by an alleged quote from a former Force 
Commander that “We won’t step in if the army turns on communities.”623 This statement 
reflected a need to maintain good ties with the South Sudanese government on one hand, 
and the realization that the UN mission could find itself outgunned by the SPLA on the 
other.624  This placed an insurmountable constraint on the UN’s ability to fulfil a 
protection of civilians mandate, and damaged its credibility as an objective guarantor of 
security.625 Needless to say, the UN missions’ response, or lack thereof to inter-ethnic 
violence during the Interim Period of the CPA and the immediate aftermath of 
independence served as an indication for why they were never credible guarantors of 
security between warring parties. 
 
Open-ended process without accountability 
 
The aftermath of the 2010 election process in South Sudan, as described in Chapter 4, 
demonstrated the sensitivity of the military integration process to political competition 
and instability. After the elections, it became clear that any individual or group 
disenchanted with the electoral process had no political recourse within South Sudan’s 
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system of governance. 626  The government’s response to the armed groups that 
proliferated after the elections demonstrated its continuing post-Juba Declaration 
commitment to use military integration to address armed opposition. Over time, the 
process in South Sudan became de facto open-ended, thereby increasing the pressure on 
integration as the primary means of addressing armed opposition. This defection-
reintegration cycle, described by Alex de Waal as ‘rent-seeking rebellion,’ became a 
revolving door process whereby some armed groups would rotate in and out of the 
SPLA.627 
 
Despite the benefits that military integration can provide during war to peace transitions, 
the process is a political quick fix that not only runs the risk of creating a ‘demonstration 
effect’ – that violence and disobedience can be translated into benefits, but it also 
displays the lack of credible guarantees to sanction defectors.628 The Government of 
South Sudan’s approach to resolving armed rebellions provided a post-CPA affirmation 
that accountability and integration were mutually exclusive. Accordingly, from the 
perspective of armed group leaders, the costs associated with military integration 
remained low, while the potential rewards in the form of financial benefits, impunity for 
past crimes, high ranks, and lucrative deployment locations, were persistently quite high. 
Knowing how much the government was willing to compromise for the sake of stability, 
armed group leaders could perpetually use the threat of violence as a bargaining tool to 
resolve political grievances, or to forestall compliance with integration and remain 
deployed in their home areas. 629  Consequently, the SPLA became a vehicle for 
purchasing loyalties through the distribution of patronage, which was contingent on the 
actual or threatened use of violence to extract additional benefits from the state. 630 
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The open-ended integration process created a perverse incentive for members of the 
SPLA to defect in order to advance their positions or increase their wealth. By seeking to 
neutralize the threat these armed group leaders posed, the government gave them and 
other aggrieved parties an incentive to defect. The most tangible demonstrations of the 
Catch-22 element of military integration were the repeat defections of David Yau Yau 
and Peter Gadet. After accepting the government’s amnesty in September 2011, David 
Yau Yau’s decision to re-defect from the SPLA in April 2012 and form the South Sudan 
Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra Faction is believed to have been tied to two 
factors.631 One was due to his disappointment at receiving the rank of Major – a severe 
demotion, given his threat potential and the fact that he had held the self-appointed rank 
of Major General during his first rebellion.632 The other was due to the political 
marginalization of the Murle in Jonglei and the onset of the March–October 2012 civilian 
disarmament campaign in Jonglei, during which the SPLA perpetrated human rights 
violations against the Murle.633 After South Sudan’s civil war commenced in December 
2013, the government quickly reached out to Yau Yau for a ceasefire and granted him 
administration of the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA), which was composed 
of the former Pibor and Pochalla counties in Jonglei state. The creation of the GPAA 
following Yau Yau’s two rebellions demonstrated the government’s continued use of 
political and military patronage and power-sharing to buy off armed opponents. 
Meanwhile, Peter Gadet, then commander of the 8th Division in Jonglei, mutinied within 
days of the outbreak of violence in Juba in December 2013 and became part of the 
SPLM/A-in-Opposition until his break with Machar in 2015. 
 
Ineffective rightsizing initiatives 
 
Containing former combatants in transitional security mechanisms such as military 
integration and civilian reintegration programs can often buy time for political and 
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economic development and help prevent the resumption of armed conflict. 634 The 
problem, however, is when either of these mechanisms fails to provide a ‘release valve’ 
for the security sector and the system becomes overwhelmed trying to accommodate 
armed groups. In the case of South Sudan, the process for bringing armed groups into the 
SPLA through military integration outpaced the SPLA’s efforts to reduce the size of the 
military. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 5, there were several attempts to rightsize the SPLA before and 
after independence, and the majority of the SPLA’s manpower was to go through the 
DDR process. Indeed, efforts to rightsize the SPLA should have reduced the cost the 
SPLA imposed on South Sudan’s budget and allowed the SPLA to focus on 
transformation. However, efforts to demobilise ex-combatants and reform the security 
sector fell victim to several security dilemmas. Due to the ever-present threat of renewed 
north-south violence and ‘enemies of the peace’ within South Sudan, the government was 
reluctant to undertake the required reduction in force. Furthermore, after decades of 
marginalization and conflict, the southern economy did not provide alternative 
livelihoods that could absorb the soldiers that the SPLA needed to demobilise, and the 
government was wary of the threats that unemployed ex-combatants would present to 
sustained peace. With South Sudan’s post-war economy providing limited livelihoods for 
demobilized soldiers, there was a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated into poverty, 
and that the government and the donor community had not managed expectations vis-à-
vis civilian life as an alternative to the SPLA.635 This was exacerbated by the inability of 
civilian reintegration initiatives to compete economically with the level of pay in the 
security forces, particularly given the decision to pay the SPLA after the CPA was 
signed.636 Thus, the government’s open-door amnesty and integration policy combined 
with ineffective demobilization initiatives increased pressure on the military integration 
process to address the actual and potential threats posed by armed groups.637  
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SPLA resistance to integration 
 
The decision to pursue an open-ended military integration process was a political one. 
Some of the SPLA senior leadership believed they had not been sufficiently consulted as 
to the wisdom of integrating armed groups into the military, and thus felt they had little 
ownership of the process.638 Specifically, some officers were concerned that the armed 
groups being integrated would eventually betray the military.639 Nuer comprised the bulk 
of armed groups initially integrated, which was unsurprising due to the alignment of 
many Nuer with the SSDF and other non-SPLA armed groups during the civil war.640 
Consequently, the integration process had also altered the demographics of the SPLA 
such that an estimated two-thirds of the military was Nuer by the time the South 
Sudanese civil war broke out in December 2013. Furthermore, integration had essentially 
overtaken recruitment, which precluded the force from bringing in qualified soldiers who 
may have been younger, more physically fit, and devoid of the baggage of past 
defections.641 
 
The integration of armed groups into the SPLA was limited by the military’s absorptive 
capacity, as it counteracted the concurrent imperative to rightsize the military. Military 
integration was costly, and the SPLA was concerned that too much money was being 
spent on salaries at the expense of operations and transformation.642 Military integration 
thus increased the costs imposed by the security sector on the nascent Republic of South 
Sudan, with the government spending almost 50 per cent of its budget on the MoD and 
the SPLA, of which over 80 per cent was on salaries.643 This expenditure on salaries 
came at the expense of investment in military professionalization, training, logistics and 
mobility, in turn undermining the development of the SPLA’s capacity to contribute to 
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the country’s security by deterring communal violence.644 Furthermore, the SPLA was 
unable to ‘graduate’ from what became an open-ended integration process towards the 
development of a cohesive, professionalized force. This meant that it remained a 
collective of armed groups under the banner of the SPLA up until the point at which it 
fractured in December 2013. 
 
Certainly, rank harmonisation was a serious challenge, and was at times a red line in the 
implementation of integration deals. Throughout the process, some officers maintained 
reservations that the low quality of integrating forces was compromising the strength and 
cohesion of the military, and was therefore not serving the interests of the SPLA.645 With 
integrated armed groups in possession of diverse training backgrounds, ranks and 
allegiances, seniority within the SPLA was difficult to determine. Many in the South 
Sudan Defence Force were poorly trained, had below-average levels of literacy, and were 
more likely to have received military training in the bush than through service in 
organised security forces.646 As they had little or no formal training, former members of 
armed groups faced the prospect of foregoing the prestige and higher salaries that would 
have accompanied higher ranks.647 Additionally, many members of the SSDF who had 
previously opted for integration into the SAF had been promoted above their abilities, in 
an attempt by the SAF to make integration into the SPLA less attractive, thereby creating 
an abundance of high-ranking officers among former SSDF personnel.648 This diluted the 
position of SPLA officers within the military hierarchy, placing the SPLA’s erstwhile 
enemies in positions of equal or higher rank by comparison within the reconstituted 
military.649 
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Some SPLA officers were concerned that there were insufficient conditions placed on the 
integration process – that integration was an appeasement of finite duration, and that the 
process was devoid of accountability. 650  Some SPLA officers also believed that 
integration should have been done according to SPLA rules and regulations – with the 
appropriate number of officers per military formation – rather than allowing the 
Commander-in-Chief to manipulate the SPLA integration committees’ rank allocations 
and increase the ranks of armed group leaders in order to buy peace.651 Rank inflation 
within the SPLA also led to the development of an inflated officer corps, with too many 
commanding officers relative to the number of soldiers. This impeded the ability of 
commanding officers to command a given division effectively in the field, for example, 
in situations in which commanders, deputy commanders and chiefs of staff were all at the 
two-star level.652 
 
The terms of the integration deals negotiated by the Office of the President and the 
Ministry for National Security in the political sphere were also frequently subject to 
resistance on the part of the MoD and the SPLA in the military sphere. In addition to 
often being unable to fulfil the promises made during negotiations, the military resented 
the fact that former adversaries were ‘rewarded’ for their rebellions with integration into 
the SPLA and that taking up arms had become an alternative to promotion for those 
unhappy with their ranks.653  
 
Not only did the open-ended military integration policy inflate the officer corps, but it 
also deepened divisions within the military, as long-time SPLA soldiers felt that 
integrated forces were being rewarded for treachery, in essence encouraging armed 
rebellion by rewarding armed group leaders with senior ranks.654 This was especially the 
sentiment towards officers like Peter Gadet, who were repeat defectors who would sign a 
                                                
650 Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan. 
651 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan. 
652 Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.” 
653 “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan”; “Jonglei’s Tribal 
Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan”; Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012. 
654 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.” 
 189 
ceasefire with the government and eventually defect – perhaps in order to negotiate better 
integration deals, to include money, promotions, food for the men under their command, 
and positions in the government and military. Due to his wartime success on the side of 
the Sudanese government, Gadet was deeply unpopular among many in the SPLM/A, 
even prior to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.655 For example, during the 2012 
disarmament campaign in Jonglei, Gadet was charged with collecting weapons in the Lou 
Nuer-populated areas of the northern part of the state under Operation Restore Peace.656 
He partially succeeded in this endeavour, to the chagrin of some senior SPLA officers, 
who reportedly hoped he would fail and trigger conflict and division among the Nuer 
communities, as he was Bul Nuer.657 In March/April 2013, there was allegedly an attempt 
to assassinate Gadet in Eastern Equatoria state, and in October of that year, there was a 
tense standoff with SPLA headquarters in northern Jonglei.658 
 
With armed groups remaining formally or informally outside of the SPLA, integration 
was often incomplete even after the conclusion of integration negotiations. In effect, this 
demonstrated the reluctance of SPLA officers to implement it, as well as the 
aforementioned financial and logistical challenges that impacted the execution of the 
process.659 At times, due to the sabotage of the process within the SPLA officer corps, the 
integration process proceeded slowly, causing recently integrated soldiers to feel 
marginalized and uncertain of their future within the SPLA. Due to logistical challenges 
and poorly planned/executed integration, integration processes often dragged on for 
weeks or months after an amnesty was agreed upon; tensions and misunderstandings 
among sizeable groups of armed men escalated on occasion as a result.660  
 
The manner in which the SPLA executed the integration process led former armed group 
leaders to feel marginalized within the force, and excluded from senior decision-making 
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positions. The late Paulino Matip reportedly complained in October 2009 that he was 
being sidelined, and his former SSDF forces had been excluded or mistreated.661 He 
furthermore resented that, despite holding the number two position as Deputy 
Commander in Chief of the SPLA, he exercised little operational control and was rarely 
consulted in decision-making processes.662 Within the senior ranks of the SPLA, mistrust 
towards the largely Nuer officers that were integrated after the Juba Declaration led to the 
re-emergence of tensions in later years.663  
 
Development of parallel security structures 
 
In 2012, during a tense period in Sudan-South Sudan relations, General Paul Malong 
Awan, the former governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state reportedly assembled a 
militia of at least 7,500 soldiers.664 This parallel security force was referred to by a Dinka 
term ‘Mathiang Anyoor’ and the phrase ‘Dut ku Beny’, which reportedly translates to 
mean “Rescue the President.” 665  These forces were mainly recruited from the 
predominately Dinka-populated Warrap and Northern Bahr al Ghazal states, the former 
of which is President Kiir’s home state. The ethnic and regional composition of these 
forces may have indicated a lack in confidence on the part of the ruling elite towards 
what was suspected to be the Nuer-dominated composition of the SPLA and its ability to 
protect their interests.666 Malong, who replaced SPLA Chief of General Staff James Hoth 
Mai in April 2014, subsequently denied complicity with standing up this group, stating 
that “no one can recruit an army apart from the national army.”667  
 
                                                
661 “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan.” 
662 “Compounding Instability in Unity State.” 
663 Young, The Fate of Sudan. 
664 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.” 
665 “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA,” Radio Tamazuj, March 9, 2015, 
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/generals-say-juba-massacres-done-private-militia-not-spla. 
666 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”; Panel of Experts on South 
Sudan, “Letter Dated 21 August 2015 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015) Addressed to the President of the Security Council” (United 
Nations Security Council, August 21, 2015), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/656. 
667 “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA.” 
 191 
Adding to the tense political environment that had been building up prior to the outbreak 
of conflict in December 2013, there was concern that these new recruits essentially 
operated outside the formal military command.668 Organized entirely outside the Ministry 
of Defence and the SPLA’s General Staff, these forces reported directly to the President, 
and accordingly received support for salaries, training, and equipment directly out of the 
Office of the President, as the Ministry of Defence refused to fund them. 669 A majority of 
these forces were not initially integrated into the SPLA, although a few were eventually 
integrated into the 3,000 soldier Tiger Battalion (Presidential Guard). The Presidential 
Guard, which was composed of troops loyal to President Kiir, former Vice President 
Machar, and the late Paulino Matip, had previously been an example of integrating 
Dinka, Nuer, and other ethnic groups into a functional unit.670 Bringing this new parallel 
security force into the Presidential Guard was seen by some as a betrayal of the force’s 
multi-ethnic ideal, which had been one of the aims of the integration process.671  
 
These parallel forces were reportedly trained at Pantiit Military Training Centre in 
Northern Bahr al Ghazal, and subsequently transferred to Luri, approximately 16 miles 
west of the capital.672 Between 300 and 700 personnel were then transferred to Juba to be 
integrated into the Presidential Guard in the days immediately before the meeting of the 
National Liberation Council in mid-December.673 Some of these forces were allegedly 
involved in the killing of Nuer civilians in Juba between December 16 and 18, 2013.674 
Concerns of ethnic cleansing and the desire for revenge on the part of the Nuer motivated 
the military commanders of the SPLM-in-Opposition, who had defected from the SPLA 
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following the events of mid-December 2013.675 These killings also triggered hostilities 
along Dinka-Nuer lines across the country; arguably, the Juba Massacres garnered 
support for Machar in Bentiu that he may not have secured without violence by Dinka 
against Nuer in the capital.676 
Conclusions 
 
Considering the competing imperatives of the post-CPA period, military integration in 
South Sudan occurred in a challenging context. Due to the concurrent state-building tasks 
South Sudan was undertaking, and the persistent threat of return to war with Sudan, the 
country lacked the bandwidth, technical expertise, finances, and logistics to be able to 
design a more functional military integration process. In this context, the military 
integration process outpaced the institutional growth of the SPLA and its thinking on how 
to address armed groups.677 
 
The Government of South Sudan not only lacked a long-term strategic vision for 
implementation, but also failed to clearly articulate the means and modalities of the 
military integration process. The lack of strategic guidance for military integration left 
implementation open for interpretation, and meant that there were limited guidelines to 
drive the planning, budget, and timelines for the process, or to establish measures of 
success. An implementation plan that dictated the strategy and resourcing for the entire 
process, from start to finish, could have improved the management of the process 
(Burgess, 2008). Understanding the maximum number of former combatants that the 
military could absorb could have limited the extent to which the SPLA’s parade 
ballooned to over 200,000 – a trend exacerbated by the open-ended nature of the process 
and the failure of various demobilization initiatives (Sangha, 2013). In this sense, 
integration outpaced demobilization initiatives, leading to the former process becoming 
overburdened as a means to address the threat of armed groups. 
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The lack of ethnic or regional quotas in the integration process created a loophole 
whereby the ethnic composition of the force did not match the country’s demography – 
and the government should have anticipated what the impact this trend could have. With 
only 16 per cent of South Sudan’s population,678 Nuer were believed to comprise 65-70 
per cent of the SPLA by the time the civil war broke out in South Sudan.679 Following the 
1991 split and the creation of SPLMA/A-Nasir and other mainly Nuer splinter groups, 
many of the Government of Sudan-backed armed groups had been based in 
predominantly Nuer areas of Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states). 
The government’s efforts to integrate mainly Nuer OAGs following the Juba Declaration 
resulted in the pendulum swinging towards a predominantly Nuer composition of the 
SPLA after 2006.680 This numerical imbalance in favour of the Nuer contributed to a 
sense that the SPLA lacked national character and diversity. 681  Furthermore, the 
Government of South Sudan’s lack of strategic direction meant there was insufficient 
focus on fostering political, task, or social cohesion in order to counter the pull of 
regional and ethnic identities within the SPLA. Consequently, the components of the 
SPLA continued to act in ethnic and partisan manners, thus undermining the spirit of 
military integration.   
 
The ethnic composition of the SPLA that resulted from an open-ended integration process 
without quotas did little to assuage fears that the equities of President Kiir’s Bahr al-
Ghazal political circle could be protected by the SPLA. This may have contributed to the 
recruitment of parallel security forces primarily from the Bahr al-Ghazal region starting 
in 2012. In turn, the establishment of regionalized and ethnicised parallel security 
structures undermined the premise of military integration as an insurance policy for 
integrated forces – or meant that the Bahr al Ghazal ruling elite was so threatened by the 
ethnic imbalance in the military that they sought out their own insurance policy. Going 
outside the SPLA chain of command in the pursuit of ethnically loyal forces further 
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undermined attempts at defence sector transformation, and undermined the notion of 
cohesion in the establishment of a professional national military. 
 
The open-ended nature of integration created incentives for defection from the SPLA. 
The demonstration effect from the 2010 elections – that political failures and armed 
violence could be transformed into rewards when the government inevitably bought off 
armed group leaders – helped create a class of rebel entrepreneurs who benefitted from a 
lack of accountability within the open-ended integration process. Moreover, open-ended 
integration counteracted concurrent efforts to demobilize former combatants, and 
prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and making progress 
towards professionalization. However, DDR and other civilian reintegration initiatives 
failed to get off the ground, increasing pressure on the military integration to address the 
threats posed by armed groups. Effective demobilization mechanisms could have freed up 
resources for SPLA Transformation or the country’s socioeconomic development, while 
reducing the pressure on the military integration process as a means by which to address 
the actual or latent threat of armed group violence. 
 
While foreign assistance could have facilitated implementation of the military integration 
process, it may have been insufficient to overcome the challenging context in which 
integration was being conducted. Still, foreign assistance to South Sudan’s security sector 
was largely limited to DDR and SPLA Transformation, which meant that military 
integration was not approached as a building block for the consolidation of the SPLA and 
the force was established on an unstable foundation. 
 
While the integration process itself was not responsible for setting off the political 
impasses that reached a boiling point in 2013, the acceleration of the conflict may be 
attributed to the fact that the national military was being built on a destabilized 
foundation. Due to the design flaws of South Sudan’s military integration process, the 
SPLA was in a state of arrested development, which handicapped its efforts to transform 
into a more professional military force, that could have been less prone to fragmentation 
in the face of political instability. The integration of armed groups into the SPLA should 
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have been a short-term quick fix and a means by which to move beyond civil war-era 
divisions; instead, the military integration process became an end in and of itself. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Introduction 
The previous six chapters of this thesis have spanned the historical factionalism within 
the southern rebellion, concurrent efforts to consolidate political-military power and 
transform the security sector amid a massive state-building enterprise and the 
proliferation of non-statutory armed groups across the South. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that military integration played a stabilizing role in 
the short term and helped achieve the goal of the referendum on self-determination, but 
was destabilizing in the long term due to the manner in which it was implemented. In this 
final chapter I will reiterate the core arguments of this thesis and discuss the findings of 
the three research questions presented in the introductory chapter, through which I will 
offer an overview of the themes covered in the previous six chapters. I will also articulate 
in this chapter the contributions this thesis makes to the field, outline the theoretical and 
policy implications and broader lessons for fragile states managing the threat of non-
statutory armed forces while undergoing transitions from war to peace, and make 
suggestions for potential areas of future research.  
Core Argument 
 
As defined in Chapter 1, military integration can be a power-sharing mechanism that is 
often employed in conjunction with other power-sharing arrangements along political, 
economic, and territorial dimensions. Military power-sharing involves the distribution of 
authority within the coercive apparatus of the state by incorporating or amalgamating 
non-statutory armed groups (i.e., rebel groups, local militia, etc.) into a statutory security 
framework (i.e., military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, etc.)682 
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In Chapter 4, I argued that in South Sudan’s post-CPA context, the government had three 
choices vis-à- vis adhering to the requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the 
threat that non-SPLA groups posed to stability: attempt to fight them, ignore them and 
accept that the government lacked a monopoly on the use of force in Southern Sudan, or 
seek accommodation with armed groups. Due to the South-South divisions of the civil 
war era covered in Chapter 2, and the imperative to consolidate power in preparation for 
the referendum on self-determination, the government largely chose to accommodate 
armed groups through integration into the security forces. I also argued in Chapter 4 that 
the Government of South Sudan chose this course of action because they needed to signal 
a genuine commitment to peace within the South and a willingness to compromise; give 
non-SPLA groups that had been excluded from CPA negotiations an ‘insurance policy’; 
and outbid the Government of Sudan in purchasing the loyalties of southern rebel groups, 
thereby largely containing potential spoilers in a statutory security framework. As an 
added benefit, the Government of South Sudan was able to diversify the country’s armed 
forces, thereby mitigating the ethnic fallout from the SPLA’s 1991 split. 
 
The SPLA had a long history of integrating former armed groups, but this process was 
formalized through the 2006 Juba Declaration. As a result of the Government of South 
Sudan’s reaction to the rebellions that commenced between 2010 and 2011, the 
integration process became de facto open-ended. As I concluded in Chapter 4, this 
indicated an over-reliance on the integration of armed groups into the military in order to 
address armed dissent. What should have been an interim measure during South Sudan’s 
aborted transition from war to peace thus became and end in and of itself, creating 
incentives for members of armed groups to use violence to achieve political or material 
gain. As I argue in Chapter 5, the open-ended defection-integration cycle led to 
ballooning personnel costs, which created an opportunity cost for SPLA Transformation 
and prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on 
cohesion and professionalization. 
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The failure of various demobilization initiatives – DDR, Wounded Heroes, Pensions, and 
the Civic Works Corps – increased pressure on the military integration process as a 
means by which to manage the threats posed by armed groups, as I argued in Chapter 5. 
Moreover, in the context of an open-ended integration process, there was no ‘release 
valve’ to flush the SPLA’s excess and ever-increasing manpower out of the security 
sector. The concurrent transformation of South Sudan’s security sector, which I discussed 
in Chapter 5, involved support from the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and 
UNMIS/S, but was not aligned with the military integration process. In fact, these third 
parties provided limited direct support to the negotiation, cantonment and verification of 
parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment phases of the military 
integration process in South Sudan. As a result of this disconnect and limited support, the 
SPLA was being built on an unstable foundation, which fractured during periods of 
heightened political competition. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I argued that the integration process disintegrated due to: a lack of a 
long-term strategic vision for the process, limited third party assistance, the open-ended 
nature of the process which undermined accountability, ineffective rightsizing initiatives, 
SPLA resistance to integration, and the development of parallel security forces outside of 
the integration process.  
Answers to Research Questions 
 
In Chapter 1, I posed three research questions to guide this thesis. In the paragraphs that 
follow, I will provide answers to each of these questions, highlighting where they have 
been answered in the body of this thesis. 
 
Research Question 1: Why did the Government of South Sudan choose to accommodate 
armed groups after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed? 
 
In spite of the legal and practical imperatives to largely accommodate armed groups, 
bringing armed groups into the SPLA’s fold was a legacy initiative, as I discuss in 
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Chapter 2. Although formalized by the 2006 Juba Declaration and the subsequent 
integration of the South Sudan Defence Forces and other armed groups, the SPLA had 
been integrating dissident groups since its inception in the 1980s. For example, elements 
of Anyanya II were absorbed into the SPLA between 1988 and 1991, and forces loyal to 
Riek Machar were brought back into the SPLA when he and John Garang reconciled in 
2002.  
 
Inclusion in the SPLA was important not only because of the history of factionalism that 
I discussed in Chapter 2, but also because it became the main purveyor of patronage 
within the new country’s limited economy. As I argue in Chapter 4, President Kiir’s 
‘large tent’ approach to dissent during the interim period demonstrated an enduring 
commitment on the part of the Government of South Sudan to use military integration to 
co-opt armed opposition. In this sense, President Kiir’s approach demonstrated the 
nascent state’s inclusivity while simultaneously working to prevent insurrections that 
would have destabilized it. As a result of the military integration process, the SPLA 
became the primary vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan.  
 
In Chapter 3, I discuss how the literature on military integration describes the process as a 
short-term transitional means by which to contain potential spoilers or convert said 
spoilers into stakeholders (Colletta and Muggah 2009). Specifically, integration can limit 
the manpower available for armed group mobilization (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Hall 2009; 
and Licklider 2014). In Chapters 2 and 4, I discussed how the Government of Sudan 
supported non-SPLA armed groups during the civil war, the interim period, and the post-
independence period. During the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Government of Sudan 
used armed groups in the South to conduct raids and pacification patrols to generally 
weaken the SPLA. This divide and rule strategy was necessary to curtail the momentum 
of SPLA offensives and compensate for the ineffectiveness of the Sudan Armed Forces. 
The Government of Sudan continued to support non-SPLA groups while preventing the 
emergence of a cohesive political agenda or command structure within government-
aligned militias, which allowed government forces to regain the offensive in the South. In 
addition, the Government of Sudan was able to establish a cordon sanitaire in the oil-
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producing areas of Greater Upper Nile while stoking further intra-ethnic fragmentation 
and casting the South as ungovernable. 
 
This legacy of factionalism within the southern rebellion and Sudanese government 
support to non-SPLA armed groups partially explains the imperative on the part of the 
Government of South Sudan to accommodate such groups lest they become spoilers to 
the CPA. Both the CPA signatories and facilitators had opposed expanded participation 
in the peace process, which meant that the agreement created several potential spoilers 
who then contributed to the subsequent emergence of conflicts in Darfur, South 
Kordofan, Blue Nile, and across the South. In Chapter 4, I argue that military integration 
both limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use OAGs to undermine 
the Government of South Sudan and prevent the full implementation of the CPA, but also 
allowed non-SPLA groups to find a way to mitigate their isolation from the peace 
process. In addition, I argue in this chapter that seeking political-military accommodation 
with non-SPLA armed groups allowed South Sudan to overcome its history of 
factionalism and ethnic conflict to consolidate political-military power prior to the 2011 
referendum on self-determination. 
 
In Chapter 3, I discussed how the literature argues that integration can give former 
combatants an ‘insurance policy’ that minimizes the risk that the new military can be 
easily used against either side (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Møller and 
Cawthra 2007; Sriram 2008; Hall 2009; and Licklider 2014). In South Sudan, integration 
allowed armed groups this type of insurance policy, which could be interpreted as an 
attempt to rectify their exclusion from the CPA peace process, notionally minimizing the 
risk that the new military could be used by one side against the other. At the same time, 
integration signalled a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, 
while making the SPLA more diverse and inclusive, which tracks with what the literature 
says about integration increasing diversity within the military, thereby making it a 
symbol of national unity (Hall 2009; Licklider 2014). 
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In sum, considering South Sudan’s history of factionalism, the impact of Khartoum’s 
meddling, and the imperative to consolidate power during the interim period, the 
Government of South Sudan was faced with the decision to fight, ignore, or 
accommodate non-SPLA armed groups. This decision to largely accommodate these 
armed groups after the CPA arguably allowed the country to avoid a return to conflict 
that was all but certain considering the relative power, support, and strategic positions of 
these armed groups. The consolidation of political-military power during the interim 
period allowed South Sudan to hold divisions at bay long enough for the region to 
achieve its independence from Sudan via referendum in 2011. 
 
Research Question 2: Why did this attempt to accommodate armed groups ultimately 
fail? 
 
One of the primary reasons the military integration process failed in South Sudan was 
that the context was not favorable for a process that can be complicated even in the best 
of situations – with effective political leadership, engaged third parties that are perceived 
by warring parties to be objective, and capable institutions to manage and finance the 
process from start to finish.  As described in Chapter 1 of this thesis, during South 
Sudan’s attempt to bring non-statutory armed forces into a statutory security framework, 
the country faced an extremely challenging political, social, and economic context and a 
potentially volatile post-conflict security environment. After decades of conflict, South 
Sudan had unfavourable human development indicators, poor infrastructure, and a limited 
economic base. During the interim period, South Sudan undertook an unparalleled state-
building enterprise in which new government and security force structures were created 
from scratch as the SPLM/A attempted to transform from guerrilla movement to a 
political party and a separate non-partisan military under civilian control. Concurrent to 
the military integration process, the SPLA was undergoing a process of defence 
transformation that included rightsizing and professionalizing the SPLA, while there was 




Military integration also failed due to an insufficient focus on overcoming the ethnic, 
regional, and political divisions covered in Chapter 2. While at times the southern 
rebellion embodied a unity of purpose, thereby transcending ethnic and regional 
boundaries, such divisions have been a consistent theme in South Sudan’s recent history 
and contributed to the ultimate failure of efforts to integrate armed groups into the SPLA. 
South-South divisions manifested in the conflicts between Anyanya II and the SPLA, 
conflicts over John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ platform for the SPLM/A as a revolution 
aimed at transforming a united Sudan into a secular democratic government, and in the 
Nasir coup which attempted to unseat Garang as the head of the southern rebellion. The 
southern rebellion further splintered throughout the 1990s with the subsequent emergence 
of groups such as SPLM/A-Nasir (also called SPLM/A-United), the South Sudan 
Independence Movement, SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, SPLA-Bor, and the South Sudan 
Defence Force. In addition, divisions continued to manifest even as the South moved 
towards peace, as exemplified by the Rumbek dispute on the eve of the signing of the 
CPA and the intra-SPLM tensions that eventually led to the sacking of the cabinet in July 
2013 and the eventual outbreak of armed violence almost five months later.  
 
Despite having actors with divergent interests, collective opposition to the North was at 
times able to galvanize the southern opposition. However, after South Sudan’s 
independence in 2011, there was little to deter the emergence of divisions in the South. 
Fissures continued to destabilize the South during the interim period, as I highlighted in 
Chapter 4, and the government did not place a sufficient emphasis on fostering a new 
collective identity to fill the void left by opposition to the North. As a result of the 
SPLA’s habitual absorption of armed groups, the military never succeeded in developing 
a national ethos and thus remained a confederation of ethnic militias with parochial 
interests that maintained loyalty to their ethnic groups or former armed group leaders. In 
addition, whether it was a deliberate decision or merely an oversight, the failure to utilize 
quotas when integrating armed groups into the SPLA may have also contributed to the 
failure of the process. The use of quotas could have ensured that that the reconstituted 
military reflected the ethnic and regional diversity of the country. The fact that the 
integration of largely Nuer armed groups altered the demographics of the SPLA in their 
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favour exacerbated this dynamic. Moreover, the post-2012 development of the Mathiang 
Anyoor, an ethnically-homogenous parallel security force, undermined the spirit of an 
integrated security force and may have contributed to the ultimate failure of the process, 
as I argue in Chapter 6. 
 
Another reason integration failed was that elements within the SPLA resisted 
implementation of the process due to the fact that members of armed groups were 
essentially being rewarded for their defections with higher ranks and material benefits. 
Such inflated ranks distributed to officers formerly associated with armed groups diluted 
power of SPLA loyalists. As I argue in Chapters 4 and 6, the costs of defection from the 
SPLA were low and the benefits of integration were seemingly unlimited. The open-
ended nature of the integration process undermined the premise of justice and 
accountability, which implied that integration and accountability were mutually 
exclusive. Consequently, armed group leaders became entrepreneurs of rebellion and 
could continually use the threat of violence as a bargaining tool to extract professional 
and material benefits from the government. Moreover, remaining in or integrating into 
the SPLA was more financially viable than civilian reintegration, considering the limited 
availability of alternative livelihoods in post-war South Sudan. Open-ended military 
integration in the context of failed demobilization initiatives also meant that there was no 
release valve for the SPLA’s excess manpower, thus adding stress to the integration 
process as the primary means to address armed group violence. In addition, this 
defection-integration-defection cycle created an opportunity cost for SPLA operations 
and professionalization of the force. 
 
In Chapter 6, I argued there did not appear to be much long-term planning for military 
integration – especially on what the desired endstate was and what indications there 
might be that troops had been integrated and not simply collocated while maintaining 
command and control linkages to their previous armed group leaders. In this chapter, I 
argued that better strategic guidance on the part of the government could have allowed 
the military to articulate a budget, timelines for execution, metrics of success, a long-term 
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vision and connection to broader security sector reform, and areas for third party actors to 
plug in and provide support.  
 
Another reason I argue in Chapter 6 for why efforts to integrate armed groups into the 
SPLA failed was that third party actors involved in transforming South Sudan’s security 
sector had limited involvement in the integration process, which may have been 
attributed to a lack of awareness of the importance of implementing integration before 
advancing to security sector transformation. In addition, the ambiguity of South Sudan’s 
security sector during the interim period between the end of the Second Sudanese Civil 
War and South Sudan’s potential independence made it awkward to engage too much 
with the SPLA lest donors be perceived as endorsing the region’s de facto independence 
prior to the referendum. The level of financial investment required may have also been 
prohibitive for such donors, when coupled with traditional post-conflict areas of 
engagement.  
 
In Chapter 5, I discuss how the concurrent transformation and professionalization of the 
SPLA, which was contingent on a reduction in force, was intended to run parallel to 
demobilization initiatives. However, in this chapter, I articulated the multiple 
impediments to rightsizing the SPLA, which posed another constraint to the 
implementation of the military integration process. The SPLA was not sufficiently bought 
into the demobilisation process due to internal and external security concerns. Internally, 
they feared the threat potential posed by demobilising nonessential personnel into an 
economy that provided limited livelihoods outside of military or government service. 
Externally, with independence still on the horizon and not yet secured, and with post-
independence tensions along the border with Sudan, the SPLA believed that it was not in 
the country’s best interest to allow its military strength to atrophy. As a result, instead of 
reducing in size, the SPLA grew during the interim and post-independence periods, and 
due to the failure of demobilisation measures to reduce the size of the military, 
integration became the only reliable way of dealing with armed groups. As I mentioned 
in Chapter 5, depending on estimates of ghost soldiers on the payroll, the SPLA may 
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have grown from approximately 40,000 troops in 2005-2006 to in excess of 200,000 by 
the time the civil war broke out in 2013. 
 
Research Question 3: What are the wider lessons that can be drawn from South Sudan’s 
attempt at accommodating armed groups during its aborted transition from war to 
peace? 
 
Because South Sudan’s experience with military integration between 2006 and 2013 is a 
veritable case of how not to address the threat posed by non-statutory armed forces 
during a transition from war to peace, the research findings from this thesis have multiple 
implications from both academic and policy standpoints. 
 
It is difficult to assess whether military integration leads to sustainable peace. In Chapter 
3, I discussed how Krebs and Licklider (2015) found no evidence of causality between 
integration and sustainable peace, while Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) cautioned that 
failed integration was both a cause and a symptom of the failure of the broader peace 
process. Indeed, military integration can be a complex process with several moving parts, 
and can be challenging to implement given the fragile political, economic, and security 
contexts of most war-to-peace transitions. As the case of South Sudan demonstrates, the 
process can have short-term, stabilizing utility while posing long-term, destabilizing 
risks.  
 
According to the literature on military integration, the process is an interim, transitional 
measure that can temporarily contain former combatants in a statutory security apparatus 
so that they do not become spoilers during a transition from war to peace (Colletta and 
Muggah 2009). As such, the wider lesson based on the case of South Sudan is that 
military integration should not be an end in and of itself. Instead, the integration process 
should serve a purpose – be it consolidating power prior to a broader security sector 
reform process, fostering cohesion within a factionalised security force, or temporarily 
mitigating the risk that spoilers pose to stability in the aftermath of a conflict.  
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The literature on military integration also provides insights on the implementation of the 
process that shed light on wider lessons from the case of South Sudan. Glassmyer and 
Sambanis (2008) caution that many integration agreements are poorly structured and not 
fully implemented, while Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue that the successful 
implementation of military integration within five years of the end of conflict increases 
the prospects for lasting peace. Considering South Sudan’s experience with implementing 
a military integration process, one wider lesson is that it might be useful to articulate a 
plan for the implementation process that includes timelines for completion and metrics 
that indicate success, establishes quotas and limits on the number of personnel that can be 
sustainably integrated, projects estimated costs, highlights best practices based on 
previous iterations, and proposes how the military will foster cohesion to engender a 
national ethos to break chains of command from their previous armed group leaders. In 
addition, better strategic guidance for the integration process may prevent it from being 
too disconnected from the security sector reform process, which may prevent the new 
military from being built on an unstable foundation. In South Sudan, SPLA 
Transformation operated in a very disconnected manner from the remainder of the 
process and was not approached as a stage to implement en route to eventual SSR but 
rather as an end in and of itself. As a result of this weak foundation, the SPLA was thus 
more likely to fracture along ethnic lines, thus undermining the security sector reforms 
that preceded this disintegration.  
 
While an implementation plan could have helped pinpoint areas where third parties can 
plug in and offer mediation, logistical/financial/technical support, or act as guarantors of 
security between warring parties, the literature has not determined whether insufficient 
third party involvement in a military integration process contributes to the failure of a 
military integration process (Burgess 2008) or is insufficient to guarantee success 
(Licklider 2014). Several authors posit that third party actors can minimize the perceived 
risk of participating in the peace process (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta (2012), add 
confidence to fully implement peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), verify 
compliance with said agreements (Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Burgess 
2008), and compensate for gaps in knowledge or expertise (Dudouet, Giessmann and 
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Planta 2012). In the complex post-CPA environment, direct third party assistance to 
South Sudan’s integration process could have helped contribute to a more favourable 
long-term outcome. At the very least, such involvement would have been unlikely to hurt 
the implementation of the process. Likewise, third party involvement could may help 
compensate for the technical and financial deficits of post-conflict countries undergoing a 
military integration process and help build trust between former adversaries if they are 
perceived to be fair dealers.  
 
Another lesson from South Sudan’s experience with military integration is that the 
intervention of political and military elites can have a negative impact on the integrity of 
the process. In Chapter 4, I discussed how President Kiir’s decision to continually offer 
amnesty and integration to those who rebelled against the government is what led to the 
process becoming open-ended over time. President Kiir altered rank allocations in such a 
manner that was inconsistent with SPLA rules and regulations, thus manipulating the 
integration process to perpetually buy off armed opposition no matter the cost. In the 
same chapter, I highlighted how political-military elites would become involved in 
amnesty negotiations, thereby indicating how important ‘buying peace’ was to the 
government, thus increasing the bargaining power of armed group leaders. Consequently, 
armed actors would use violence, or merely the threat of violence to increase their power 
within state institutions, increase the amount of patronage under their control, or because 
they were overlooked for promotion or for placement in more influential posts. 
Meanwhile, the Government of South Sudan was concerned not only about the threat that 
non-SPLA groups would pose if not brought into the fold of the SPLA, but also about the 
social and security implications of demobilized former combatants. Knowing how 
desperately the Government of South Sudan needed to ‘buy peace’ for the sake of 
stability, armed group leaders could perpetually use the threat of violence as a bargaining 
tool to resolve political grievances and forestall compliance with the integration process. 
The lack of pressure on those participating in the military integration process and the fact 
that they were allowed to maintain control over their former combatants plus the benefits 
meant that the rewards of an open-ended integration cycle outweighed the risks of 
defection, as I argue in Chapter 6. 
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This dynamic highlights the Catch-22 aspect of the military integration process. On one 
hand, armed groups are integrated due to the imperative to buy peace and consolidate 
power; on the other hand, this process can undermine efforts to secure justice in the 
aftermath of conflict and risks creating a demonstration effect for armed group 
mobilization. Accordingly, another lesson from South Sudan’s experience with 
integration is that an open-ended integration process undermines justice and 
accountability mechanisms by failing to hold defectors accountable for betraying the 
military or committing human rights violations. In addition, by incentivizing armed group 
leaders to become entrepreneurs of rebellion, open-ended integration can be a burden on 
military financing in terms of increased personnel salaries, and can also undermine 
cohesion within the security forces due to defectors being rewarded with higher ranks 
while the career progression of loyalists is stalled. Continually rewarding defectors with 
integration into the military may mean that the military is unable to ‘graduate’ from the 
integration process and focus on professionalization. Another lesson is that the costs of 
defection must be higher than the costs of remaining in the national military in order to 
incentivize such entrepreneurial behavior. And while it may not be possible to either offer 
blanket amnesty or push for the prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abuses, 
governments facing this dilemma must decide where to draw the line between 
accommodation and accountability.   
 
Based on some of the SPLA’s reactions to the integration process, the case of South 
Sudan indicates that, as a central stakeholder, the military needs to be brought into the 
amnesty and integration decision-making process early and their equities need to be 
protected as much as possible so they are less likely to sabotage the implementation of 
the process. Absent such engagement, there is a danger that the military could 
marginalize and alienate members of armed groups who have been integrated, which 
could contribute to the development of armed rebellions in the future. In Chapter 6, I 
discussed allegations that some SPLA officers overtly or covertly sabotaged the 
implementation of the integration process in order to avoid rewarding defectors. Such 
officers viewed integration as contrary to the interests of their institution, as the excess 
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personnel costs created an opportunity cost for professionalization. In addition, the 
inflated ranks promised by the president made rank harmonization challenging and 
created disaffection within the cadre of long-time SPLA loyalists who saw defectors 
being rewarded for their disloyalty.  
 
The case of South Sudan also offers the lesson that cohesion within a newly integrated 
military is not necessarily organic. In fact, the leadership of the new military should 
determine how best to foster cohesion across political, social, and task dimensions in 
order to discourage newly integrated forces from acting in a parochial manner, encourage 
a sense of belonging to a national institution, and erode the allegiances and chains of 
command between members of armed groups and their former leaders. South Sudan’s 
political and military leadership neglected the need to foster cohesion along these 
dimensions during the military integration process. As a result, integration was a missed 
opportunity to replace the galvanizing aspect of opposition to the North, which gradually 
eroded the closer South Sudan got to achieving independence. Based on my own 
observations of contemporary plans to reconstitute security forces in the aftermath of 
conflicts in places such as the Central African Republic and Somalia, I can affirm that 
this remains an overlooked and poorly understood aspect of engagement during war-to-
peace transitions. In short, both national governments and the donor community seem to 
believe that cohesion within a newly reconstituted military can be willed into existence. 
 
While integration was an opportunity to introduce diversity into South Sudan’s security 
sector, it was a missed opportunity to create ethnic and regional balance. Thus, the lesson 
for other instances of military integration is that quotas, which were not employed in 
South Sudan, may be an important means by which to ensure that the new military is 
representative of the nation. In an interesting development, the lack of quotas in South 
Sudan meant that the Nuer ended up comprising a majority of the military despite being 
an ethnic minority. Arguably, the development of an ethnically homogenous parallel 
security force outside of the integration process can be traced to the ethnic imbalance 
within the SPLA and the notion that a given force might not protect the interests of the 
majority ethnic group, the Dinka. Contrary to the literature on military integration, 
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political exclusion and the establishment of parallel security forces can undermine the 
validity of the ‘insurance policy’ that armed groups get, assuming that being a part of the 
security forces minimizes the risk of the new military being used against either side.  
 
Finally, the case of South Sudan highlights the importance of having a release valve for 
the security sector during the integration process. When combined with failed 
demobilization initiatives, an open-ended integration process can increase pressure on the 
integration as the primary means of addressing armed group violence during war-to-
peace transitions. Consequently, military integration and demobilization initiatives need 
to be linked so that there is less pressure on military integration to address the threats 
posed by armed groups. A disconnect between integration and demobilization initiatives 
means that one process can outpace the other – such as the integration of armed groups 
outpacing ways to flush excess manpower out of the SPLA. A related lesson from the 
case of South Sudan is that demobilization needs to be financially competitive with a 
reliable military salary; in order for rightsizing to work, civilian reintegration has to be 
economically commensurate with remaining part of the military. Absent a financially 
compelling reason to leave the relative security of the military, the force will be saddled 
with excess manpower. The operational implications of this included having insufficient 
equipment, a lack of tactical and strategic mobility, and less of a willingness within the 
security forces to be more proactive in addressing security concerns across the country. 
The Role of Military Integration during War-to-Peace Transitions 
 
In Chapter 1, I stated that, after answering this thesis’ three research questions, I would 
discuss what the case of South Sudan tell us about the role military integration plays 
during war-to-peace transitions. 
 
Like South Sudan, many countries attempting a war-to-peace transition may have to deal 
with the outcome of exclusive peace negotiations, factionalized armed movements, and 
foreign support for potential spoilers. In these contexts, military integration can help such 
countries temporarily overcome post-conflict security dilemmas, resolve civil war-era 
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divisions, and build confidence between formerly warring parties – as was the case in 
South Sudan during the interim period. 
 
How the military integration process unfolded in South Sudan demonstrates how 
integration can avert conflict, as some observers note that the Juba Declaration may have 
averted another round of South-South conflict after the CPA was signed. In South Sudan, 
integration temporarily took potential spoilers off the battlefield and reduced the 
manpower available for armed group mobilization. In addition, this decision allowed the 
Government of South Sudan to outbid the Government of Sudan for the loyalty of 
potential spoilers to the peace process. Considering the wartime divisions in the South 
and the Government of Sudan’s use of non-SPLA armed groups to further destabilize the 
region, the case of South Sudan provides an empirical example of how military 
integration can serve an important purpose in the short term by allowing formerly 
warring parties to consolidate political-military power and overcome wartime divisions. 
From this example, we can also understand how the decision to seek political-military 
accommodation with former adversaries can allow governments undergoing war-to-peace 
transitions to achieve a goal that would have been harder, if not impossible, if they were 
to ignore or attempt to fight armed opponents. In the case of South Sudan, this goal was 
the 2011 referendum on self-determination, which secured the region’s independence 
after several decades of conflict within Sudan. 
 
That said, there is an argument to be made that military integration may merely postpone 
conflict, as the war that broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 was fought over the 
same sets of grievances that had been raised in 1991 during the Nasir coup and in 2004 in 
Rumbek, as detailed in Chapter 2. Thus, the case of South Sudan demonstrates that 
military integration may help avert conflict in the short term, but it is by no means a 
permanent solution. Moreover, military integration, as shown in this case study, also 
cannot overcome failed efforts at political accommodation. The case of South Sudan 
demonstrates how military power-sharing arrangements can become more vulnerable 
when political power-sharing arrangements start to erode. This was the case in 2010-2011 
after the SPLM’s exclusionary electoral practices prompted multiple rebellions, and again 
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in 2013, as the politics of South Sudan became more exclusionary and the SPLA became 
embroiled in a political conflict between President Kiir and former Vice President 
Machar.  
 
South Sudan’s experience with military integration also demonstrates how a military 
integration process during a transition from war to peace can be an attempt to rectify an 
exclusive peace process. Members of non-SPLA armed groups were excluded from the 
peace process that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but were able to 
participate in the new political-military dispensation through the Juba Declaration and 
subsequent amnesty and integration agreements. Yet, while integration provided many of 
these groups some level of assurance that the new security force would not be used 
against them, the case of South Sudan shows how the notional trust that can be built 
during an integration process can be undermined by the creation of ethnically 
homogenous parallel security forces outside the military’s normal chain of command, 
such as the Mathiang Anyoor. 
 
Besides its inclusive function, the military integration process in South Sudan also 
diversified the SPLA’s manpower base by integrating primarily Nuer members of non-
SPLA armed groups into the command structure of the new national military. In this 
respect, we can see an example of how integration can attempt to counteract some of the 
ethnically polarizing elements of the Second Sudanese Civil War within the South. That 
said, the case of South Sudan demonstrates that integration alone cannot resolve ethnic 
factionalism, but that during the integration process, the new military must initiate efforts 
to foster cohesion along political, task, and social dimensions. This sort of cohesion may 
be an asset once the military embarks on a broader security sector reform process. 
 
The case of South Sudan demonstrates the risk that the integration of armed groups poses 
to overwhelming a post-conflict military, and highlights the importance of having a 
means by which to flush excess manpower out of the statutory security forces. The failure 
of demobilization initiatives to get off the ground in South Sudan indicates that 
integration may be best executed in a dual-track fashion so as to minimize the pressure on 
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the integration process as the primary means by which to address the actual or latent 
threat of armed conflict. Therefore, it is important during war-to-peace transitions that 
include military integration, for there to be concurrent demobilisation options that are as 
economically viable as remaining in the military in order to manage potential spoilers to 
the peace agreement. 
 
Finally, referenced in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Krebs (2014) argues that the failure of 
military integration can be the ‘canary in the coalmine’, or an early indication that a 
peace process is in decline, but not the cause of renewed violence. The disintegration of 
the military integration process in South Sudan certainly fits this mold. While integration 
contributed to a period of relative stability during the interim period, there were other 
factors that contributed to this atmosphere – among them, high-level diplomatic 
engagement and economic support from the international community, and incentives 
within the South to keep the majority of its divisive tendencies subdued until after 
independence. In this respect, we can conclude that integration may not itself cause 
peace, but can contribute to a peaceful atmosphere during a transition from war to peace. 
Furthermore, the gradual disintegration of the military integration process from the 
2010/11 rebellions until the outbreak of war can be understood as an indication that 
South-South accommodation was in decline, which aligns with Krebs’ argument.  
Contributions to the Field 
 
This thesis makes several contributions that advance the academic study and practical 
application of military integration as a potential peace-building mechanism during war-
to-peace transitions. 
 
Some of my contributions to the field are based on the examination of the case of South 
Sudan itself, which was based on information that was previously not well documented or 
collated. The interviews I conducted with individuals who played a direct role in the 
implementation of the military integration process provide useful insights as to why this 
approach was pursued, how it was implemented, why it succeeded in the short term, and 
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why it ultimately failed in the long term. Thus, this thesis’ examination of South Sudan’s 
experience with military integration contributes to a body of literature that has largely 
been focused on DDR and SSR processes. 
 
This thesis also provides a deeper analysis of an ‘inside-out’ approach to how former 
combatants themselves attempt to consolidate peace. In this thesis, the South Sudanese 
government and security forces play a primary role, whereas the focus on third party 
actors such as the United Nations, United States, and United Kingdom is secondary. This 
stands in contrast to much of the literature on war-to-peace transitions that focuses on the 
roles that external actors play in shaping the environment, and not enough, in my opinion, 
on the roles that individuals and groups in the country itself play in shaping the post-
conflict outcome.  
 
This thesis also fills a critical gap in understanding the role that bringing armed groups 
into statutory security frameworks plays in countries transitioning from war to peace. 
Unlike the existing body of literature on military integration, which casts the process as 
good or bad, this thesis has demonstrated how integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice 
for a country attempting a transition from war to peace. As one considers how to address 
armed groups during such transitions, it is useful to think of accommodation through 
integration as a potentially lesser evil than fighting or ignoring armed groups. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, I argue that the Government of South Sudan could either 
fight, ignore, or accommodate armed groups. The government largely chose 
accommodation, the option with the fewest immediate drawbacks, which afforded them 
short-term stability and helped them achieve independence through the referendum on 
self-determination. 
 
In the context of the increasing use of military integration as an element of contemporary 
peace agreements, this thesis also illuminates why military integration can benefit short 
term peace consolidation as a transitional measure, but can become destabilizing if 
approached as an end in and of itself. Again, integration is not good or bad; such 
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characterization depends on the purpose the process serves during particular points of the 
war-to-peace transition. 
 
An additional contribution that this thesis makes to the field is that when confronted with 
failed demobilization initiatives, an open-ended integration process can increase the 
pressure on the integration process as the primary means by which to address the threat of 
armed groups. Furthermore, an open-ended military integration process can make it 
harder for a military to ‘graduate’ from the process and focus on cohesion and 
professionalization, making the military prone to fracturing when political-military 
power-sharing arrangements fall apart. 
 
Finally, this thesis also singles out military integration as a distinct subset of security 
sector reform and posits that integration can be considered a foundation of broader 
security sector reform during negotiated settlements to armed conflict. However, the 
analysis provided on the case of South Sudan in this thesis warns of a disconnect between 
the military integration process and broader security sector reform, which meant that the 
security sector was being built on an unstable foundation. 
Additional Research 
 
Due to the outbreak of civil war near the outset of my research, I was not able to tap into 
the insights of current or former rebel leaders who had gone through the integration 
process. As a result, I believe that future research on this topic could benefit from their 
perspectives on the implementation of the process and whether their experiences 
contributed to their decision to defect.  
 
As academics and policymakers in this field continually expand their analyses of military 
integration during war-to-peace transitions, cross-national comparisons might provide 
useful insights on how integrating non-statutory armed forces into statutory security 
frameworks might play out in contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan, the Central African 
Republic, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen. Specifically, there should be further 
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examination along the lines of the functional subsets of military integration that I have 
conceptualized throughout this thesis. Potential research questions include: 
• Under what conditions can military power-sharing persist when other power 
sharing arrangements have collapsed? 
• Is there a particular dimension through which a military can foster cohesion that 
contributes to a more favourable military integration outcome? 
• In what circumstances might a particular type of third party support (i.e., 
technical, financial, logistical) be most effective? 
• How should practitioners effectively integrate military integration and security 




Epilogue: The Future of Military Integration in South Sudan 
As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, one of the bookends for my analysis was 
the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war in December 2013. In the body of this thesis, I 
have laid out the history of military integration in South Sudan between 2006 and 2013 
and offered an assessment as to the peaks and pitfalls of this approach when it comes to 
managing the threats posed by armed groups. Based on this analysis and the evolution of 
South Sudan’s civil war, I will now give an overview of the military power-sharing 
arrangements in the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in South 
Sudan (ARCSS) and speculate on the future prospects for military power-sharing in 
South Sudan. 
 
Following over a year of international pressure, the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition as the representative of 
the armed opposition in South Sudan, the Former Detainees,683 and representatives of the 
other political parties in South Sudan signed the Agreement on the Resolution on the 
Conflict in South Sudan. Guarantors to the peace agreement included IGAD heads of 
state and government, the African Union–High Level Ad hoc Committee for South Sudan 
and African Union Commission, and international partners as witnesses, including a 
representative of the United Nations. 
 
Chapter II (Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements) of the ARCSS 
addresses the issues most relevant to future plans for reconstituting and rightsizing the 
                                                
683 The term ‘Former Detainees’ refers to a group of prominent politicians arrested by the South Sudanese 
government in the early days of the conflict and accused of complicity with Riek Machar’s alleged coup 
attempt. These individuals were subsequently released and participated in the IGAD-mediated peace 
process in Addis Ababa as a bloc representing the non-armed political opposition. This group of Former 
Detainees included: Pagan Amum (former Secretary General of the SPLM), Deng Alor Kuol (former 
Minister of Cabinet Affairs), John Luk Jok (former Minister of Justice), Majak D’Agoot (former Deputy 
Minister of Defence), Oyay Deng Ajak (former Minister of National Security), Kosti Manibe (former 
Minister of Finance), Gier Chuang Along (former Minister of Internal Affairs), Cirino Hiteng (former 
Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports), Madut Biar Yel (former Minister of Telecommunications), and 
Chol Tong Mayay (former governor of Lakes state). Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (former presidential 
advisor and widow of John Garang) later aligned with the Former Detainee bloc without formally joining, 
although her son Mabior became the spokesman for SPLM-IO. Peter Adwok Nyaba (former Minister of 
Higher Education, Science and Technology) and Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth (former head of mission for the 
Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the United States) were also detainees, but subsequently joined 
ranks with the armed opposition. 
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security forces, as well as broader security sector transformation.684 Some highlights that 
may be relevant to the future of military power-sharing in South Sudan are as follows: 
• Article 2 (Separation, Assembly, and Cantonment) stipulates that within 30 days 
of the signing of the peace agreement, warring parties should separate, assemble, 
and place forces in cantonment in order to enable accountability, screening, 
reorganization, disarmament and demobilization, during which said forces would 
receive non-military logistical supplies.  
• Article 3 (National Architecture for Permanent Ceasefire) stipulates that a 
Temporary National Architecture for the Implementation of Permanent Ceasefire 
would oversee the unification of the ‘National Defence Forces of South Sudan’ 
and other security forces. 
• Article 5 (Transitional Security Arrangements) stipulates that only Presidential 
Guards, Joint Integrated Police, and guards assigned to protect military barracks, 
bases, and warehouses were allowed to be within a 25km radius of Juba. 
• Article 6 (Strategic Defence and Security Review) stipulates that a comprehensive 
assessment of South Sudan’s security sector will be undertaken, to include future 
command structures, security force functions, size, composition, budget, and 
DDR requirements. A Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board 
would then articulate a Roadmap for Security Sector Transformation, to include 
the unification of the security forces, DDR, and security sector reform.   
• Article 7 (Unification of Forces) stipulates that the Temporary National 
Architecture for the Implementation of Permanent Ceasefire would oversee the 
process of unifying the country’s security forces, which was to be completed 
within 18 months. Based on the outcome of the SDSR assessment, full DDR was 
to be conducted after reunification, although special cases would go through the 
DDR process prior to reunification. 
 
                                                
684 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South 




Eight months after the ARCSS was signed, former Vice President Riek Machar returned 
to Juba as First Vice President in a Government of National Unity. However, just over 
two months later, in July 2016, fighting again broke out in Juba, prompting Machar to 
once again flee the capital. The following month, Machar was rescued by UN forces in 
the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo following several weeks of pursuit 
by government forces through the bush. After a brief recovery in Sudan, Machar has 
since been a ‘guest’ of the South African government and there are allegations that his 
movements throughout the continent are being physically and diplomatically blocked in 
order to prevent him from stirring up further trouble in South Sudan. 
 
As it appears at the moment, the events of July 2016 and the aftermath were a watershed 
in South Sudan’s conflict. In late July, Taban Deng Gai replaced Machar as First Vice 
President in the Government of National Unity. Although Deng notionally represented 
the SPLM-IO faction of the government, many speculated that this development was 
instead a palace coup to cut Machar out of the government and weaken the opposition 
while strengthening Deng’s own power. In addition, Machar’s flight through Equatoria 
prompted government forces to commence extremely violent clearing operations, 
opening up a new conflict front in a region that had largely been immune to the violence 
that had afflicted other parts of the country since December 2013. There has also been 
some speculation that such operations were reprisals for the Equatorians allowing, or 
perhaps more precisely not actively resisting Machar’s path of escape. In addition, the 
transitional security arrangements in the August 2015 peace agreement had encouraged 
the mobilisation of armed groups in the Equatorias so that they could benefit, through 
cantonment as SPLM-IO forces and eventual integration into the SPLA, from what was 
essentially perceived to be a Dinka-Nuer power-sharing pact that had excluded those 
residing in the southern region of the country.685 Towards the end of 2016, approximately 
3,500 people were fleeing South Sudan daily amid reports of government forces razing 
villages throughout Equatoria. By early 2017, Bidi Bidi refugee camp in Uganda had 
                                                
685 Alan Boswell, “Spreading Fallout The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-
DRC Border,” Issue Brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (Small Arms 
Survey, May 2017), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB28-
Spreading-Fallout.pdf. 
 220 
become the largest refugee camp in the world, with an estimated population exceeding 
270,000 people as of June 2017.686 
 
At the same time, when compared with previous years, South Sudan has slipped from the 
international community’s radar, despite warnings of ethnic cleansing towards the end of 
2016 and the declaration of famine in two counties in what was formerly Unity state in 
February 2017. One reason for this is donor fatigue with South Sudan’s political-military 
elite, which appears not to be genuinely interested in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Another reason was the flurry of political transitions at the beginning of 2017, with a new 
United Nations Secretary General, African Union Chairperson, and presidential 
administration in the United States. Considering this trajectory, the ARCSS is on life 
support, yet this is yet to be acknowledged or accepted by the negotiators and guarantors 
in the international community who pushed reluctant parties to sign the agreement in the 
first place.  
 
As of this writing, the armed opposition is as weak and fractured as it has ever been 
during the course of the civil war. This means that not only does it have little incentive to 
place trust in a unity government and reunified security forces, but it also lacks the 
negotiating power to be integrated on terms its members might find advantageous. In 
order to regain relative power, the opposition would have to re-establish a conduit of 
external support. At the outset of the conflict, this would have naturally come from the 
Government of Sudan, however, Sudan appears to have calculated in the latter half of 
2016 that it was much more advantageous to pursue actions that would allow it to ‘come 
out from the cold’ after two decades of a strict sanctions regime imposed by the West in 
response to the country’s previous support for terrorist organizations and its campaign of 
genocide in Darfur. One of these such actions, according to the terms of a five-track 
plan687 between the Obama Administration and the Government of Sudan, includes 
                                                
686 “Uganda May Be Best Place in the World to Be a Refugee. But That Could Change without More 
Money.,” Washington Post, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/20/uganda-may-be-best-place-in-the-
world-to-be-a-refugee-but-that-could-change-without-more-money/. 
687 “United States Lifting Select Sanctions on Sudan,” U.S. Department of State, accessed May 26, 2017, 
//2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/01/266946.htm. 
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agreeing to cease support to South Sudanese rebel movements. This has essentially 
starved South Sudan’s armed opposition of support, and is one of the reasons Machar has 
had difficulties regrouping the opposition or using Khartoum as a platform since his 
escape from Juba. Sudan’s deal with the United States is likely to be upheld under the 
new administration, and it is equally likely that this will continue to deter the 
Government of Sudan from supporting the armed opposition in South Sudan. In addition, 
it is also possible that other regional powers such as Ethiopia, Uganda, or Egypt may 
eventually decide that it is in their economic or security interests to intervene to tip the 
balance in favour of either the government or armed opposition. As of this writing, there 
is speculation that Egypt may throw its support to the Government of South Sudan in 
order to diplomatically and militarily encircle Ethiopia as the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam is completed in the coming years.688 (The dam is being constructed on 
the Blue Nile, and Egypt believes that the filling of the dam and the evaporation of water 
from the reservoir will have a negative impact on downstream water flows, thereby 
threatening the country’s water security.) There is also speculation that Ethiopia may 
decide to back a new wave of Equatorian armed opposition, having become fed up with 
the destructive Kiir-Machar struggle for power. What appears to be increasingly likely is 
the potential expansion of what has long been a regional proxy war amidst a moribund 
peace process and a catastrophic humanitarian outlook.  
 
Yet recent months (as of July 2017) there have been indications of limited progress. In 
May 2017, the Government of South Sudan declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced 
its intent to launch a National Dialogue with opposition groups. During the same month, 
President Kiir dismissed SPLA Chief of Army Staff General Paul Malong, who by his 
somewhat overblown reputation had been responsible for some of the most egregious 
decisions the government had made since his appointment in April 2014. In his place, 
Kiir appointed General James Ajongo, who by reputation, lacks the baggage that Malong 
had domestically and within the donor community. 
 
                                                
688 Payton Knopf, “If Trump Does Nothing, 50% of South Sudan’s Population Could Soon Be Gone,” The 
Guardian, May 22, 2017, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/22/donald-
trump-50-percent-south-sudan-population. 
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That said, these changes appear to be a façade, and there continue to be indications that 
the Government of South Sudan is not making good faith efforts towards a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. During the May 2017 SPLA reshuffle, Lieutenant General 
Marial Chanuong, former commander of the Presidential Guard who was responsible for 
some of the events that accelerated the crisis in December 2013, including the Juba 
massacre, was promoted as head of the Ground Forces. For his previous endeavours 
during the conflict, Chanuong had been sanctioned by the United States and the United 
Nations Security Council. On the humanitarian front, in spite of the determination in June 
2017 that parts of South Sudan were no longer experiencing famine, the number of 
people facing ‘emergency’ levels of food insecurity (one level below a famine 
declaration) increased from 5.5 million to 6 million people – half of South Sudan’s 
population. In addition, there are now almost two million South Sudanese refugees in the 
region689 and approximately a quarter of a million people seeking refuge in UNMISS 
Protection of Civilians camps in Bor, Malakal, Juba UN House, Bor, Melut, and Wau.690 
Meanwhile, the Government of South Sudan continued to impede access into areas with 
opposition presence and otherwise hamper the humanitarian response by charging a 
$3,500 registration fee for non-governmental organizations responding to the 
population’s needs. 
 
The collapse of the peace agreement in July 2016 demonstrated one of the shortcomings 
of the plan for the reunification of South Sudan’s security forces. While there were 
guarantors of the ARCSS on paper, none possessed the neutrality, credibility, clout, and 
the willingness to employ military force to constrain warring parties from violating the 
peace agreement. This shortcoming was on full display when fighting again broke out in 
Juba between government forces and those of the opposition in July 2016. The United 
Nations, long viewed with suspicion in South Sudan, again failed to contain the violence; 
their restricted freedom of motion was exemplified by the delayed UNMISS attempts to 
secure clearance from the SPLA to medevac wounded Chinese peacekeepers to a Level 2 
                                                
689 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR South Sudan Situation,” 
UNHCR South Sudan Situation, accessed July 1, 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php. 
690 “UNMISS PoC Update No. 169,” Text, ReliefWeb, (June 20, 2017), http://reliefweb.int/report/south-
sudan/unmiss-poc-update-no-169. 
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hospital at the UN base a mere 15km away from where they had been injured to receive 
live-saving treatment. (In the end, the Chinese contingent had to leverage their bilateral 
relationship with the government to secure clearance, although this was not soon enough 
for two of the peacekeepers who bled out after 16 hours without medical assistance.) 
 
The manner in which UNMISS forces reacted to the outbreak of violence in July – 
abandoning their posts along the perimeters of some of the Protection of Civilian (POC) 
camps – reflected previous problems that had occurred within such camps earlier that 
year in Malakal. One of the proposed solutions to attempt to repair the peace agreement 
after the outbreak of fighting in July was the deployment of a 4,000-strong Regional 
Protection Force (RPF) to secure Juba so that opposition forces could return and assume 
their positions in the Government of National Unity. However, as of this writing (July 
2017), this force is minimally closer to deploying to Juba than they were when initially 
proposed almost a year ago. For the foreseeable future, I would expect that the 
government will continue to obstruct this deployment with little chance of negative 
ramifications. As evidence of the weak negotiating power of international guarantors to 
the ARCSS, paper tiger threats to impose an arms embargo on the government should it 
fail to sufficiently comply with the RPF deployment failed to secure sufficient votes in 
the UN Security Council in December 2016. The halting RPF deployment and the 
baggage of UNMISS failures to protect civilians in South Sudan raise the question of 
how credible such forces could be as guarantors of security during a future notional 
reunification of the security forces. 
 
This is all to say that despite a few recent indications that the situation in South Sudan is 
on the rebound, it continues to be an extremely challenging context for the resolution of 
the conflict, and an even more challenging context for any efforts to integrate any armed 
opposition into the SPLA. Given the current state of affairs, and especially with the last 
attempt at putting South Sudan back together failing so spectacularly, I would conclude 
that the prospects for military integration in the near future appear to be dim. As of this 
writing, warring parties in South Sudan have not yet concluded that they cannot win 
militarily. If one were to understand South Sudan’s pathways to military integration 
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according to the options I laid out in this thesis, warring parties are still fixated on 
fighting rather than ignoring or accommodating one another. In order for this to change, 
the current combatants must again calculate that integration is their least bad option or 
one side must be defeated militarily.  
 
Yet, even if combatants were to pursue a military integration arrangement, they would 
face several impediments. Not only is there a serious deficit in trust that would 
undermine any future attempts at integration, but donor nations are also becoming 
increasingly sceptical of further non-humanitarian investment in South Sudan given the 
unfavourable prospects for peace. I do not foresee many countries determining that South 
Sudan warrants sufficient geostrategic importance to warrant significant logistical, 
financial, or technical support to a future integration process. Likewise, considering the 
escalating violence in many parts of the country, I would not think it likely that donor 
nations would risk making their personnel guarantors of security in order to compensate 
for the trust deficit between government forces, SPLM-IO forces, and other armed 
movements that may or may not have been party to the August 2015 peace deal. 
 
In addition, as I mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there are some in South Sudan’s 
national security apparatus who adhere to the hardline view that accommodation through 
military integration caused the current conflict. To a less extreme extent, there are those 
who believe that the government’s emphasis on ‘buying peace’ ultimately failed, and 
they have not pursued the line of inquiry as to what went wrong in order to understand 
what the government and the security forces could do to avoid repeating past mistakes if 
integration, amalgamation, or reunification were to be attempted again. Moreover, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether third party actors have themselves learned the lessons from 
South Sudan’s previous experience with integration and have accordingly made 
integration and concurrent demobilization mechanisms the primary foundations of future 
security sector reform efforts. Consequently, I am not optimistic that South Sudan is in a 
position to implement integration in a way that could decrease the threat posed by non-
SPLA groups in the near future.  
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Appendix A: CPA Protocol on Security Arrangements  
Whereas the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (the Parties) have been conducting 
negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya, since 2nd September, 2003 under the auspices of the 
IGAD Peace Process; and  
 
Whereas the Parties reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive 
resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan as set forth in the Machakos 
Protocol of 20th July 2002; and  
 
Now Record That within the above context, the Parties have reached specific agreement 
on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, the initialed text of which is 
annexed hereto and which will be subsequently incorporated into the final Peace 
Agreement; and  
 
It Is Agreed And Confirmed That the Parties shall immediately resume negotiations on 
the remaining outstanding issues and subsequently negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire 
agreement in order to achieve a final, comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan.  
 
__________________________ 
Hon. Idris Mohamed Abdelgadir 
For: The Government of the Sudan 
__________________________ 
Cdr. Pa'gan Amum Oklech 




Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo (Rtd) 
Special Envoy 
IGAD Sudan Peace Process and 
On behalf of the IGAD Envoys  
 
Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period 
Between The Government of the Sudan (GOS) and The Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)  
 
1. Status of the Two Armed Forces:  
1. In the context of a united Sudan, and should the result of the referendum on 
self-determination confirm unity, the Parties (the Government of the Sudan and 
the Sudan People's Liberation  
Movement and Army) agree to the formation of the future army of Sudan that 
shall be composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Army (SPLA).  
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2. As part of a peace agreement and in order to end the war, the Parties agree that 
the two forces, the SAF and the SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim 
Period, and further agree that both forces shall be considered and treated equally 
as Sudan's National Armed Forces during the Interim Period taking into 
consideration 1 (c) below.  
3. The parties agree to the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on 
both sides, at a suitable time, following the completion of the comprehensive 
ceasefire arrangements.  
4. The national Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate 
except in constitutionally specified emergencies.  
 
2. Ceasefire:  
The parties agree to an internationally monitored ceasefire which shall come into effect 
from the date of signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Details of the Ceasefire 
Agreement shall be worked out by the two parties together with the IGAD mediators and 
international experts.  
 
3. Redeployment:  
1. The two forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed as 
will be detailed in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.  
2. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the forces of 
SAF currently deployed in the South shall be redeployed North of the 
South/North border of 1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance 
within and up to two and one half years (2 1/2) from the beginning of the pre-
Interim Period.  
3. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the SPLA 
forces currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be 
redeployed South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the 
Joint/Integrated Units are formed and deployed under international monitoring 
and assistance.  
4. The SPLM/A undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those 
currently serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various 
institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA 
soldiers.  
5. The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international 
community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by 
the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of the forces as agreed in 1(c), 3(d) 
and 7(b).  
 
4. Joint/Integrated Units:  
There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during 
the Interim Period. The Joint/Integrated Units shall constitute a nucleus of a post 
referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise 
they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.  
4.1 Elaboration On Joint/Integrated Units:  
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a. Their Character:-  
They should have a new character based on a common doctrine.  
b. Their Functions:-  
i. They will be a symbol of national unity during the Interim Period.  
ii. They will be a symbol of sovereignty during the Interim Period.  
iii. They will participate in the defense of the country together with the 
two forces.  
iv. They will provide a nucleus of a post Interim Period future army of the 
Sudan should the vote of referendum confirm unity.  
v. They shall be involved in the reconstruction of the country.  
c. Size and Deployment:  
The size and deployment of the Joint/Integrated Units throughout the Interim 
Period shall be as indicated below:-  
1. Southern Sudan: twenty four thousands (24,000) 2. Nuba Mountains: 
six thousands (6,000) 
3. Southern Blue Nile: six thousands (6,000) 
4. Khartoum: three thousands (3,000)  
5. Eastern Sudan:-  
a. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan to South 
of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 shall be completed within 
one (1) year from the beginning of the pre-Interim period.  
b. The parties shall discuss the issue of establishing 
Joint/Integrated Units.  
 
5. Command and Control of the Two Forces:  
1. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the 
Presidency, and shall be comprised of the chiefs of staff of the two forces, their 
deputies and any number of senior officers to be agreed to by the parties. It shall 
take its decisions by consensus and it shall be chaired alternately by the respective 
Chiefs of Staff.  
2. Functions of JDB: The JDB shall perform the following functions:  
a. Co-ordination between the two forces.  
b. Command of the Joint Integrated Units.  
 
6. Common Military Doctrine:  
The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint/Integrated 
Units as well as a basis for a post Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum 
vote is in favour of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year 
from the beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the 
SPLA (in the South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) 
will be based on this common doctrine.  
 
7. Status of Other Armed Groups In the Country:  
1. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the 
two forces.  
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2. The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify 
shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, 
Prisons and Wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil 
service and civil society institutions.  
3. The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country 
with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and 
to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.  
 
8. National Security Organs and Police forces:  
Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, 
and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing 
arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.  
 
Done at Lake Naivasha Simba Lodge Date: Thursday, September 25th, 2003  
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Appendix B: Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces  




The SPLA and SSDF having met in Juba between the 6th and 8th January, 2006 and fully 
aware of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) regarding the 
status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s).  
• Committed to upholding and defending the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
its full implementation;  
• Motivated by their desire for peace, reconciliation and unity among the people of 
Southern Sudan;  
• Determined to end all forms of conflict and hostilities among themselves, so as to 
usher a new era of hope, stability and sustainable development in Southern Sudan;  
• Further determined to build trust and confidence among themselves and to avoid 
past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict between 
themselves and among the people of Southern Sudan in general;  
• Cognizant of the fact that the SPLM led Government has already included 
members of the SSDF in the institutions of Government of National Unity, the 
Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States to ensure 
SSDF participation;  
• Acknowledging that the people of Southern Sudan have one indivisible destiny;  
• Inspired by the struggle and the immense sacrifices and suffering of our people in 
defence of their land, freedom, dignity, culture identity and common history; and  
• Remembering our fallen heroes, heroines and martyrs who paid the ultimate price 
for the freedom of our people and to ensure that these sacrifices are not in vain;  
 
Do hereby make the following Declaration to be known as the Juba Declaration on 
Unity and Integration:  
 
• Complete and unconditional unity between the SPLA and SSDF.  
• Agree to immediately integrate their two forces to form one unified, non-partisan 
Army under the name of SPLA as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.  
• Immediate and total cessation of all forms of hostilities and to ensure that all their 
forces and persons under their control observe and comply with this declaration.  
• Guarantee freedom of movement of people, goods and services in all areas in 
Southern Sudan.  
• Declaration of general amnesty covering any criminal acts committed during the 
past period of hostilities between the two forces.  
• Appeal to any armed persons or groups outside the two forces to join the process 
of unity and reconciliation in order to promote peace, stability and development 
throughout Southern Sudan.  
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• The unified Movement shall mobilize the people of Southern Sudan behind this 




In implementation of this declaration the two parties agree to form the following 
committees: 
 
1. High Political Committee 
 
There shall be a High Political Committee to oversee the overall implementation of this 
unity agreement. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of 
SPLA in consultation with Major- General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the 
SSDF.  
 
2. Military Technical Committee  
 
There shall be established a Military Technical Committee consisting of equal numbers to 
implement the terms of this declaration. It shall be established by the Chairman of the 
SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, 
Chief of Staff of the SSDF. The Joint Military Technical Committee shall report to the 
High Political Committee and handle inter alia the following issues:  
• Integration of SSDF into the SPLA and its command structures and all its 
component units including the Joint Integration Units.  
• Harmonisation of ranks and deployment of forces and to report to the principals.  
• Handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing of forces in accordance with the 
provisions of the CPA.  
• Report to the High Political Committee on all matters relating to this Unity 
Declaration. 
 
3. Administrative and Civil Service Committee  
 
This committee shall deal with the integration of non military personnel of SSDF into the 
Civil Service of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States.  
 
Call on the National Congress Party and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) calls upon its partner the 
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to support this 
agreement which has been guided by the provision of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s). The decision by the 
SSDF to be integrated into the SPLA is a legitimate decision which will consolidate 
peace and security in Southern Sudan and the Sudan at large. The two parties signatory to 
the agreement call on all other Sudanese political forces to support this declaration.  
 
Appeal to the International Community  
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The two parties also appeal to the international community to support this agreement as it 
will consolidate peace in the Sudan and bring about lasting peace among the people of 
Southern Sudan.  
• H.E Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, 
Chief of Staff of Southern Sudan, Chairman of the SPLM and Commander- in-
Chief of SPLA.  
• Major General Paulino Matip Nhial President of the Government of South Sudan 
Defence Force (SSDF)  
 
Witnessed by  
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